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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The difference between the 'practical' and the
•theoreti cal' in school administration and the re
lationship between the two is up for renewed dis
cussion. This kind of argument used to be pretty
mu ch localized to exchanges between professors and
their students. When they left the campus, many
students felt they had escaped the ivory tower of
theory to enter the •real' world of practi ce.
This is no longer the case.

Interest in practical theory and in sound
theoretical pra ctice has been widely stirred with
in the past few years. The studies and confer
ences of the Cooperative Project on Educational
Administration has related practitioners and pro
fessors directly and in great number. This re
lationship promises to continue as the Committee
for the Advancement of School Administration ex
tends consideration of what is good practice and
what is sound theory throughout the profession
nationally. l

The preceding statement by Van Miller seems to set

forth accurately some important considerations by school ad
ministrators, professors of educational administration,

so cial scientists and students.of school administration.

There is a vast range of opinions regarding the nature of

administrative theory and of administrative practice in edu
cation, whether there is an interdependent relationship
lvan Miller, "The Pra cti cal Art of Using Theory,"
S chool Executive, LXXVII (June, 1958), 60.

2
between the two or if there exists a sharp dichotomy.

The entirety of this study was a detailed examination

of the nature and structure or theory; however, because of

wide differences in the interpretation of theory, it seemed

important at the outset to give some clarity to the inter

pretation which was adhered to throughout this study.

To

clarify the position taken, some postulates are set forth in

the following paragraphs.
1.

Theory cannot be disassociated from the human

process of theorizing.

This postulate may appear to be self

evident; however, there is substantial evidence to suppose

that some writers would be unwilling to accept it.

Much has

been written about administrative theory, educational theory,

and social theory, but tar less has been written about the
pro cess ot theorizing.

Consequently, theory has taken on a

neutral, detached meaning, which is readily discernible from

investigations of the various one line or one paragraph

It could be said that theory is

definitions given to theory.

the product of theorizing by the theorist, a definition not

as absurd as it may sound.

The only absurdity is the attempt

to c ommunicate meaning of abstractions through short defini
tions.

Even the product or the theorist to be of maximum

usefulness tor another person must be literally re-theorized

by him.

This discussion leads us to the next postulate

which is related to the.first.

3
2.

Theorizing is� interdependent combination

deductive and inductive processes.

or

This postulate is meant

to thwart immediate engagement by the reader in mentally
dichotomizing the two processes.

in various forms.

Sueh a dichotomy erupts

The more .frequent ones being (1) "theory

starts with deduction " versus "theory starts with induetion"; (2) "theory building is a mental process" versus

"theory building is a physical (through experience} process";
-

-

and (3) "theory building is an observational process" versus
"theory building is a logical process. "

Certainly no at-

tempt was made to avoid consideration of these issues.

The

postulate is made ror the purpose of freeing the reader tor

concentration on what appeared to be more logical considera
tions of theory building.

3.

Theorizing is .fundamentally and primarily� pur

poseful activity.

This postulate has a host ot in.ferences

and implications within the milieu or theory controversies.

It seemed more appropriate, however, to draw the inferences
and make the implications in subsequent sections or the

study where more lo.gical relationships may be shown.

The

point was made here to eliminate the notion that theorizing

is an activity cont'ined to the charlatan on the one hand and
to the busy worker on the other hand.

or course, there are

degrees of quality or theorizing; thus, the purposes of the
theorizer may be on a very low level.

4.

relevance.

4

Theorizing is .2B � continuum of space, time, and

Some theories are more comprehensive and general

than others; some are ot more immediate use than others; and
some are more useful.than others.

Also, there are specific

theories of an individual act of administrative behavior,

more general theories about administrative processes, still
more general theories of social interaction, and finally
theories of a broad philosophical nature.

Here again, this postulate has some far-reaching in

ferences in theory controversies which were postponed tor

later treatment.

Suffice it to say here that dichotomizing

scientific theory and philosophic theory is an unfruitful,
perhaps an impossible, activity.

Of course, tor clarity,

it is necessary to specify what it is one is theorizing

about; but to claim a priority on theory tor the philosopher

or for the scientist gets one nowhere.
B.

ment

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS A
.
FOCUS OF STUDY

With the foregoing introduction regarding the treat

or theory, the next logical inquiry would be to examine

its relevance to the study of educational administration.

An implied concern about administrative leadership

has existed as long as there has been concern for education,
however, this concern historically has not been focused on

5
administration.

As a matter of fact, school administration

is a fairly recent arrival in American education.

At the midpoint of the nineteenth century very
few communities employed superintendents of
schools. • • •
�aving just been created by citi
zens vho had come to realize that the direction or
education called for knowledge and skills not
possessed by laymen, it Liehool administratioy was
cautiously but resolutely establishing itself on
the educational frontier. 2
The American Association of School Administrators

{AASA) was organized in 1865; at that time the organization

was known as the National Ass ociation of School Superintend
ents. 3

'!'his professional ass ociation of superintendents

perhaps played the major role in initiating extensive studies
in school administration.

In 1947 the AASA planning com

mittee recommended that studies and programs be initiated at
once to instigate further protessionalization of the super

intendency through improved training programs, refined

standards for selection by boards of education, and more ex

tensive participation in the activities of the profession.
The recommendation was accepted by the AA.SA membership. 4
2

American Association of School Administrators, You
and AASA GoinJ Places T�ether (Washington: American
Assoc!ition o School A !nistrators, 1958), p. 5.
3 Ibid.

4Ho111s A. Moore, Jr., Studies in School Ad.ministra
tion {Washington: American Assoc!ationof School Adminis
trators, 1957 ), PP• 1-23.

6

It was during this same year, 1947, at the annual AA.SA meet
ing that plans were initiated tor an August meeting of a

group, the majority ot whom were professors engaged in

training educational administrators.

The group was to dis

cuss mutual problems encountered in preparation programs and

the methods utilized in solving these problems.

The first

conference of professors ot educational administration ever
held on a national scale was at Endicott, New York.

Inter

national Business Machine Corporation provided physical
facilities tor this meeting.

The National Conference of

Professors of Educational Administration (NCPEA) meetings

became an annual attair. 5

It was in January, 1946, that an advisory committee

on educational projects for the W. K. Kellogg Foundation
of Battle Creek, Michigan, recommended to the Foundation

that it enter the field of public school administration.

As

Hollis A. Moore, Jr. , suggests, it was, indeed, a recommenda
tion with exciting consequences. 6
In November, 1947, A.ASA made an official proposal to

thew. K. Kellogg Foundation; the project called tor the

5william R. Flescher and A. L. Knoblauch, A Decade of
Development in Educational Leadership (The National.Conter=
ot Professorsof Educational Administration, 1957), pp. ix-x,

1-8.

�oore, �· cit., p. 1.

appointment of a national commission to conduct a project

7

tor upgrading the professional competence of the superintend
ency of schools.

A grant of $75,000 was requested for opera

tion during the first year.

Early the next year the Founda

tion rejected the proposal but agreed to support a series ot

exploratory conferences ot administrators, graduate school
faculty members, and representatives of state and federal

agencies to ascertain the feasibility of some national study
and to make re commendations tor consideration by the Founda

tion.

Five regional conferen ces were jointly sponsored by

AASA, the Coun cil ot Chief State S chool Otticers and the

National Conference of County and Rural Area Superintendents.

Out of the re commendations ot these conferences and the· f ore

sight and ingenuity of the Foundation came a scurry of ac

tivity throughout this country and Canada in a program known

as the Cooperative Program in Edu cational Administration
(CPEA).

Instead ot a program tor studying the superin

tendency there came a nation-wide study of every aspect of

s chool administration.

The Foundation invited proposals

from universities from which five were initially sele cted

and subsequen tly three additional ones to serve as regional

headquarters for the exploration and research.

A tive-year

project was launched with an initial grant of approximately

$3, 400, 000. 7

8
Some of the projects were extended tor an

additional four-year period.

New institutions, particularly

in the South and Southwest, were awarded grants for concen
tration in the area of graduate program improvement. a

Throughout the nine-year period, 1950-1 9 59, Kellogg awarded

grants totaling some nine million dollars. 9

In addition to

the Kellogg grants, participating agencies and institutions
contributed to the program.

For example, Kellogg awarded

some $1, 025, 000 to the Southern States Cooperative Program

in Educational Administration (SSCPEA), while participating
institutions and agencies contributed what has been con
servatively estimated as $1, 200, 000. 10

Two additional organizations, the Committee for the

Advancement of School Administration (CASA) and the Uni

versity Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), should

be mentioned here.

CASA was created in 19 55 through Kellogg

support as an agency of AASA .

7rbid. ,. p. 18.
-8Hollis Moore, Jr. , "Things Are Happening All Over, n
Phi Delta Kappan, XLI (November, 1 9 59), 42.
York:

9naniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theo
(New
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. , 1959), p • ?.•

lO Truman M. Pierce and A. D . Albright, A Profession
1n Transition (The Southern St•tes Cooperative-Program in
Educational Administration and The Associated Programs in
Educational Administration, 1960), p. 180.

9
The committee's job in essence was to observe
the institutional projects as they completed
their original plans and as they reached conclu
sions about actions necessary to give lasting
pro.fessional status to s chool. adminiatration. 11
The committee played a vital role in spearheading er

torts at professionalization; among these were AASA's member

ship requirement or two years' graduate study, and the com
mittee drafted .for the National Council for the A c credita

tion or Teacher Edu cation (NCATE) standards .for accrediting
graduate programs .for training s�hool administrators. 12
One o.f the last grants by the W. K. Kellogg Founda-

tion in the national school administration program was in

response to a recommendation or the CPEA Middle Atlantic

Region tor the formation ot the University Coun cil for Edu
cational Administration.

The Council, organized in

1957 ,

is a corporation ot some torty institutions engaged in pre
paring educational administrators, and is lo cated at The
Ohio State University Campus.

The Council "has been organ

ized to provide a means o.f inter-university cooperation tor

improving the preparation or s chool administrators and for

condu cting a comprehensive program ot educational researeh." 13

42.

11Moore, "Things Are Happening All Over," �· cit. , p.
12American

Association ot S chool Administrators Year
book Commission, Professional Administrators tor America's
Schools, Thirty-Eighth Yearbook (Washington: American ,..
Association of S chool Administrators, 1960), pp. 277-278.
13Gritti tbs,

�· cit. , p.

5.

10 .
A decade ot accelerated programs of study and research

has c oncluded with indications that there is still much to
do and much will continue to be done.

The AASA with its Com

mittee tor the Advancement or School Administration, the
NCPEA and the UCEA are still working to improve the pro

fession.

Some ot the earlier CPEA regions are still con

tinuing cooperative efforts.

It is or interest to note that early efforts tor

intensively s tudying school administration came from AASA,
the professional organization of school superintendents.

is a healthy sign when a group ot professional people are

It

dissatisfied with the way they are operating and they initi

ate a study f or self-improvement.

Another interesting thing to note is the wisdom dis

played by the statt members ot thew. K. Kellogg Foundation
in their insistence on a nation-wide study or the entire
field of educational administration instead of just the
superintendency.

One can only speculate on the outcome it

the initial AASA proposal tor s tudying the superintendency
had been approved.

It appears that such an approval ex

cluding other levels of school administration would have

been most unfortunate.
One can only speculate on the total number mustered

in this total CPEA study; in the Southern Region alone more
than 35,000 persons--professors, administrators, students

11

and laymen--had s ome part in the program. 14

C�

THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS
A FOCUS OF S'l'UDY

Once serious consideration was given to problems in

educational administration, it was inevitable that ques
tions ot a theoretical nature would be raised.

Moore, re

porting on the .first tive-year CPEA project reported that,
"The natural next step from schematic approaches to research
in school administration is ·the development ot a theory. "1 5

At the conclusion ot the nine-year project he reported that,

"study o.t' administrative theory is currently in vogue, and
the impact or such development is likely to influence re
search in this .field to a marked degree. ttl6

The .first seminar o.t' UCEA was jointly sponsored with

the Midwest Administration Center at the U�iversity o.t'

Chicago, November 11, 12, and 13, 1957, and was devoted to
the role ot theory in educational administration. 17 This

p. 29.
p.

44.

14Pierce and Albright, �· cit. , p. 180.
1�oore, Studies in School Administration,!:?.£• cit. ,
1�oore, "Things Are Happening All Over,"

.2E.• cit. ,

17The proceedings ot this seminar were reported in
Administrative Theory in Education, Andrew W. Halpin, editor
(Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, 1958).

seminar was a sharing of ideas among professors ot educa
tional administration and social scientists.

12

Two years

later, November 1959, the Midwest Administration Center con

ducted another seminar which included in addition to pro

fessors of education and social scientists, those practicing

school administrators who expressed interest in examining
theoretical concepts and in exchanging ideas. 18 UCEA has

continued active promotion ot theoretical considerations in

educational administration.

The NCPEA membership in 19.54 approved Conference

sponsorship ot a publication which would synthesize research

findings in administration and generalize implications tor

preparation programs tor educational administrators.

authors of this book found themselves wrestling with

The

theoretical considerations. 19

The staff and regional participants in the SSCPEA con
centrated their efforts mainly on preparation programs tor

educational administrators, and their first big consideration

was to determine factors relating to effective or competent

18The proceedings of this seminar were reported in
Administrative Theory as a Guide to Action, Roald F. Camp
bell and James M. Lipham, -editors\Chicago: Midwest Admin-.
istration Center, 1960).
19Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (eds. ),
Administrative Behavior in Education; sponsored by the
National Conference ot Professors ot Educational Adminis
tration (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

administrators.

Thus came formulation or what is known as

the Competency Pattern. 20

13

A prime ingredient of the Com

petency Pattern was a theory of educational administration;

the other ingredients were identified as "job•• and "know
how. " 21 The relationships of these three elements or the
SSCPEA Competency Pattern are outlined as follows:

The job is central, and evaluation or competence is
in terms of job performance. Theory is • • • the
base or the pattern and is considered essential
since all performance is, consciously or uncon
sciously, carried on in terms ot some theory. Re
membering the assumption that 'a workable compe
tency pattern can have but a single theory, ' we
recognize that theory provides the guideposts and
evaluative criteria needed to insure consistency
and logic throughout the pattern. The job tasks
and the necessary know-how must not contradict the
basic theory.
• • • the job comprises the body
of the pattern. It is composed or the things to
be done and is supported by and reflected in the
know-how essential to their doing. 22
The totality of the Competency Pattern may, itself, be

considered a general theory of administrative competence.

20 southern States Cooperative Program in Educational
Ad.ministration, Better Teaching in School Administration
(Nashville: Southern States Cooperative Program in Educa
tional Administration, 1955).
21An elaboration on the competency concept in educa
tional administration with emphases on philosophical, psy
chological and sociological bases is presented in Orin B.
Graft and Calvin M. Street, Im roving Competence in Educa
tional Administration (New Yor �: Harper and Brothers,

1956).

22Grarr and Street, ibid. , pp. 45-46.

In addition to the NCPEA publication, Administrative

Behavior in Education, the Conference members have had "Ad

ministrative Theory" as one ot several discussion topics at

their annual meetings tor the past few years. 23

At the 1960

Conference held at Macomb, Illinois, a general program topic

was the presentation of papers and a discussion of "The Place
ot Values in Theory ot Educational Administration. "24

The members of the 1960 AASA Yearbook Commission con-

cluded that, "It is clear that those who have .t aken upon

themselves the scholarly study ot our protession agree that

empirical administrative processes must give way to theory.
• • • tt25

In his appraisal ot research in educational adminis

tration, Gri:f.tiths says that, "Without doubt, the greatest

weakness or research in educational administration is the

2 3 This particular discussion group attracted more
con.terence participants than any other or the eight groups
at the 1960 NCPEA Conference held at Macomb, Illinois,
August 21-27, 1960.
24Professors Daniel E. Gri:ffiths and Lawrence
Iannaccone presented_papers in support of the value-free
nature or theory. Professors Orin B. Graff and John
Ramseyer presented papers in support of the value-packed
nature of theory.

25American Association or School Administrators,
Professional Administrators for America's Schools, Thirty
eighth Yearbook, 1960 (Washington: American Association
of School Administrators, 1960), p. 103.

1.5

lack of theory.1126

The above paragraphs should be ample evidence that

theory is of wide concern to those involved in educational
administration.

As was noted earlier, it was inevitable

that with the growing concern in educational administration,

there would appear the theory problem.

An inquisitive child

is not long content with manipulating an interesting toy,

but soon be starts minutely examining its components, experi

menting with new uses tor the toy, and determining what its
capacities are.

So it is in educational administration, or

any other field, when inquisitive people become concerned,

there results generalizations about the nature, the purposes
and the possibilities of the area under study.
D.

THE PROBLEM

The foregoing was a brief review ot accelerated inter

est and concern tor intensive study in the field of educa

tional administration, especially in the realm ot adminis

trative theory .

The purpose of this study was to otter a logical ex

planation of the process of theory construction in educa

tional administration so that wide differences ot opinion
26Daniel E. Griffiths, Research in Educational Ad
ministration, An Affpraisal and a Plan (New York: Teachers
College, Columbia nivers!ty;-Bureailof Publications, 19.59),
p. 16 .

16

These con

regarding administrative theory may be reduced.

troversial issues tend to hamper united efforts tor improye

ment ot the profession.

The existence ot such controversial issues among

those engaged in the profession and concerned tor its im
provement constituted the problem ot this study.

To attack

this problem adequately, five sub-problems were identified
tor solution.

These sub-problems are listed below with some

explanation of their treatment in the study.

Sub-problem !--to determine, through review of liter

ature, some general understandings of the basic nature and
constructs ot theory, the uses tor which theory may be em

ployed in educational adminfstration and to identify the

major controversial issues regarding the nature ot theory

and its uses.

This sub-problem was treated first in the study to

provide a setting tor the logical explanation ot theory con
struction in subsequent sections ot the study.

Specifically,

the sub-problem was treated to provide an explanation ot
what theory is generally considered to be.

Also, to provide

a focal point tor the theory construction process, it was
necessary to identity some basic constructs ot the ory.

Finally, it was deemed important to identity early in the

study the major controversial issues regarding the nature ot

and uses tor theory.

The investigations relative to this

17

first sub-problem were for informational purposes so that the
basic problem ot the study would be described clearly before

efforts at its solution were initiated.

Sub-problem 2--to examine systems of inquiry and psy

chological research for the purpose of identifying the

genesis of and the context of controversial issues regarding
theory.

Treatment of this sub-problem was to pinpoint the

origin and context of different points of view regarding
theory.

The historical evolvement ot the method of science

and the philosophical framework embodying opinions about the

nature and uses of science were discussed in some detail.

Sub-problem l--to examine analytically theory con

structs tor the purpose of identifying their nature, their
derivation and their usefulness tor educational administra

tion.

Sub-problem �--to synthesize the theory elements so

that a logical relationship will ensue.

Following the analysis of theory constructs, with the

meanings attributed to these elements, it was possible to
logically synthesize the elements into an organismic view
of theory.

For clarity, some mention was made or the synthe

sis which may have resulted if different logic or a different

frame of reference had been employed.

Sub·-problem 2--to outline some axiomatic bases tor

intelligent theory construction in educational administra
tion.
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These axioms are derived from the logic ot the study.

Their validity rests on the soundness or the argumentation
and the logical development of the study.

On the basis ot

findings in this study, these axioms were drawn to provide

direction tor those who engage in theorizing in educational
administration.

E�

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

It is most refreshing to note the interest that is

being given to theoretical matters in education and educa
tional administration.

It is a change from the "how-to-do-

it n analyses to a careful look at meanings and purposes to

give directions tor improvement.

In discussing the place

of philosophy in educational research, Clyde V. Martin
points out the following:

It should be borne in mind that education
comprehends the renewal of the very substance of
civilization. Itseoncerns run tar beyond the
methodological. Only at the greatest peril to
civilization itself can education fail constantly
to
reconsider its basic aims and functions.
.
Quality is as important as quantity. Perhaps no
where in the modern world does the latter re
ceive more respect than in America, and considera
tions of the former suffer more from neglect. 27
27

clyde v. Martin, "The Place or Philosophy in Educa
tional Research, " Phi Delta Kappan, XL (October, 1958), 40.
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Martin quotes Robert Ulich regarding the sparsity of

research geared to generalization:

According to the bibliographies ot •Doctors •
Theses under Way in Education • in the Journal �
of Educational Research during the years 1930 to
1936, more than 90 per cent ot the intended dis
sertations were dedicated to techniques, to
organizations, to experimental and descriptive
forms of psychology, ·to testing and measurements,
while less than 10 per cent were concerned with
those problems which give to our whole educational
endeavor its sense ot direction with values and
aims in education and civilization, the thoughts
and problems of the great leaders, the relation
of education to the history of religion and phil
osophy and to the development of literature, art,
and the sciences, and the great human institu
tions. 28

Martin comments that his analysis of doctoral dis

sertations under way during the academic year 1950-1951 con

firm that only a small fraction ot the research in education
is given over to studies geared to levels of high generali

zation. 29

Griffiths points out the sparsity of research in edu

cational administration compared to that done in other

fields.

For example, in 1957 for some 594 published and un

published researches in educational administration, there
were 9,074 in psychology and 112, 000 in chemistry. JO

28rbid. , citing Robert Ulich, On the Reform of
EducationaTResearch (Occasional Pampiiietlro. 2, Griauate
School of Education, Harvard University, 1937), p. 2 2.
2 9 rbid.

JO oriftiths, Research 1n Educational Administration,
An Appraisal and� Plan,�· cit. , pp . 23-24.
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The significance of a study on the structure ot adlllin

istrative theory lies not in its being another piece ot re

search in educational administration, but rather its signifi

cance lies in the relati onship of theory to all research in

the profession. · All scientific investigation proceeds from

theoretical frames of reference , whether stated or unstated,
conscious or unconscious.

Since the profession is young and research is limi ted,

it is highly important that theoretical structures be

minutely examined to determine their adequateness and re

liability to engender research.

Before structures can be

built with any degree ot intelligence it is necessary that
there be an understanding of the nature ot theory.

This

understanding can only come about through an examination of

the process of theorizing, which is what this study purports

to do.

The justification for any study ot administrative

theory, in clud ing this particular study, is invariably
determ ined by two prob in g questions :
1.

What usefulness can be attached to theory in

2.

T o what extent is there commonality of agreement

educational administration ?

as to the nature and usefulness of theory in
educational administration ?

Essentially, then, the importance of a topic as a
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focus tor study is gauged by its adequacy for performing

certain functions; and, it there does appear to be some use

fulness, are there clear understandings about the nature of
the topic of study and the uses to which it may be put?

The investigations of this study revealed that there

is rather general agreement that theory will provide more

comprehensive and deeper understandings ot educational ad
ministration.

However, there is a marked difference of

opinion regarding the nature ot theory and the methods

whereby it can be utilized to provide these greater under
standings .

Thus, it may . be concluded that differences on

this second question would render agreements on the first

of minimal validity, if not completely invalid.

If it is

assumed that theory is the means ot improvement and im

provement is the goal of theory, then a clear understanding

of one would require an understanding of the other, and,

conversely, vagueness of one suggests vagueness of the other.
There seems to be a polarity of opinion regarding

theory, ranging from broad generality to narrow specificity,

from the philosophical to a specific incident of scientific
inquiry.

Another polarity concerns who theorize s.

Some

would limit this activity to the scientist, some to the

philosopher, while others would solve the dilemma and have

everyone theorizing.

Of course, these differences hinge
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largely on different understandings of the origin and nature

of the theory (i. e. , the process of theorizing).

If theory

is necessary tor greater understandings in educational ad

ministration, a thesis maintained in this study, then there
is a great need tor some refined understandings of theory .

F.

CRITERIA FOR DEFINITION OF TERMS

A very important aspect of this study was to identify

with clarity pertinent terminology that has been used by

theorists and to specify what meanings were intended in this

study.

The important thing in any communication is tor the

recipient of the communique to get the intended message.

I t is not always possible to communicate meaning even with

the most specific instructions for interpretation because of

the varied experiences and understandings of people.

Even

in de.tin. itions and de scriptions we fall into the fallacy of

equating specificity with brevity and , conversely, ambiguity
with prolixity.

What, seemingly, has resulted is the demand

for one-sentence definitions .

Dwight Waldo, defining public

administration, sums up this .fallacy as follows :

The immediate effect of all one-sentence or one
paragraph definitions of public administration is
mental paralysis rather than enlightenment and
stimulation. This is because a serious definition
of the term--as against an epigrammatical defini
tion, however witty--inevitably contains several
abstract words or phrases. In short compass these

abs tract words and phrases can be explained only
by other abstract words and phrase s , and in the
proces s the reality and importance ot 'it ' be
come fogged and lost. 31
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In the first section ot this chapter, an effort was

made to clarity to some extent the interpretation or theory

that was adhered to throughout the s tudy.

Of course, the

explanation was inadequate; it it were adequate, further in

ves tigations in this study would have been unwarranted.

Since terminology other than "theory" pertinent to this
.
.
s tudy are neces s ary tor an adequate definition ot " theory, "

it was concluded that short definitions of those terms here

would serve more to con!'use than to c larity.

These perti

nent terms were, therefore, defined in their logical rela
tionship s within the theory-building proces s.

Essentially, the criteria tor definitions throughout

the study were in keeping with those set up b y_ Professor

Ernest Bayles.

He proposes that a definition should:

( 1 ) indicate with clarity any line or action
which may be involved; ( 2 ) difrerentiate sharply
among alternatives; ( 3) avoid self-contradiction;
( 4 ) be as precise a s feasible; and ( 5 ) in light
or the foregoing, represent as much of consens us
among probable users as is pos sib le. 3 2

31Dwight Waldo, The Study of Public Administration

( Garden City:

Doubleday and Company, Inc. ,

1955),

p. 2.

3 2Ernest E. Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory

( New York :

Harper and Bros. ,

1960 ),

P•

!48 .

Criterion 1 , he tells us , was adopted from Charles

Sanders Peirce, who thought that if between two ideas or

thoughts there is no apprec iable difference in terms of con

sequent action, there is no appreciab le difference between

the ideas.

Criterion 2 is important because of the practice of

confining ourselves to the positive side.
Criterion 3 , he asserts:

• • • is also highly important . For selt
contradictions cause one to be one's own enemy-
probably one of the worst--and, in � eommunication,
to foster frequent confusion or misunderstanding
on the part of communicatee, if not ot communi
cator. 33
Regarding criterion

4,

he points out that " to speak

with simplicity is promotive of understanding and it would
seem that , if one should ever speak understandably , it

would be in the definition ot terms . 34
Criterion

5

is a very elusive one and is important

only after the first tour have b een complied with.

These criteria are formulated on the assump 
tion that the purpose of having a term at all is
to use it for communication among human beings.
The fifth criterion is proposed , therefore , so
as to take advantage of whatever common usage or
understanding has already been achieved, thereby
reducing to a minimum the necessity of learning
and using new terms and new meanings. But tull
33Ibid . , p. J.49 .

34Ib id.

consensus is rarely achieved, even among our most
commonly used words, so we hope only to work
toward it rather than to a chieve it. Moreover,
consensus on a definition which would violate one
or more of the first tour criteria would hardly
prove satisfa ctory. 3 5
G.
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METHOD OF THE STUDY

It was necessary in a subsequent chapter of this

study to discuss modern scien ce so that a setting could be

established tor showing the context and uses of theory.

Howe�er, since the study proposes to employ the method of
logi c, it seemed necessary to explain in some detail the

logical methods used.

There are varied opinions about what

constitutes logic in scientific investigation.

An oft-quoted definition ot theory has its system of

logic built in.

Herbert Feigl' s definition is, " · • • a set

of' assumptions from whi ch can be derived by purely logi c

mathematical pro cedures a larger set of empirical laws. " 3 6
Logic has long been allied to mathematics and to philoso

phy .

The allian ce with mathemati cs has provded tor some

logi cians two purposes :

( 1 ) The rigidity of mathematics

has provided a c omfortable base of assurance, and ( 2) sym
bolism has been convenient for showing relationships.

-

35.. Ibid. , p. 148 •

36Herbert Feigl, " Principles and Problems of Theory
Construction in Psycholo gy, " Current Trends in Ps1cholo i cal
Theor� (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsbur gii""°Press, 19�1) ,
p. 18

F.

s.

C. Northrop summarizes the method or initiating in
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quiry suggested by Descartes wherein deductive logic i s pro
pounded because of the firm and solid foundations ot mathe
matics. 37 Leibintz conceived the idea of symbolic logic
• • • in which the elementary operations ot the
proce ss of rea soning would be represented by
symbols--an alphabet of thought, so to s p e ak-
and envisaged a distant future when philo sophi
cal and theological discu s sions would be con
ducted by its means and would -reach conclusions
a s incontrovertible a s those of mathema tics.
Perhaps this was too much to hope, but the actual
achievement s or mathematical logic have been
amazing . Logic, when its power ha s been aug
mented by the introduction ot symbolic methods,
is capable ot leading from elementary premises of
extreme simplicity to conclus ions far beyond the
reach of the unaided reason. 3 8

Rather than just using �athematic s to facilitate

logic, Russell and Whitehead

• • • set out to examine, and if pos sible to
prove, • • • that mathematics i s a part of logic:
it is the science concerned with the logical de
duction of consequences from the gener al premise s
of all reasoning so that a se p arate ' philosophy
ot mathematics' simply does not exist. 39

Even with the advent of new relativistic mathematic s

which do not provide a comfortable solid ba se, mathematics

37F. s. c . Northrop, The Logfi ot the Sciences and
the Humanities ( New York : �Macm liii Company, 1947},p .

r.

38 sir

Edmund Taylor Whitaker, " Mathematics and Logic, "
in What is Science, Jame s R . Newman, editor ( New York: _
Sim;andSchuster, 1955 ) , pp. 48-49 .
39 Ibid . , p . 52.

is still relied on tor logical rig idit7.

Dewey took a d ifferent approach to logic .
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He said :

Inquiry is the controlled or d irected transforma
tion of an indeterminate situation into one that
is s o determinate in its constituent d istinc
tions and relations as t o convert the elements of
the original s ituation into a unified whola. 40
The indeterminate s ituation not only is open for inquiry but

its c onstituents are not unif ied.

The dete rminate s ituation

is a closed, finished situation or "universe ot experience. "
He tells us that "controlled " or "directed" in the defini.

.

tion "refers to the tact that inquiry is competent in any

given case in the degre e in which the operat ions involved

in it actually do terminate in the establishment of an ob
jectively unified existential system. n lµ.

The indeterminate situation is "a unique doubtful

ness which makes that s ituation to be just and only the
situation it is. n 42
It is this unique quality that not only makes the
particular inquir1 engage d in but ·that exerc ises
control over its special procedures . Otherwise,
one procedure in inquiry would be as likely to
occur and to be effective as any other. Unless a
situation is uniquely qual ified in its very in
determinateness, there is a c ondition of complete
panic; re sponse to it takes the form of blind and
wild overt activ it ies . • • •
A variety of names

40John Dewey, Logic, �he Theor 0£ Inquiry (New York :
Henry Holt and Company, 1938},pp. 16n -Il5"5.
4].Ibid . , p. 105.
42Ib id.
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serves to characterize indeterminate situations.
They are dis turbed, ambiguous, contused, .full of
conflicting te ndencies, obscure, etc. 43

I t can readily be seen that in this explanation, in

quiry becomes a personal activity employing methods deter

mined by the nature of the prob lem.

So it is a problematic

situation which initiates inquiry.

Bayles has differentiated between these two approaches

tor the presentation of subject-matter.

"psychological'' versus the " logical. "

This is the

The "psychological"

organization he defines as " the type which follows the logic

of a growing mind. "44

With reference to the above explanations of some

differences regarding logical procedure, the method of this
study more nearly complied with that outlined by Dewey.

The

sequence of logic was that or "a growing mind, " beginning

with experiences and methodically progressing from one
prob lematic situation to the next .

Specifically, this study

began with a look at the prob lem and employed the analytical

method which, Bronows ki sai d , is "to shift our gaze from the
thing or event to its atructure. "45

Theory construction was

explained in terms of a psychological s equence ot learning,
43Ibid.

44Bayles, � · cit. , p. 200.

45Jacob Bronowski, "Science as Foresight , " in What
is Science, �· cit. , p. 429.

i. e. , perception to conceptualization and progressively to
behavior .
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'!'his system does not eliminate mathematical logic;

quite the reverse is true.

A logic of sequence implies

orderly progression in space and time.

The method . here em

ployed does not utilize the comfortable, solid foundati on of
mathematics, nor does it employ symbols tor machine-like
(opposed to insight) manipulations.

The literature was examined; the criteria tor selecting

literature were its availability, its relevance to the study

and its compliance with the logical method utilized.
H.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter I provides a setting and suggests a course of

action tor the entirety of the study.

Specifically, some

clarification is given to the interpretation which was placed
on "theory" throughout the study ; a general background of

the study of educational administration and theory of educa
tional administration is provided; the problem and sub

problems are set £orth; and, finally, justifications for con
ducting such a study, the methods employed, and the outline
of the study are given.

Chapter II immediately attacks the problem of identi
fying the constructs of theory, generali zing about the nature
ot theory, and suggesting uses tor theory.

The chapter con

cludes with identification of some controversies about theory
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in educational administration .

Chapter II I identities basic controversies about the

nature of theory with the philosophic system from which the

various points of view ensue.

Opposing philosophies ot

science are described; specifically, deterministic and rela

tivistic no tions of science are discussed.
zing.

Chapter IV examines the p sychological bases ot theori

Since theorizing is a human process, research in per

ceptual theory is necessary tor clearer understandings about
this process .

The theory controversies are reviewed in the

light ot knowledges about perception, the process whe reby
knowledge is gained .

Chapter V analytically treats the theory constructs

and synthesizes them into an explanation ot intelligent be
havior through theorizing.

This involves a discussion ot

(1 ) the formulation ot assumptions, (2) the process ot de

ducing hypotheses, and ( 3 ) the nature ot hypotheses.

The

chapter also includes a discussion ot prop ositions and con
cepts , the vehicles £or communicating me aning .

The logic or the discussion of theory construction

in terms or possible solutions to the controversial prob 
lems is reviewed in Chapter VI .

The chapter concludes with

some suggested axioms tor theorizing in educational admin
istration.

These axioms are nothing more than a reply to

the question, " It I am to engage in the business ot

the ory-construction in educational administration, what

31

understandings mu s t I have ab out myse;f, about the na ture
of the ory, and about the nature of e.ducational administra
tion ?"

The validity of these axioms is in direct proportion

to the validity of the logic employed throughout the study.

Different approaches to the ory-construction would neces

sarily resul t in diffe rent axiomatic bases for theorizing.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THEORY:

ITS BASIC CONSTRUCTS AND

ITS APPLICATION IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
A.

INTRODUCTION

With the efforts for elevating educational administra
tion as a profession came concomitant efforts t o classiry

educational administration as a science.

It was at this

point that the theory problem was introduced.

The social

scientists were called upon to assist in the formulation of

a theory of educational administration.

Heretofore, theori

zing had been largely identified with the educational phil
osopher.

Those concerned with the science of administration

apparently felt compelled to speci�y that their theory was a
different theory from that of the philosopher; consequently,
explanations of what their theory is have involved converse
explanations of what their theory is not.

The result has

been the drawing of sharp dichotomies between the realm of
that which is scientific and that which is philosophic.

The

ideas proclaimed by many of the administrative scientists

were in keeping with the· logical positivistic p oint of view,
seemingly in vogue among many philosophers of science.
The philosophic and scientific derivations of theory

controversies are discussed in Chapter III.

The topic was

introduced here to note the origin of theory controversies

outlined in this chapter, and to give s ome orientation to
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discu s sions regarding the general nature ot theory and its

basic constructs.

It would not be pos sible to sugge st a general nature

of theory which would be universally accepted, nor was this

feat attempted.

However, some general discu s s ion was deeme d

ne ce ssary s o that the identification of basic constructs of

theory could be contextually re lated.

Discus sions of theory by se lected authors were re

viewed and abridged, and general conclusions were drawn

re garding the nature of theory.
B.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF THEORY

To provide a frame or reference tor this discussion,

attention is called to the first postulate in Chapter I,

" Theory cannot be disas s ociated from the human proce s s or

the orizing. "

Thus, an e xplanation or the nature ot theory

is foremost an explanation or a human proce s s.

Postulate

number tour , " Theorizing is on a continuum ot space, time

and relevance , " implies that e veryone theorize s to some ex
tent.

This implication is unapologetically acknowledged.

Therefore, the human proces s or theorizing about which we

are concerne d is a proces s not re stricted to any particular
group or people nor to any particular topic to which

theorizing is directed.

Unless all of one ' s experiences

throughout life are to be trial and error, a complete h olo
caust or happenstance from one moment to the next, then it

must be concluded that the individual is able to provide

some organization and direction tor his experiences.

The

normal purposive drives ot seeking affection, tood, sur

vival, sex, etc. , are inadequate to provide intelligent

direction throughout lite.

It is the process ot purposive

organization and direction that is attributed to theory.

"Everyone who makes choices and judgments implies a the ory
in the sense that there are reasons tor his actions. "l
The question very properly arises regarding the con

cern tor theory in educational administration it theorizing

is a process engaged in by the man on the street as well as

the philosopher, the scientist, the teacher, and the adminis
trator.

The point or concern is one ot quality ot theori

zing which is elaborated further in Chapter

v.

Obviously,

there are those who manage the organization and direction of

their daily lives more ertectively and more intelligently
than others.

H owever, to deny those less effective and less

intelligent individuals any degree or theorizing is essen

tially pronouncing them non-existent , since survival is
lArthur P. Coladarci and Jacob W. Getzels, The Use
of Theory in Educational Adll.iniatration, EducationuAam!n
I"itration Monograph No. 5 (Stanl'ord: Stanford University,
School ot Education, 1955), p. 5 .

dependent on a degree of expectation of the consequent.
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This argument rules out a frequently advanced one that there
are the theorizers and there are the practitioners.

It

appears that the epitomy of a training program for educa

tional administration would b e to upgrade the quality of
theorizing by the practitioner.

When an administrator ' s experiences have led
him to b elieve that a certain kind of act will
result in certain other events or acts, he is
using theory. If the experiences of others have
been roughly similar, his theory will not be
unique, even though he has never formulated it
in so many words or has never heard it stated b y
others. Those who learn from their experience
in ways which mean revising the ir judgments and
decisions (hypotheses) are modifying their
theories in a never-ending process of self
correction. Such people are theorizing--it may
be poor theorizing, b ut it is theorizing none
the-less. 2

The problem tor those concerned with preparing educa

tional administrators b ecomes one of improving the quality
of theorizing by the practitioner.

It would appear that a

false trichotomy of function is promoted in the thesis sug

gested by Professor Roald F. Campbell that the scientist is
a producer of knowle dge ; the developer (ordinari ly the pro

fessor of educational administration) is one who must se

lect knowledge for particular ends ; and the practitioner is
the user of knowledge in an actual situation; and , further

more, the practitioner who tries too hard to play another
2I bid.

role " may find that spe culation or confusion dulls the edge

of his chief instrument--de cision making. "3

It is readily

acknowledged that each of these three categories ot indi

viduals may theorize with varying levels of understanding,

however, the scale is not necessarily a descending one from
the scientist to the practitioner.
C.

THE S CIENTIFIC CONTEXT OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION

The topic of science needs some clarification here

since most of the discussions of theories reviewed in sub 

sequent p aragraphs are referred to as scientific theory.

Dewey suggests the proper relationship and differentiation

between science as a method and science as a body of knowl

edge:

• • • A distinction needs to be made between
science as attitude and method and science as a
body of sub ject matter. I do not mean that the
two can be separated, for a method is a way of
dealing with sub ject matter and science as a
body of knowledge is a product of a method. Ea ch
exists only in connection with the other. An
attitude becomes p sychopathic when it is not di
rected to ob jects b eyond itself. What is meant
is, first, that attitude and method come before
the material which is found in books, journals,
and the pro ceedings of scientific organizations;
and, second, that the attitude is manifested

3Roald F. Campbell, W. W. Charters, Jr. , and William
L. Cragg, "Improving Administrative Theory and Practice:
Three Essential Roles" ( Introduction by Roald F. C ampbell )
in Roald F. Campbell and James M. Lipham, editors, Adminis
trative Theory as a Guide to Action (Chicago: Midwest Admin
istration Center, University of Chicago, 19 60 ) , pp. 171-173 .

primarily toward the objects and events ot the
ordinary world and only secondarily toward that
which is already scientific sub ject matter. 4
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Dewey continues with a discussion of the scientific

attitude which he conceives as a quality that is manifested

in any walk ot lite :

On its negative side, it is freedom from con
trol by routine, pre judice, dogma, unexamined
tradition, sheer self-interest. Positively, it
is the will to inquire, to examine, to discrimi
nate, to draw conclusions only on the basis ot
evidence. It is the intention to reach beliefs,
and to test those that are entertained, on the
basis ot observed tact, recognizing also that
tacts are without meaning save as they point to
ideas. It is, in turn, the experimental attitude
which recognizes that while ideas are necessary to
deal with facts, yet they are working hypotheses
to be tested by the consequences they produce. 5

In this framework ot science, as a method and an atti

tude for intelligent living, the process of theorizing pro
moted in this study is contextually oriented.

The point

that needs to be stressed is that educational administration
is not natively a science.

It is, rather, a series ot

processes tor the attainment of certain purposes.

The im

portant thing is that these processes be sub jected to

scientific scrutiny and that those individuals engaged in
4John Dewey, "Unity ot Science as a Social Problem , "
International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences, Otto Neurath,
Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris, editors (Volume 1, Nos. l5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955 ) , p. 29.
5rbid. , p. 31.

the processes operate in a scientific manner .

This remove s

science from a cold, detached world of sub ject matter to a

personal attitude and method purposefully directe d toward
certain ends.
D.

REVIEW, IN TERPRETATION AND ELABORATION OF

DISCUSSIONS ON THEORY BY SELECTED AUTHORS

Dis cussions � Sele cted Psychologists and Elaborations on

Their ---Points -of View
---

For discussions regarding the nature of the ory, se

lected writers in psychology are reviewed first.

Many

s ocial and behavior scientists, other than psychologists,

have made contribut ions to the development of theories of
social interaction and behavi or.

However, the psychologists

seemingly have been more prone to investigate the nature and

structure of theory .

I t is for this reason that the section

here is limite d to psychologists.

Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey describe _theory
as "a set of conventions created by the the orist. " 6 'fhis

me ans that theories are not predetermined by nature or any
other determinant source.

Data gathered through observation

and investigation may be incorporated into any ot countless

theoretical schemes.

6calvin s . Hall and Gardner Lindzey , Theories of
Personality ( New York: John Wiley and Sons , Inc . , 1957 ) , p.

10 .

The theorist in choo sing one particular option
to re pre sent the events in which he is interested
is exercising a tree creative choice that is differ
ent from the artists only in the kinds of evidence
upon which it focuses and the grounds upon which
its fruitfulness will be judge d . We are emphasizing
here the creative and yet arbitrary manner in which
theories are constructed and this leads naturally
to the observation that we can specify how a theory
should be evaluated or appraise d but we cannot
specify how a the ory should be constructed . The re
is no formula £or fruitful theory construction any
more than there i s a formula tor making enduring
literary contributions . 7
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Theory consists ot two propertie s, a cluster of rele

vant, systematically related assumptions, and a set ot em
pirical definitions .

The relevance ot the as sumptions is

determined by their bearing on the empirical event s which
they repre sent .

Also, to permit the deduction ot empirical

consequences trom the a s sumptions, it is nece s sary that

there be a systematic relationship between the as sumptions

and their imbedded concepts as we ll as a clear relationship
ot one assumption to another within a set ot as sumptions .

The interaction 0£ concepts within a the ory with em

pirical data is accomplished by empirical definitions, fre
quently called operational definitions. "Thus , by means of
these definitions the theory at certain prescribed places

comes into contact with reality or observational data . "8
7 Ibid. , p . 11.

8 Ibid . , P • 12 .

Hall and Lindzey have delineated three functions for

a theory.

It should lead to the collection or observation

ot heretofore unobserved relevant empirical relations; it

should permit the incorporation ot known empirical findings

within a framework which is logically consistent and reason
ably simple; and it should prevent the observer from being

overwhelmed by the complexity ot natural or concrete events

by delineating relationship s about which he sho uld be aware. 9
In promoting a scientific theory of learning, Guthrie

has the following to say :

Such a theory is essential to progress tor
several reasons. One of these is that unles s
the beads of fact can be strung in order and
pattern on the threads ot a theory, there is a
strict limitation upon imparting p sychological
knowledge to others. Theories are mnemonic de
vices that make science teachable . And theories
are the basis or working concepts. They enable
men to confront new tacts and deal with them
successfully. Furthermore, theories are re
quired to direct the search for relevant facts.
It is theories that endure, not facts • • • •
It is theory rathe r than fact that leads to new
controls over nature and e vents . From theory
inferences can be made and new applications de
vised. 10

Since Guthrie p laces so much reliance on facts in

theory building, it is interesting to note his di scus sion

of facts.

"A tact, " he says, "has a peculiar and intricate

9Ibid. , pp. 13 -15.

10Edwin R. Guthrie, " Psychological Facts and Psycho
logical Theory, " Psychological Bulletin, XLIII ( January,
1946 ), 3 -4.

structure.
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It belong� _ to two ·worlds, the world of ob jects

and events, and the world ot human discourse. "11

become facts when they are described b y peop le.

Facts only

"A tact is

an event so described that any observer will agree to the
description. "1 2 He hastens on to say that no tacts will

meet this requirement.

"There are, therefore, no absolute

facts, and a universe without men and human discourse would
be a universe without tacts. n l3
Shoben tells us that

A theory is a generalized statement ot something
that we know. It is usetul because it allows us
to understand a multitude of concrete cases
through the application of a general principle. 14

He goes on to say that these generali zed statements are in

escapable since understanding our world consists in general
izing experiences in particular times and situations to

events in other times and situations.
cussion is a word of caution:

Along with this dis

• • • It might be weli to belabor the obvious
in pointing out that theories are man made. Con
sequently, they are subject to the limitations,
distortions, and errors that creep into virtually
all human products. 1 5
11�. ,

P•

1.

13 Ibid.

14Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr. , " Psychological Theory
Construction and the Psychologist, " The Structure of Scien
tific Thought, Edward H. Madden, editor (�oston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 19 60 ) , P • 1 53 .
1 5Ibid.

Hu11 16 points out that the beginnings of science
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evolve from everyday activities, and from the se activities

comes a body of observations and simultaneously a para�lel

body of ideas or interpretations of these observations .

The orderly arrangement of the observations con
stitutes the empirical component of science, and
the logical systematization ot the ideas concerning
these observations constitutes the theoretical com
ponent. 17

Systematic natural-science theory properly con
sists of three distinguishable portions: 1 ) a set
of definitions of the critical (indispensable)
terms employed in the system ; 2 ) a set of postu
lates concerning presumptive relationships among
the natural phenomena re presente d by the terms;
and 3 ) a hierarchy of interlocking theorems ul 
timately derived trom the postulates by a rigorous
logical process . 1 8

Marx l 9 makes the point that empirical me asurement in

science, is not always possible, consequently a large number

of theories or abstract explanatory principles have been de
veloped .

He sets forth three basic assumptions in support

of arguments relating to theory construction.
His first assumption is:

• • • The ultimate aim of all natural science
is explanation and understanding and not simply
l 6 c 1 ark L. Hul l, "The Hypothetic_o-Deductive Method, "
Psychological Theory, Melvin H . Marx, editor ( New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1951 ) , PP • 21 8-2 33.
�
1 8 Ibid . , p . 2 1 .
1 7 Ibid . , p . 218 .
9

1 9 Melvin H. Marx, n The General Nature or Theory Con
struction, " Pszcholofical Theory, Melvin H. Marx, editor
New York : The Macml Ian Company, 19 51 ) , pp. �- 19 .

prediction and control in a practical sense, as is
often assumed. • • •
Theory, or general explana
tion, is the ultimate o? jective of scienee. 20
His second as sumption is:

4.3

" In the development of any

scientific theory it is impos sib le to avoid direct dependence

upon empirical opera.tions. 0 21

Because ot the inevitability

of some kind of bias in all empirical measurements, the empirical and the theoretical cannot be completely separated;

however, a plea is made tor delimiting as much as possible
the theoretical component s.

The third assumption stre s ses the neces sity for verbal

communication of all scientific investigation.

With the

underlying as sumptions that the ultimate aim of s cience is
understanding, that theories are dependent on empirical

operations, and that all scientific inve�tigation mus t be

verbally communicated, four general characteristics of

theories are introduced:

1. All theories aim at explanation, which means
the establishment of �unotional relationship s be
tween variables • • • •

2. A theory is both a tool and an objective.
Which of these functions i s emphasized largely de
pends upon the degree or confidence--or social
acceptability, and thus 1 tactualnes s • --that it
has achieved • • • •

.3 . Theories are always relative to the b ias
not only of the theorist, but also ot the various
observers upon whose empirical reports he has
depended. • • •
20Ibid. , p.

5.

21 Ibid.
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4. It .follows that alternative .theoretical
approaches can be directly compared, scientific
ally, only it they make dif.ferent predictions
within the same observational .framework • • • • 22

To get a proper understanding of what Marx intended

by the last two characteristics it is necessary to look at

his elaboration ot the points.

First ot all the po int re

garding the inevitability of personal bias in a theory

(characteristic number three, above } was made to clarify the

position that theories are not absolutely " true" or truly

representative of "reality . "

"All problems of ultimate

' reality' are entirely extra-scientific questions, or

' metaphysical ' ones, as the logical positivists would say. "23
Characteristic number tour was explained in prac

.tically the same manner as was number three, ab ove:

Scienti.fically, their {theorie.!7 value is a
matter ot empirical test_ rather than philosophi
cal or logical test, or even practical applica
tion. The various a priori biases which in actual
practice account tor much ot the polemic and in
vective generated in psychological controversies
ought to b e recognized more cle arly and explicitly
as just such, an d not disguised as the •Eparent
functions o.r purely scientitic analyses. 24

Special note should be given to these assumptions ot

science and characteristics or scie ntific theories.

The

point o.f view promoted by Marx is representative ot elabora

tions which provide the major controversies among theorists.
22 Ibid. , pp .

6- 7 .

23Ibid. , P •

7.

24Ibid.

These controversies are noted and elaborated in a subsequent
section of this chapter.

Marx suggests that theory construction depends upon

three ma jor element s ( types of verbal statements or proposi 
tions ) :

( 1 ) empirical propositions- -statements ot "tact" ot

wha t has been observed. ( 2 ) hypothetical propositions-

statements ot supposition, or conjecture. ot what is pre

dicted in observation, and ( 3 ) theoretical propositions- 

generalized statements concerning functional relations among

variables. 2 5

It should be noted that the discussions on theory re

viewed above are discussions by psychologists, comparatively
late-comers to the realm of science.

At this point some elab

orat ion is in order regarding the nature of theory promoted

by the authors noted in the preceding paragraphs.

Hall and Lindzey26 interpret theory a s a conventional

structure of the theorist .

Theory has two basic constructs,

a set of assumptions and empiri eally defined concepts.

The

punoses tor theory are to lead to a systematic expansion of
knowledge, to consistently organize known knowledge. and to

focus the researcher ' s attention only on that which is per
tinent to the theory.
25Ibid.

2 6Hall and Lindzey, � · cit. , pp. 10 -15 .
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Guthrie27 thinks of theory as a pattern and orderly

arrangement of the bead• of facts.

Fa cts, he suggests, be

long to the dual worlds of ob jects and events and of human

dis course.

The ories are useful to (1 ) provide the basis ot

working concepts, ( 2 ) enab le men to confront and deal with
new facts, ( 3 ) direct the search ror relevant facts, ( 4)

lead to new controls over nature and events, and ( 5 ) provide
a framework for making inferences and devising new applica

tions.

Shoben 28 defines theory as a generalized statement

ot something we know.

Its usefulness is to provide under

standing of many concrete eases through applying a general
principle.

Hu112 9 contends that the theoretical component of

science is the logical systematization of ideas or interpre
tations of empirical ob servations.

Its elements are ( 1 ) a

set of definitions of critical terms employed, ( 2 ) a set of

postulates concerning relationships among the phenomena to

which the terms relate, and { 3 ) a hierarchy of interlocking
theorems logically derived b y the postulates.
27outhrie, � · cit. , pp. 1 -20.

28 shoben,

�· c it. , pp. 1 5 2 -157.

2 9Hull, �· cit. , pp. 2 18 -233.

Finally, Marx 30 equates theory with general under-

standing which he says is the ultimate aim of science.
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Ex

planation means functional relationships between variables.

A theory may be an ob jective as well as a tool if there is
a high degree of confidence.

Marx draws a line of demarca

tion between that which is scientific and that which is

metaphysical; theories must be empirically tested.

It is interesting to note that Marx makes the point

that theories are human constructs and have a degree of bias

incorporated into them; yet, he insists that there is the

metaphysical on one hand and the scientific on the other.

By the standards that Marx has set up, i. e. , empirical test,
human biases (values } lie in the realm of metaphysics.

One

is made to wonder if he has not fallen into his own trap.
To proclaim that there is a realm outside the inquiry of

science, yet to incorporate this realm into scientific
theory is illogical.

Many authors are -not as frank as Marx;

they would contend that human values are not incorporated

into this human endeavor ( theorizing } , thus naively assuming
that they have ridded themselves of this perplexing problem.
Marx identifies the three ma jor elements of theory

construction as empirical propositions, hypothetical propo

sitions, and theoretical propositions.

30M arx, �· cit. , pp. 4 -19 .
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It is quite obvious that no comprehensive agreement

exists among these authors; yet, there are some common e le 

ments in their works.
1.

They would agree that theory is an integral part

of scientific endeavor .

Furthe r, comprehensive agreement

with the explanation drawn £rom Dewey regarding science as
an attitude and method is unlikely. 31
2.

They would agree that theory is a generalization

about factual information .

There are varying degre es of

interpretation of the "hardness" of the facts.

These inter

pretation� range from Guthrie ' s "human agreement" criterion
through Shoben • s assertion of that which we " know" (with

. human limitations ) to Marx's demand for ultimate empirical
test.

3. They would agree that theories are constructs of

the scientist .

Here the agreement seems to end.

Thus, among the authors reviewed the extent of general

agreement is severely limited.

the purpose of theory .

There is disagre ement about

Marx would restrict it to explana

tion, which limits its userulness ror m ankind in his en
deavors to attain goals.

Shoben also emphasizes the pur

pose of theory as understanding; however, his thesis that
this understanding is transfe rable from a given time and
3 1 see

pp . 36-38 for Dewey's discussion of science as
an attitude and method .

situation to another time and situation gives theory a re
stricted predictive role.
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Guthrie suggests that theory is

functional tor communication to others, to provide as sist

ance tor collecting and dealing with new tacts, to lead to

controls over nature and events, and tor making inferences.

Here, theory haa not only explanatory functions, but predic
tive functions tor control ot consequential factors.

Hull

doe s not elaborate on the purposes ot scientific theory,

however, he suggests that observations give rise to ideas
(theoretical components ot s cience) and the se ideas give

rise to other observations.

Hall and Lindzey see the de

velopment of new knowledge as the aim of first importance.

There is a similar lack of unanimity of opinion ex

pre s sed on the constructs ot theory.

Hall and Lindzey name

two constructs of theory, a set of as sumptions and em
pirically defined concepts.

Perhaps Guthrie would suggest

that the constructs are concepts, but there is no further
elaboration .

Hull is very specific in his listing of con

structs; these are definitions, postulates and theorems.

Marx's three type s of propositions are empirica1, hypotheti
cal, and theoretical.

The Philosopher and Scientist

Without elaborating further at this point on the agree

ments and lack of agreements on the nature of theory by these

psychologists, a similar treatment of writings by philoso
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phers of science is presented in the succeeding paragraphs .

Perhaps all great scientists are a lso great philosophers of

science:

Einstein, Conant, Bridgman, Eddington, Russell,

Whitehead, and Bronowski, to name only a few .

It is true

that all philosophers traditionally have not emphasized nor
relied on the method ot science.

It is most unfortunate

that so many scientists have pegged all philosophers into

this lot.

William Jam.es • analogy of the tender-minded and the

strong-minded has, alas, been used to describe all philoso

phers and all scientists respectively.

There is reason to be

lieve that many of the scientists who would categorize them

selves with the strong-minded empiricists would more properly
fall with idealist-oriented philosophers.

Those scientists

who maintain that the realm of human values and purposes are
alright but should not be confused with that which is scien

tific is an admission that these areas are outside the bounds
of scientific inquiry.

The insistence by many scientists

that there is no conflict between the fundamental princip les
of theology as well as other manifestations of idealistic

philosophy and the princip les ot science is also an admission
that there is a realm beyond inquiry.
the strong minded?

Could these peop le be

On the contrary, the strong minded would

seem to be more appropriately the person who knows what his

values are and respects the values of others.

He is equally
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willing to examine his own values, giving s erious considera

tion to alternatives, as he is to insist that others do like

wise.

Only in this scientific atmosphere can two or more

people work together for the attainment of common purposes .

To do otherwise is to cre ate a constant state of frustration

trying to out guess one's " partners' " intentions.

Jacob

Bronowski properly poses the question, "Has science abandoned

its own responsibility, because it has lost it s moral j udg
ment? " 3 2 One can come to no other conclusion regarding the

scientists who naively assume for themselves the role of the

man in the white coat who j ust manufactures a product, and
places moral responsibilities for its use on the consumer .

This thesis is elaborated more fully in Chapter III of this

study, but was introduced here to properly define the philos

opher and the scientist .

Discussions � Selected Philosophers of Science and Elabora

tions on Their Points of View

F. ' s . c . · Northrop33 has an excellent discussion of

theory, the intermediate stages of scientific inquiry.

He

reviews the contentions ot Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes,

3 2 Jacob Bronowski, "A Moral for an Age of Plenty, "
Saturday Evening Po st, CCXXXIII ( November 12 , 1960 ) , 26.

33 F. s. c . Northrop, Logic of the Sc ience s and the
Humanities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947}o -
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Morris Cohen and John Dewey; then he expresse s his own point
of view .

Bacon, he says, contends that the first thing to do

when one initiates any inquiry is to put aside all pre

conceived ideas or "idols" and proceed purely inductively.

Even formal logic is rejected since it tends to stabilize
old errors. 34

Descartes • method is one

de pending solely on mathematics.

or pure rational deduction

To initiate inquiry , one

intellectually doubts everything possible and deduces from
the minimum that is lett. 35

Cohen respects both the induction and deduction

methods but he urges that hypotheses be formulated immedi

ately to direct inquiry. 36

According to Dewey, antecedent to any inquiry is an

indeterminate situation--a problem.

This indeterminate

situation becomes problematic in the process of becoming
determinate.

For Dewey, inquiry does not begin with the

collection of facts ; it does not begin by rational deduc

tion; nor does it begin by immediate formulation of an hy

pothesis.

Inquiry begins with a problematic situation. 37

34Ibid . , p. 6.

36 Ibid. , p. 11

35Ib1d.

3 7 Ibid.

, P• 9.

, pp . 12-1 3 .
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Northrop in si s t s that Dewey i s correct about this

fir s t step in inquiry:

Inquiry s tarts only when some thing i s unsati s
factory, when traditional belief s are inadequate
or in ques tion, when the fact s nece s sary to re solve
one s uncertainties are not known, when the likely
relevant hypothe ses are not even imagined. What
one ha s at the beginning ot inquiry is merely the
problem. 3 8
Some di scussion is in order here regarding a point

on which Northrop does not elaborate. Thi s point is the

matter of human purpose 3 9 which seems to logically tit into
a di scussion or the initiation or inquiry.

Plea se remember

the po s tulate tha t theory cannot be. disas socia ted from
theorizing .

In like manner, neither can inquiry be di s

as socia ted from inquiring, nor inve s tigation from inve s ti
gating.

It i s important to remember that the se are human

proce s ses, and to theorize, to inquire, or to inve stigate

are progres sive human proce s ses .

What happen s when an indi

vidual has a problem - -i s suddenly faced with a problematic
situation ?

Without elaborating here on the proces se s in

volved ( i.e . ; reflection to inductive fact s or immediate
deduction) , very soon a solution i s required.

The solution

may be to minimize or to ignore the problem, which is

38 Ibid . , P • 17 •
3 9Throughout this s tudy, "purpo se, " "goal" and "ob 
jective " were used synonymou sly • . The u se of either <;>f - the
three term s wa s determined by the customs of general u sage.

nonethele s s a solution.

This negative solution probably

me ans an alte red purpose, or it could me an that the problem
was not a valid one .

A posit ive solution to a problem would

be to alter the method 0£ purpos e attainment.

In the posi 

tive approach the oriz ing is more force:fully utili zed, al

though s ome theori zing is use d in a negative solution; in
de ed, in some instance s, all pos itive approache s may have

be en exhausted.

So, our individual is confronte d w ith a

problem , and a solution--some solution--is ine vitable .

A

pertinent que stion is, "How did it happen that he got him
se lf mixe d· up with this perplexing problem? "

The logical

reply is that he was progre ssing through time and space, not
,_

aimle s sly, e lse the proble m would not have occurred ; but,

rather, he was progre s sing through time and space purpose 

tully--toward de termine d obje ctive s.

With some degre e of

intelligence a method for approaching this obje ctive had

been worke d out.

Had there been no pre determined method of

approach, there could be no objective.

Under the se circum

stance s, progression through time and space would be by

sheer chance; an ob je ctive would be what "Just happened" not

what was aought afte r.

-

-

Now, with the ob je ctive (purpose )

be ing pursue d within the contine s or a pathway me thodologi

cally charted with a certain degree of intelligence, here
looms be fore the individual a proble m .

The problem is an

indeterminate situation simply be cause it hovers in this
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progressive movement in time and space between the particular
point where the individual is at the moment and the point

where he is going--his objective , or his determinate situa
tion.

A word ot caution is inter je cted here .

Isolated pur

poses are me aningrul only as sub jects tor investigation.

Throughout lite there are an infinite number of purpose s ,

a hierarchy ot subpurposes for attaining gre ater purposes .

It should be noted that the methodological proce dure

tor attaining purposes , that is, a reduction of the threshold

of chance, is the role attributed to theory in this study.

Howe ver , that is not the major point intended in this im
mediate discussion.

The ma jor point ot emphasis is :

(1 )

It all scientific inquiry begins with a problem; ( 2 ) and

since a problem is an obstruction in the path of a purpose ;

( 3 ) then, all scientific inquiry is purpose rully oriented.

This antece dent condition and the consequent conclu

sion are vigorously supported and promoted in this study.
Northrop agrees with Dewey regarding the initial

step in inquiry, but he be lie ves that Dewey hastens on too

early toward formulating hypothese s.

Northrop would place

great emphasis on analyzing the problem.

The me thod ot

solution would vary with the nature of the prob lem.

Analy-

sis ot a problem entails reverting to the source ot the

problem as well as examining determinate e lements

or

it. 4°
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The source of the problem, any prob lem, is the set or

assumptions underlying the particular goal being sought.

Galilei and his contemporaries noted by observing the

motion ot pro jectiles such as shells shot from a cannon that
the pro jectiles did not act the w�y they should if Aris
totelian physics were correct.

In Aristotelian physics it

was held that force is that which produces velocity.

In the

case of the cannon sho ts it was evident that the velocity

continued after the force ceased.

The solution to this problem of determining what was

wrong with the Aristotelian theory of the motion of a pro jec

tile was not obtained by gathering empirical data ( induc
tion).

Deduction from a minimum of data after vigorous

doubting would not be profitable.
ulation of hypotheses suffice.

Nor would immediate form

Galilei analyzed his problem.

"This was accomplished by stating clearly what the prob lem

was and then noting the traditional assumptions which gener
ated it. n4l This analysis ot the problem focused Galilei • s
attention on the theory of force, not on the motion or pro 
jectiles.

The analysis led to gathering data from a simple

observable phenomenon ( dropping a ball from his hand down an

inclined plank to the floor).

From these observed data,

40Northrop, � cit. , pp. 19 - 34.

41 Ibid.

, P • 23 .

three hypotheses were formulated.
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From each hypothesis de

du ctions were made to determine what might follow if the
hypothesis were true.

put to empirical test.

The deduced c onsequen ce could then be
Thus, came a new definition of for ce

which is the foundation of modern me chanies. 4 2

Northrop' s discussion of the experimentation of

Galilei serves to point up a very vital ingredient ot theory,

the assumption.

The idea is erroneous that scientific in

quiry begin s by empirically observing minute particles, then

after making ample observations, generalizations of me aning
are formulated.

Rather, prior to any empiri cal investiga

tion there are certain assumptions, many ot which can never
be verified b y empiri cal indu ction.

more fully in Chapter V.

Thia point is elab orated

After the initial analytical stage ot inquiry, North

rop introduces the second stage, that of induetion. 43

This

process involves observation, des cription and classifica
tion.

Here it is importan t to take spe cial note that for

Northrop, indu ction is not de aling with pure empiric al fac t.
Following the immediately apprehendable facts, which are

non-fun ctional, c ome c oncepts and desc ribed fact.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if one
wants pure ta ct, apart from all theory, then one
�2Ibid. , PP • 22-27 .

�3Ibid. , PP •

35- 58.

must keep completely silent, never reporting, either
verbally or in writing, one's observations to one's
colleagues. For the moment � one reports or describes
what one has observed, one has described tact rather
than merely observed, or immediately apprehended,
tact. In short, one has observed tact brought under
concepts and propositionized. And to have concepts
and propositions is to have theory. 44
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The third stage ot inquiry tor Nothrop is that ot de

ducing hypotheses, which is injected into the system ot in
quiry when the assumptions are by postulation, i. e., unob

servable data.

The method ot test is from logically de

duced hypotheses.

The methods are well known. They involve the
construction ot a deductively formulated system.
The basic assumptions or postulates ot this sys
tem designate unambiguously what is proposed to
exist. To this proposal or hypothesis, formal
logic is then applied to deduce theorems or con
sequences . • • •
The experiment designated by
the theorem or theorems ot the theory is then
performed. 45

It should be noted that logical deduction is required

tor theoretical systems whose assumptions consist ot con
cepts by postulation ( unobservable data ) .

If the science

were not advanced sufficiently beyond intuition (immediately
observable data } , then the induction stage would conclude
the inquiry.

It would be unnecessary to derive theorems

from immediately observable data because the data itself

constitutes the test.

44Ibid. , p. 36 .

This is a very elementary kind ot

45Ibid. , pp. 60 -61.

scientific inquiry .
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Status studies in education are an ex

ample of this kind of inquiry.

Such studies are signifi

cant when they are used to predict consequences in a more
advanced type ot inquiry.

However, even immediately ob 

servable tact, when it is communicate d becomes interpreted

fact, not pure tact.

this.

The scientist needs to be aware of

From an examination ot Northrop ' s three introductory

stages ot inquiry the elements ot assumptions ( postulates )

and hypotheses ( theorems ) can be pulled out.

These two ele.

ments are associated by logical deduction- -hypotheses from
�

the assumptions, and they are themselves composed of con
cepts.

The propositions ot any empirical scientific
theory tall into two groups, · termed ' postulates •
and • theorems. ' The propositions termed postu- �
late s are related . to those termed theorems by
the formal logical relation of formal implica
tion. Given the postulates, the theorems can
be derived b y nothing b ut the rules ot formal
logic. • • . Q.6

Northrop continues with this discussion and explains

the roles ot each ot these two elements:

The postulates ot a deductively formulated
theory are those propositions which are assumed
in the theory in question as logically un
provable and which are sufficient to enab le one
to prove, i . e . , to logically deduce the theorems.
The theorems ot a deductively formulated theory
are all the emp irical propositions in the theory
46 I b id. , P • l40 .

other than the postulates . They have the additional
essential property of being provable in terms of the
postulates . Thus, if one assumes the postulates,
formal logic requires one to accept the theorems .
This is quite independent of the empirical , as
opposed to the formal logical question or the truth
or falsity of the postulates .
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A postulate or a theorem, i. e. , any proposition
in any empirical scientiric theory, is a collection
of concepts . 47

With regard to the purposes of theory, Northrop is

very specific in stating that its purposes are predictive .
It is often said that the criterion of a scien
tific theory is its predictive power . Predictive
power depends upon establishing connections between
the present and the future. The more these connec
tions between the present and . the future can be shown
to be necessary, the greater and the more unequivo
cal the predictive power. 48

The above is a very pertinent statement by Northrop .

Prediction, he points out, is the relationship between the

present and the future .

Predictive power increases ac

cordingly as this relationship can be shown to be necessary.
It will be noted that this point of view is sub

stantially difrerent from that promoted by the positivists

that s cience only deals with what is and avoids what ought
to be.

To establish relationships between the present (is )

and the future (ought ) , the future must already be assumed
to soma extent.
47Ibid .

48 Ibid. , p . 115 .

Northrop points out that a science which restricts
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itselt to directly observable entities and relations loses

its predictive power.

It tends to be merely descriptive and

accomplishes little more so far as prediction is concerned

than to express hope that the sensed relations between the
entities of the particular sub ject matter today will recur

tomorrow. 49

To suppose that science deals only with what is and

yet has the capacity to predict is indeed, as Northrop

points out, a very weak supposition that there will be a

recurrence tomorrow of the relationship established today.
This hardly does justice to the scientific endeavors that
have resulted massive technological achievements l

It per

haps could be argued that the predictive powers ot science
are unfocused.

Indeed, such has been argued; however, it

is outside the bounds ot any logical understanding to sup

pose that a scientist repairs to the laboratory, starts ex
perimenting, and opens the frontiers ot knowledge!

He does

this no more than the target shooter closes his eyes, fires
blindly and then searches to find what he hit.
a target; so does the scientist.

He fires at

Accidental creations ot

the scientist are rare, and even then, these creations are
intermediate to activities directed toward other purposes.

Should the re search terminate with these "accidental" cre

ations, a change ot purpose is indicated.
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The scientist is

shooting at a target ; his activities are purposeful.

The

predictive power ot his activities are determined by the re
lationship ot his "ises" and his " oughts. "

-

.

It should also

be rememb ered that the " is " state is so interpreted because

ot past experiences and has within itself no validity except
through interpretation.

Northrop ' s discussion o� theory has been elaborated

in great detail .

This elaboration was deemed important be

cause ot the tremendously deep insights which he possesses.
Many ot the interpretations were indeed extrapola

tions ot what Northrop said, however no liberties were in 

tended.

From his point ot view the interpretations and dis

cussions seemed logical.

Some examination ot other writers who are categorized

as philosophers and/or philosophers ot scien ce follows in

the subsequent paragraphs .

Norman R. Campbe1150 describes theory as follows:

A theory is a connected set ot propositions which
are divided into two groups. One group consists ot
statements about some collection ot ideas which are
characteristic ot the theory; the other group
50worman R . Campbell, "The Structure of Theories, "
Readings in the Philosorhy ot Science, Herbert Feigl and
May Brodbeck-;-iditors ( ew York: Appleton -Century-Crofts,
Inc. , 1953), pp . 2 88 -308.

consists or statements of the relation between these
ideas and some other ideas of a different nature .
The first gro up will be termed collectively the
'hypothesis' of the theory; the second group the
! dictionary. • 51
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It should b e noted that Campbell's use or terms are

different from uses enco untered thus tar .

The important

thing is that this different use or terms b e recognized s o
that the meaning o r his discussions will not be distorted.

He defines an hypothesis as " · • • a proposition which is

put forward for consideration, and concerning the truth or

falsity of which nothing is asserted until the considera
tion is completed. " 5 2

He goes on to say that t he word

hypothesis necess arily implies doubt b ut it should be doubt
of a positive nat ure, a s uspense ot judgment, rather than
do ub t of a negative nature, an inclination to disbelieve.
To interpret:

Campbell has said that a theory is a

connected set of propositions which are divided into two

groups .

One group, the hypothesis, consists of proposi

theory.

The other group, the dictionary, consis ts ot propo

tions ab out a collection of ideas characteristic of the

sitions or the relation between ideas composing the hypothe

sis and other ideas of a different nature.
further on these two elements:

He elab orates

The hypothesis is s o called, in accordance with
the s ense that has just been stated ( a suspense of
51I b id. , p. 290.

judgment ) , because the propositions composing it
are incapable ot proof or of diaproot by them
selves; they must be significant, but taken ap art
trom the dictionary, they appear arbitrary assump 
tions. They may be considered a ccordingly as pro 
viding a definition by postulate ot the ide as which
are characteristic ot the hypothesis. 53
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Campbell continues with a discussion of the element

which he terms the dictionary:

The ideas which are related by me ans of the
dictionary to the ideas of the hn>othe sis are, on
the other hand, such that s omething i s known about
them apart from . the theory • • • • The dictionary
relates some ot these propositions ot which the
truth or falsity is known to certain propositions
involving the hypothetical ideas by stating that
it the first set of propositions is true then the
second se t is true and vice versa; this relation
may be expressed by the statement that the first
set implies the second. 54

It is important to note that the role of the diction

ary is to re late one set of ideas , those comprising the

hypothesis with another set of ideas, which Campbell terms

concep t s.

Here again is a special use ot the term concep t,

which is defined:

a " · • • collection of fundamental judg

ments; and the propositions involving these ideas , of which
the truth or falsity is known, are always laws. " 55

To equate Campbell ' s ide as ot theory with the ideas

ot Northrop may provide some clarity.

Each ot them are pre

senting structures that have considerable similarity.

Campbell ' s hypothese s would be synonymous with Northrop ' s
53Ibid.

54Ibid.

55Ibid. , p. 29 1 .

assumption by postulation, i . e. , a set ot propositions in

capable ot proof or disproof by themselves.
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Ca mpbell' s con

cepts or laws, the ideas propositionally related to the hy

potheses, would probably be synonymou s with Northrop ' s hy

pothesis or theorem ( Northrop uses hypo thesis and theorem

interchangeably ) .

tionship here.

There may be a question ot strict rela

Northrop ' s theorems were propositi ons to be

tested, whereas, Campbell seems to be convinced of the soli

darity ot his laws.

At any rate, the relationship would ex

ist in the framework of the theoretical structure.

Camp

bell ' s dictionary is a bit more difficult to relate t o North

rop' s structure.

The dictionary is a set of propositions

which explain the relationships between the hypotheses and
the laws.
two.

These serve to explain relationships between the

Northrop uses logical deduction to derive theorems

from the assumptions.

This is substantially different from

just ·showing relationships.

This difference is to be

expec ted with the great stock which Campbell places in the
rigidity of his laws.

The laws exist independent of the

hypothesis with the dictionary pointing our relationships.
In Northrop' s structure, the validity of the theorems was
.

�

dependent on the validity of the assumptions from which
they are deduced .

Suffice it to say that positionally with

in the two structures Campbell' s dictionary and Northrop' s
formal logic are synonymous, but they differ in function

66
because of the difference between the nature or the laws and

the the orems of each respectively.

It is worth noting some of Campbell's assertions re

garding frequent misrepresentations about the nature of
theory.

First of all he decries the tendency to contrast

theory with pra ctice.

Although this separation is justified

etymologically, the separation is usetul for only discussion

purposes to separate consideration by intellectual processes

from manipulative details.

For in this original sense ot the word all proposi
tions are necessarily theoretical, since they con
cern thought and not action; and in this sense all
science , in so far as consists ot propositions, is
theoretiea1 . 56
The idea that there are propositions •true in
theory, but false in practice ' has its foundation
only in the incompetence of the uninitiated to
understand theory, and in their habit of applying
propositions to circumstances entirely foreign to
the theory.· To those who have not the �ower to
think, theory . will always be dangerous. 57
The above statement is in opposition to the desire ot

those whom Campbell refers to as half-educated persons to

rely on practical conclusions rather than on the reasoning
of the theorist .

The views ot 'practical men ' are usually de
rived from assumptions and arguments no less com
plex than those on which theory is based; they are
56Ibid. , P • 288.
57 Ibid . , P • 289.
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more and not less liablt to error because they are
less openly expressed. 5�

Other misrepresentations that Campbell takes issue

with are ( 1) that theoretical propositions are contrasted

from other types by the amount ot thought required; ( 2 ) that

propositions in science are termed theories because they are

complicated; and ( 3 ) that the more theoretical is a proposi 

tion the less should be the conviction of its truth. 59

He

states that theory is a question of degree and science be

comes progressively more theoretical as it progresses from

th� elementary and fundamental judgments to the various
ranks of propositions . 6 0

J. W. N . Sullivan6 1 in his excellent disc ussion of

scientific ideas says that the aim ot science is the con

struction of theories as opposed to the formulation of
purely de scriptive laws.

Just as a law unities a group of phenomena, so
· a theory unifie s a group of laws . A theory is, as
it were , a central principle, rrom �hich the
various laws belonging to it can b e deduced. The
58Ibid.

59 Ibid. , pp. 288 -289.

60Ibid. , P • 288.
61 J. w . N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science
(New York: Mentor Books, The"'Nev American LYS'rary ot World
Literature, Inc. , 19 52 ) .

outstanding example of this is provided by the most
celebrated ot all scientific theories, Newton's
theory of gravitation. 6 2
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Here, again, is an assertion of the priority of ex

planation as an aim of science.
important in science.

Of course, explanation is

An understanding of the present is

prerequisite for inferring relationships to a future state

or activity.

The predictive purpose of theory is, however,

acknowledged by Sullivan.

Sullivan notes the changes brought about in scien

tific theory with the advent of Einstein's theory of rela
tivity . 6 3

Whereas, under Newton's ideas of mathematical ex

planations from directly observable physical qualities, it
became obvious that such things as force and potential en

ergy are arbitrary creations .

Many people had attempted

manipulations and alterations of Newton's theory of gravi

tation to no avail.

It remained for Einstein to comple tely

sweep away the entire foundations of the theory and insert
a new structure .

This destroyed the solidity of structures

founded directly on observable physical qualities.

"There

is in science, " Sullivan concludes, '1 a certain amount of use-

ful myth.

But the myths are useful because they are, as it

we re , pegs on which the mathematical formulation can be

hung. n 64

62Ib id . ,

P • 4.5.

64Ibid . , p. 1 57.

6 3 Ibid . ,

pp . 1 .57-162 .

It is evident • • • that a true scientific theory
merely means a successful working hypothesis. It
is highly probable that all scientific theories are
wrong. Those that we accept are verifiable within
our present limits of observation. Truth, then, in
science, is a pragmatic affair. A good scientific
theory accounts tor known facts and enables us to
predict new ones which are then verified by observa
tion. b 5
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Sullivan ' s work is an historical chronology ot scien

tific ideas, but his insights into theoretical formulations

are helpful tor our consideration.

The outstanding thesis

of Sullivan regarding theory is the indeterminate nature of

all theoretical structures.

They are unprovable , but are

helpful tor purposes or accounting tor known facts and tor
enabling us to predict new ones.

It should be noted that

verifiability lies within the confines ot our p resent limits

ot observation, which, it will be recalled, Northrop in

sisted are personal interpretations.

James Bryant Conant gives great prominence to
.
.
�
theoretical structures in science.

Science is an interconnected series or concepts
and conceptual schemes that have developed as a
result or experimentation and observation and are
fruitful or further experimentation and observa
tiona. 66

This view attributes to science a dynamic activity

rather than a static state, and it makes or science an

-

6 5. Ibid. , p . 158 •
6 6 Jame s B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 195]:'T; p. 25.

activity from a theoretical frame ot reference .
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Conant sug

ges t s that one may consider science a s an attempt to lower
the degree ot empiricism or conversely to extend the range

of theory . 67

He defines empiricism as "The observation ot

facts apart from the principles which explain them, and

which give the mind an intelligent mastery over them. n 68

So, rather than science being an activity directed toward

.further empiricism (pure facts), science is directed toward
lowering the threshold ot empiricism .

Conant's �onceptual scheme, " synonymous with what has

heretofore been called "theoretical structure, " is examined
below.

Activity baaed on a conceptual scheme is not limited

to any particular scientific endeavor, but is typical of an

intelligent way of life :

Literally every step we take in life is deter
mined by a series of interlocking concepts and con
ceptual schemes. Every goal we formulate for our
actions, every decision we make, be it trivial or
momentous, involves assumptions about the universe
and about human beings . 6 9

The above i s a highly significant statement, and

should serve a s a topic tor consideration by those who
67 Ibid . ,

P•

6 9Ibid. ,

pp. 135-136.

58 .

68 Jame s B. Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man
(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday and-COmpany,
Inc . , 1952), p . _ 41 .
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suppose that the realm of metaphysics is outside the realm
of a conceptual scheme.

It is always an enlightening exer

cise to analyze the bases ot any act or behavior.

Such an

analysis always results in one of two conclusions; either

the act of behavior is justified on the basis or assumptions
about the nature of the universe and of mankind, or the in

dividual concludes that· the act of behavior was a very fool

ish one because or a lack of consistency with basic assump
tions held.

These assumpt ions of an instance or behavior,

whether conscious or unconscious, are indeed providers of

The concep tual

our frame of reference in acts of behavior.

schemes are evolutionary in their comprehensiveness and in
their reliability .

Citizens today take for gr anted things

which their ancestors never dreamed possible.

Our concep

tual scheme must not only be composed of current knowled ges

but, as Conant has suggested, they mus t be "f'ruittul of
.further experimentation and observations. " 7 0

Conant quotes

from William James a pass age descr ibing man ' s construction
or a conceptual order :

The intellectual lif'e of m an consist·s almost
wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order
for the perceptual order in which his experience
originally comes. , • •
Every new book verbal 
izes some new concept, which becomes imp ortan t in
propor tion to the use that can be made of' it ,
Different universes of thought thus arise, with
specific sorts of relation amon g their ingredients .
7 0c onant, Science and Comm.on Sense,

2.E.• cit. , p. 25.

The world ot comm.on sense ' things • ; the world ot
material tasks to be done; � the mathematical world
of pure form; the world of ethical propositions;
the worlds of logic, of music, etc. , all abstracted
and generalized from long-forgotten perceptual in
stances, from which they have as it were f lowed
out, return and merge themselves again in the par
ticulars of our present and future perception • • • •
Percepts and concepts interpenetrate and melt to
gether, impregnate and fertilize each other.
Neither, taken alone, knows reality in completeness.
We need them both as we need both our legs to walk
with. 71
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Man must be constantly at work improving his concep 

tual order, thus lowering the threshold of empiricism.

A conceptual scheme when first formulated may be
considered � working hypothesis � � grand scale.
From it one can deduce, however, many consequences,
each of which can be the basis or chains ot reason
ing yielding deductions that can be tested by ex
periment. If these teats confirm the deductions
in a numberor instances, evidence�cumulates
tinaing to confirm the working hypothesis on a
-new
asa
grand sciie, which soon becomes accepted conceptual scheme. 7-Z--

A close correlation can be detected b etween Northrop's

theoretical structure and that of Conant.

Conant's working

hypothesis on a grand scale would correspond with N orthrop's
postulations.

Both authors depend on deductive reasoning as

the next step, and both require experimentation to veri�
the deductions.
science :

Conant identifies three elements in modern

(1) speculative general ideas, (2) deductive

71 Ibid. , p. 32, citing William James, The Philosophy
ot WilliaiiJames, Drawn from His Own Works. Introduction by
H. M. Kallen (New York : The Modern Library, 19 2 5).

7 2 Ibid. , P •

47 .

reasoning, and (3) experimentation . 7 3
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It will be recalled

that Northrop ' s three stages ot scientific inquiry were :

( 1 ) analysis or problematic situation, which involves cheek

ing the assumptions; (2) induction ; and ( 3 ) logical deduc
tion or theorems tor testing.

Discussions

!!Z Selected Authors in Educational Administration

and Elaborations on Their Points or View

The preceding discussion by psychologists and philos

ophers or science regarding the nature or theory gives rise
"What does this have to do with

to a pertinent question :

educational administration ?"

This section of the chapter is

devoted to reviewing and interpreting selected writers in ad
ministration who have concentrated on the problem or admin

istrative theory .

In Chapter I or this study, mention was made of the

work at SSCPEA in administrative theory.

This work was

first reported in Better Teaching in School Administra tion, 74
'

.

which was followed by Professors Graff and Street's compre-

hensive treatment of the theory or administrative competence
7 3 Ibid. , P. • 49 •
7 4southern

States Cooperative Program in Educational
Administration, Better Teaching in School Administration
(Southern States Cooperative Program in Educational Adminis
tration, 1956 ) .

in Improving Competence in Educational Administration. 7 5
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The final report of the nine-year program , A Profes sion in
Transition, 7 6 discus ses activities of the group , including
their efforts with theory.

Those working in the SSCPEA program concluded that a

theory ot educational administration is e s sential tor compe
tent task performance and that a ma jor role of a training

program tor educational administrator s is to provide oppor
tunity for the s tudent to develop a s ound theory.

They pro

posed some guides for a preparation program that may provide
this opportunity tor theory development. 7 7

It is obvious that one does not get a theory
s imply by memorizing principles of educational ad
ministration. He must internalize important con
cepts about individuals and group s , democracy as a
way of lite, education, and administration. These
concepts become values and beliefs by which he
lives and works. They indicate what is i� g rtant
and how he should act as an administrator. ,

The above statement is a forceful endorsement of the

importance of theory and its importance to the administrator.
7 5orin

B. Graff and Calvin M. Street , Improving Com
petence in Educational A dministration ( New York: Harperand
Brothers;-1956.
7 6rruman M. Pierce and A. D. Albright, A Profe s sion
in Trans ition ( Southern States Cooperative Program in Educa
tional Administration and Its Succes sor , As sociated Programs
in Educational Administration , 1960 ) .

77 southern States Cooperative Program in Educational
in School Administration , � ·
Administration , Better Tea ching ·
cit. , pp. 17 8 -1 94.
7 8 Ibid. , p. 17 8.
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It is contended that " theory houses the fundamental logic or
justification b ehind all administrative actions. n 79

The

composition ot a theory or educational administration is dis

cussed in the following quotation:

A theory or educational administration is,
broadly speaking, a collection or concepts or prin
ciples that define what educational administration
is and that give directions to an indiTidual at
tempting to be an educational administrator. I t
is conceivable that a theory of educational admin
istration would include concepts relating to the
nature of individual and group life, the major
tenets or American demo cracy, the purposes ot pub 
lic education , the n ature of the administrative
process, aud the functions of e ducational admin
istration. HO

It will be apparent that the use ot the term " theory"
by the SSCPEA work groups corresponds with Conant's "working
- .
hypothesis on a grand scale" or N orthrop's "postulations. "
This elemen t ot any theore tical s tructure is the framework

tor deducing hypotheses.

Although " theory" as used b y SSCPEA

does not in clude the e ntire conceptual scheme, it does, in
fac t , include the theoretical element or the s cheme.

That

is, this use of theory does not include the element of logi
cal deductive relationships from the assumptions to the hy

potheses, or theorems, or the ele ment of hypothesis or
theorem.

However, sin ce it is synonymous to the assumptions

or postulates of a scheme , it is that element which provides
79 Ibid. , P • 51.
BOibid. , p.

47 .

the base for interpretation
the theoretical element.
the validity

or phenomena; in b rie r, it is
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As has already been pointed out

or any hypothesis or theorem ( or law, tor those

who insist on this stronger term) is proportional to the
validity of the assumptions from which it was deduced.

Con

ant called to our attention that every act of human behavior

involves assumptions about the universe and ab out man.

Rather than be content with unexamined assumptions, the

SSCPEA group proposed that these assumptions which dire ct

our behavior - be sub jects tor investigation and improvement.
It appears to be a valid expectation that preparation pro

grams would be concerned with behavioral determinants.

To

concentrate on the administrative acts without concern tor

the framework from which the particular situation was inter
preted, and the particular act selected, is to concentrate

on the symptoms and ignore the causes.

There are those who would be offe nded by introducing

metaphysical elements into a discussion or theory.

Wolfgang

Kohler in discussing the tenden cy of b ehavioristic psychology
to maintain that human thinking as an experience is irrele

vant because science, to be ob jective is only concerned with

tacts observab le from the outside, po ses a question which is
pertinent to the discussion here:

" I s it not the busines s

of science to destroy evidence? " 8 1
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One gets the impression

that the attitude is, " Let ' s ignore it and maybe it wi ll go

away. ''

The question is clear.

Shall metaphysical assump 

tions be honestly stated and sub jected to examination, or

shall they be furtively and/or reluctantly avow ed with the

naive insistence that these directors of behavior make no
difference. 82

In discussing the foundations of the competency

pattern, Professors Graff and Street assert that:

Since competence is so completely bound up in
living and acting in the 'right ' way, clearly that
• right ' way will depend upon a particular point of
view, which will provide an entree into one or the
important problems of competent behavior (philo
sophical assumptions ) and will establish a refer 
ential basia for further examinations regarding
com.pa tence. tj 3

This use of the term tttheo:ry" by those individuals

working in SSCPEA to refer only to the set of assumptions of

a conceptual scheme does not mean that they were unconcerned
about the other eleme nts of the scheme.

The competency

pattern is itself a comprehensive theoretical structure with
8 1wolfgang Kohler , "Gestalt Psychology Today, " The
American Psychologist, XIV (December, 1959 ) , 732.

82For the complete statement of the postulations
undergirding the competency pattern, see : Southern States
Cooperative program in Educational Administration, Better
Teaching in School Administration, .2.£• cit. , pp. 11 7 -124.
8 3 oraft and Street, ££• cit. , p. 10 3 .

( 1) assumptions--the theory element, (2) logical inrerences,

and (3 ) working theorems--tasks and skill s.

Ma j or emphases

were placed on the set of assumptions which directed the

selection of consistent job tasks and the concomitant skills

required tor their execution.

Since the purpose of this study· does not require the

examination of particular theories, but rather the examina
tion of theoretical stru cture s, no further explanations of

the competency pattern need be elaborated.

The following di scussions are con centrated on ideas

expressed by contributors to the seminar devoted to adminis
trative theory sponsored by UCEA and the Midwest Admini s

tration Center, held at the University of Chicago, November
11, 12, and 1 3, 1957 . 84 Professor Halpin introduced the
discussion of theory by m aking the following observations

regarding its construction:

The construction of a theory demand s an act of
creative imagination. This is a tough as signment,
and not many of us are equal to it, nor can we get
help from a ' how-to-do-it ' manual. Theories can
not be produced on demand; they evolve, and they
evolve in many shape s and in many different de
grees of precision. The building blocks of which
they are composed--the con structs, the postulates,
the assumptions--may be molar or mole cular • • • •
A theory may be broad and eclectic in its range,
or narrow and specific. • • •
The comp onents of

8 4Proceedings were published in: Andrew w. Halpin .
(ed. ), Admini strative Theory in Education ( Chicago: The
Midwe st Administration Center;-1958 ).

a theory may also differ in the ease with which
testable hypotheses can be adduced from the postulate d model. 6 5
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Although theory possesses all of these characteris 

tics of flexibility , Halpin is disturbed with the wide uses
ot the term, theory.

It is his opinion that this condition

is especially complicated in educational administration be
cause some writers tend to use the term in the sense of

value-theory, i. e. , how administrators ought to behave
rather than how they do behave.

He say s that there is a

need for normative standards, but they cannot be secured

through the methods used tor constructing scientific theory.
In short, the description of events and their
evaluation must be kept distinct. To state the
issue: the imme diate purpose of research is to
enab le us to m ake more ac curate predictions of
events , not t2 prescribe preferential courses ot
human action. 66

Another problem in developing a theory of educational

administration is the tendency to be preoccupied with taxo

nomic me thods.

A third problem is the molar-molecular

prob lem which particularly means the difference between the
comprehension of administration qua administration or a

restriction to educational administration. 8 7

8 5Andrew w. Halpin, "The Development of Theory in
Educational Administration, � in Halpin , � · cit. , p. 5.
8 6rbid.

, PP • 6- 7 .

8 7Ibid. , PP • 9-10.

James D. Thompson, in his discussion of modern
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approaches to the theory88 sets up a set of criteria for a

usable theory.
explanations.
1.

These criteria are listed below with abridged

The variables and constants for such � theory

will be selected for their logical and operational proper

ties rather than tor their congruence with common sense.
Common sense terms should . b e used in systematic

theory only if they possess the precision and clarity for

ordering experience, otherwise new terms must be invented
or adopted.
2.

abstract.

An adequate theory !.!!,! be generalizable, hence

A theory is more powerful as the range of events which

it explains become broader.
aspects of administration.

A theory should encompass all

An adequate theory c annot be limited by time or place.

It would be equally applic able in any country at any time.

3.

The values capable ot being attached to education

and to administration will not be incorporated into the

theoretical system itse lf; instead, the system will treat
such values as variables.

88 James D. Thompson, "Modern Approaches to Theory in
Administration, '! Halpin, � · _ cit. , pp. 20 -39 .

An adequate theory should be applicable equally in
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countries which prize democracy and those which prize other
political ideals.

Similar application would be made to

profit -oriented administration and nonprofit-oriented ad

ministration.

The value factors would be treated as vari

ables instead of being incorporated in the theory .

4.

An adequate theory or administration will be

rooted in the basic social and behavioral sciences.

The subject matter of the fields of social and be

havioral sciences have manifestations in administration.

5.

The focus of

_!E,

adequate theory will be .2!!

processes rather than � correlations .

Correlations within performance are inadequate un

less there is an explanation of how the relationship

oe curs. 8 9

In their discussions or the development of a theory

of educational administration, Halpin and Thompson share
.
.
some common £ears. They are both troubled with the matter
of human values, and they are insistent that these values
be kept out or the structure itself .

They are both con

cerned about the generality or a theory.

Thompson urges

that the more general the theory the better.

One is led to inquire about human purposes in a theory
8 9 Ibid. , PP • 29-33 •

ot univeral applicability.

The development of a theory

82

applicable in any political ideology and at any time would

be quite a feat l
theorizing.

This would be the theory to end all

Can all the aims, aspirations, purposes, and

goals or mankind be universalized into a common denominator?

This would hardly fit into our ideal or the "potential worth
and dignity of every individual. " But, then ., this is an

ideology that must not be included in the theoretical scheme,
except as a variable.

scheme?

What then could be included in the

We are raced wi th the thorny task or developing a

theoretical scheme for explaining and predicting human be
havior, and people have a unique way . or behaving in a manner
that will contribute to the achievement of purposes.

But

here again is an elemen t of purpose that mustn ' t be in
cluded in the theory.

Another thorny problem is that any

theory, including educational administration . is a human con
stru ction--a human who, incidentally, has a purpo se.
left for a theory of educational administration ?

What is

It makes

the chore a bit easier to symb olize the theory, e . g. , if
"A, " then "B . "

But when the transposition or " A " and "B "

is made to human processes, then the · problem recurs .

Either

it will be ne ce ssary to remove the ory construction from

human handicraft and its application from human pro cesses

( or perhaps, it would be possible to assume that people act

irresponsive to purposes), or take an alternative course or

action and admit human purpose as the core or any s uch

theoretical scheme.
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It this alternative c o urse ot action is

adopted--and it is strongly recommended in this study--it

will be unneces �ary to a s sert "that ' s my theory; it ' s not to

be believed in, just to be used. "

A more acceptable ad

mis sion wo uld be that any theoretical scheme is based on cer

tain assumptions.

It could have been based on alternative

assumptions, but the ones used were selected because o r per
s onal values.

To use the theory fruitfully will require that

similar assumptions be held by the user; otherwise the scheme

must be remodeled.

Similar hypotheses neces sary tor use in

educational administration proces ses can never be logically ·
deduced from conflicting ass umptions.

So the theorist must

as sume e qual responsibility with every practitioner tor the

res ults derived from the scheme.

This makes it mandatory

that an adequate theory of educational administration or any
other theo ry have the assumptions clearly defined rather

than maintain that they are not a part of the theory, thus
being mo st unscientific.

These remarks which take is s ue with Halpin and Thomp

son, it should be noted , are logical derivations from the

po stulations o utlined in Chapter I ot this study.

Daniel E . Griffiths9 0 discus sed the structure of

90naniel E. Griffiths, "Administration as Deci sion
Making, " Halpin, �· cit . , pp. _ 119-149 .

theory at the seminar, but his ideas are elaborated more

84

fully in his book, Administrative Theorz91 which is dis
cussed in the following paragraphs.

Griffiths clears the negative slate by explaining

what theory is not:
1.

Theory is not a personal affair.

" It is appar

ently believed by many that theory is a rather personal

matter--that each person works out for himself a theory of

administration. tt 9 2

The administrator should not suppose he

has developed a theory when he forms opinions ab out what
will work as he faces his problems .
2.

Theory is not a dream, a flight or fancy, or a

3.

Theory is not a philosophy.

daydre am.

Here, Griffiths

supports the development or a philosophy but would pla ce it
outside of his theory.

It can b e seen easily that when one develops
a set of values he necessarily involves the other
areas of philosophy. • • •
As imperative as is a
sound philosophy, theory is something el se again.
Just how does philosophy differ from theory? This
is commonly discussed as the ' is-ought ¥ dicbotomy. 9 3

This line of reasoning, Griffiths suggests, has its

origin in logical positivism, a philosophy which is discussed
York:

91Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory (New
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc . , 1959 ) .
92Ib1d. , p. l.4 .

93Ib 1d. , p. 1 5.
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in detail in Chapter III ot this study.

4.

Theory is not a taxonomy.

Here again, Griffiths

acknowledges the values of a taxonomy and states that

.

.

• One could probably make a very good arguement to sup-

port the contention that any science begins with a taxon

omy. "94

He labels the competency pattern as a taxonomy. 9 5

Griffiths, before discussing the nature of theory,

appropriately considers some characteristics of science.

Science seeks to accomplish three things :
explanation, and prediction.
are:

description,

The characteristics proposed

ob jectivity, reliability, operational definitions,

coherence or systematic structure, and comprehensiveness. 9 6
Ob jectivity, we are told, means not only that the

science must be tree from bias and prejudice but it must
be capable of testing by any intelligent person who has

the necessary technical equipment for making the observa
tions.

Reliability is concerned with confirmation by others

working . on the same pro blem.

Operational definitions are discussed as follows :

"The concepts which are used in a science must be defined
94Ibid. , p . 17.

9 5Ibid. , PP • 13-19.

9 6rbid. , pp. 21-24.

by a series of operations which permit the perception and
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identification of the phenomena referred to by the con

cepts . n 9 7

Coherence or systematic structure means:

" Not a mere

eollection of miseellaneous items of information, b ut a

well-connected account of the facts is what we see k in

science. n 9 8

Comprehensiveness is a plea for abstract concepts. 9 9

Next , Griffiths proposes a set of criteria tor a

theory ot administration. lOO

The first criterion is,
" Theory as a guide to action. n lO l

Unless a theory can provide guidance t or the ad
ministrator when he needs to act , it is a poor
theory indeed. The he l p which an administrator
gets from theory . is not in terms ot what he ' ought'
to do. Guidance in this area comes trom his � value 
system. The help he g e ts from theory is in terms
of what will happen if he does a certain thing.
In other words, theory deals with the consequences
ot action. • It the administrator does this, then
this will happen' is, in brief, theory in action. 10 2

The sec ond criterion is, " Theory as a guide to the

collection of facts. " 10 3

Theory provides a relationship of

facts one to another, and, thus, is useful tor insuring that
97Ibid. , p. 23 .
9 9 rbid.

, pp.

2 1- 24.

101 :r bid. , p. 2 5.
1 0 3Ibid.

9 8 Ibid. , p. 23 .

l0 0 1 bid.

l0 2 Ibid.

, pp. 24-27 .

only related facts are gathered.

In building a theory, facts

are sought which bear upon the concepts devised, and once the

theory has been written, tacts are sought which are sugges ted

by the theory or are needed tor its validation.

"Theory as a guide to new knowledge tt l04 is the third

criterion.

Theory guides the researcher to new knowledge b y

testab le hypothe ses which it sugge sts .

Finally, "theory to explain the nature of adm.inistra-

tion, " is suggested as a criterion .

A theory of adminis-

tration should help in understanding what administration is.
In summary, a theory ot administration must provide

guide s for action, tor collecting tacts, for sugge sting new
knowledge and for explaining the nature of ad.minis tration.
Griffiths recommends that Feigl 1 s definition ot

theory b e adopted:

In order to provide for a terminology which
will not constant l y involve us in a tangl e ot
contusions, I propose to detine a ' theory ' as a
set of as sumptions from which can be derived by
purely logico-mathematical procedures a larger
set of empirical laws • • • • 10 5

Theory, in this sense, is e s sentially a set of assump 

tions from which empirical lava can be deduced b y logico

mathem.atics.

104Ibid. , p. 26.
105Ibid. , p. 28 , citing Herbert Feigl, "Principles
and Prob leiiisot Theory Construction in P sychology, " Current
Trend s in Payeholofieal Theors ( Pittsburgh: Univer sity ot
Pittsb urgh Press, 951) , p. 1 2 .
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In building a theory it is s uggested that the observa

tional approach be used tor des cribing human behavior in
organiz ations.

"All theory building starts with observations
ot some s ort or other . " 10 6
These observations are to be re

ported in the form ot tacts.

They should be collected by

someone not involved in the event reported, and they must be

reporte d in detail in clear, understandable language.

The tir st and major task in con s tructing a theory is

the development ot a set ot concepts to des cribe the administrative situation.

Any theory is based on a set ot con

cepts relevant to the theme of the theory.

A concept is simply a term to which a particular
meaning has been attached. Once the meaning has
been attached to the term, the term should always
be used with this particular meaning; and, con. verse�y, whenever a particular me aning is intended,
the same term should be used. 1 0 7

The recommended approach to be used in proper concep t

tormation is operationism.

Operationism means that concepts

are given their meaning by the methods of observation or

investigation employed to arrive at them and concept s have
no me anings apart from these operations . 108

Griffiths ' point of view about theory development out

lined in the foregoing paragraphs is briefly elaborated on
10 6Ibid. , p. 36 .
107 Ibid. , PP • 38-39 .
108 Ibid. , PP • 40 -42 .

here.

His works were referred to frequently throughout
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other sections of the study.

First of all, Griffiths delimits the activity ot

theorizing to a small minority ot people.

The administrator

is only an applier of theory developed b y administrative researchers. 10 9
Theory is .tu.rther delimited by divorcing it

from philosophy and human values, 110 and the insis tence that

theory is not a personal matter. 111

Furthermore , all con

cepts of a theory must adhere to operational detinitions. 112

Even though theory is defined as being a set of assumptions,
it is still maintained that all theory building starts with
observations which are reported in the form of tacts. 11 3

The similarity of this beginning ot theory by observations to

Bacon's "inductive" pro cess described earlier will be noted.

The thesis promoted by Griffiths is a good example ot

the position maintained by the logical positivists regarding
the nature of science and scientific theory.

Differences

between this and other philosophies appear to set forth the
genesis of fundamental differences regarding the nature ot

theory.

1 0 9 Ibid.

, P•

24 .
14.

lllibid. , P •
113Ibid. , P • 36 .

11 0 Ibid.

, PP •

14-17.

112 Ibid. , PP • 38 -42 .

E.
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THE BASIC CONSTRUCTS OF THEORY

From the various discussions ot the nature ot theory,

a common set ot constructs could not be drawn.

The dis

cussions have, however, given general descriptions ot the

structure or theory that have been most usetul in the de 

velopment or constructs proposed for analysis.
structs proposed are:

The con

( 1) assumptions, (2) logical deduc

tions , and ( 3) hypotheses .

Assumptions are a generally recognized ingredient of

any theory; however , there are disagreements about what con
stitutes an acceptable set of asswnptions, or what takes
place in the process ot assuming.

The development of an

appropriate set of assumptions would for some be tree crea 

tions , while others would insist on a statistical average of
observable facts.

Logical deductions are also quite generally attributed

a place in any theoretical structure, but here again the

process may be one of mathematics or one of many less formal
(but not necessarily less logi cal ) methods.

Hypotheses are not always included in a theoretical

structure.

They sometimes are pla ced outside the structure

as being derivations from the structure itself; that is, it

is held by some that hypotheses begin where the the ory leaves

ort .

It is maintained here , however , that hypotheses are

vital ingredients ot the structure.

They are essentially the

link between the idea and the act .
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That is, an hypothesis,

derived logically trom a set of assumptions, is an expecta

tion ot the consequent .
future.

It is a projected look into the

" If I pe rform this act , then, on the basis ot my

assumptions, the purpose which I em seeking to achieve will
probab ly be accomplishe d . "

These constructs are analyzed and described in detail

in Chapter V of this study.

Some mention should be made of other constructs often

attributed to theory.

These are p ropositions and concepts .

All theories should be subject to verbalization and descrip

tion .

When this is done, the structure is formulated into

propositions.

The propositions are compilations of concepts.

The se two elements, propositions and concep ts, were dis
cussed in the analytical section of the study.

F.

THE PURPOSES OF THEORY IN
..

EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The purposes of the ory in educational administration

are no different from the purposes ot any theory except tor
differences in the nature and purposes ot the particular
process or activity to which theory is applied.

To be more

specific, the fundamental purpose ot any theory is to make

accurate predictions .

But it should be reme mbered that pre

dictions are the drawing ot relationships between the present
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state or activ�ty and a future state or activity.

This

means that the future state has already been identified and
is thus synonymous with a purpose.

future-oriented.

Purposes are always

However, the very fact that they are identi

fiable means that they are important { of value) to the indi

vidual .

This sense of importance has developed from the

individual ' s experiences.

Thus, in the process of theorizing

there is a consideration of past experiences for explanation
of the present and delineation of possibilities for the

future.

All other purposes which can be attributed to theory,

such as description, explanation, delimitation of facts,

understanding, et cetera, are all by-products ot or prepara

tion for the .fundamental aim of attaining purposes { predic

tion) .

This means· that efforts to categorize educational ad

ministration with the ad.ministration of other organizations
is an unfruit:rul ven ture.

First or all the purposes of edu

cational administration must be speci�ied .

These purposes

will always be dependent on assumptions held about the nature
of man, the nature of society, the nature of education, and

the nature of educational administration.

Only af'ter the

purposes have been clearly formulated can the processes and
activities be defined and the characteristics ot the admin
istrator be specified.

After this has been done, then, and

9 .3

only then can comparisons with the administration of other · .
organizations be made.

elements.

Ot course, there will be many common

Preparation programs tor educational administra-·

tors should take advantage of experiences ot preparation pro
grams tor other administrators to avoid unnecessary duplica

tion ot etforts.

But to adopt the experiences ot another

program without first delineating purposes is an invitation
for frustration and despair.
G.

MAJOR CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AMONG THEORISTS

There are many ditferences of opinion about the nature

ot theory, the purposes of theory, the constructs ot theory,
and the several techniques and pro cesses of f ormulating
theory.

Such differences ot opinion are more likely when

dealing with abstractions such as theoretical s tructures

than when dealing with r outine matters.
sarily a serious detriment.

They are not neces

As a matter of fact, they are

oftentimes responsible for progres s tha t could not be possi
ble with old w �ys ot d oing the job.

On the other hand, differences are not always healthy;

they can be exceedingly detrimental to progress and they can
deter new developments indefinitely .

It is the opinion ex

pressed here that some controversies among theorists f all in

this latter category.
import.

These are basic differences of serious

It has been erroneously supposed by some that the
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faculty members in a preparatio.n program should be representa 
tive of different philosophic systems so that the students
will not develop a philosophic bias.

This is a grave e rror.

It is founded on premises incompatible with what is known

about teaching and learning experiences.

The student must

be motivated in a problematic atmosphere .to consider alter

natives and develop his own beliefs after carefully con

sidering others.

This differs from the premise that the

student is the object ot the wares peddled by the professors
and he must get a balanced diet ot idealism, realism, and

pragmatism.

Understanding can never be the ultimate aim of

scientific endeavor .

All of the understandings possible can

not insure intelligent behavior.

Rather, the ultimate aim ot

scientific endeavor must be to point the way toward new and
ex citing experien ces in the future so that man may be able
more and more to control his destiny.

"United we stand ,

divided we fall" is a truism of history and was never more

important than it is now.

It is not proposed here that there

be commonality of opinion regarding the several administrative
processes and methods of operation.

The plea is made , how

ever, that there be unifi cat ion ot opinion about the purposes_
ot educational administration .
It ha s already been stated that most ot the major con 

troversial issues among theorists have roots in different

philosophic beliefs .

It is tor this reason that Chapter III

is devoted to an examination ot · these beliefs .
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Some ma jor controversies about theory which have

potentially serious import are stated b elow in the torm ot
questions .

It will be noted that many ot these controversies

have already been aired in the preceding sections of this
study and a firm s tand expressed.

for this.

No apologies are offered

The major po stulations of this study were ex

pressed at the beginning so that there could be no question

about the point ot view held.

This is the plea made tor all

· theorists in educational administration, that they open th�
linen closet ot beliefs and opinions and place them on the

table for inspe ction.

Since these asswuptions and beliefs

direct acts ot behavior, everyone in the profession has a
right to know what they are.

Otherwise, we are constantly

engaged in a game ot " hide and seek. "

The issues listed be

low are re-examined in Chapter VI in the light of findings

in the analytic end synthetic sections of the study.
1.

Are theoreti cal structures tree of human values?

It should be emphasized that this question has refer

ence to the structure itself and is not restricted to vari
ables .

This encompasses a similar question regarding

whether theory is a public or private matter .
2.

Are theoretical assumptions necessarily generali

zations ot inductive facts ?

This question could b e stated, "Are assumptions always

empirically tes table? ''

There are some who insist that the

tails at both ends are anchored to empirical facts.
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One

wonders about the fruitfulness ot a structure that is tied

to the ground at both ends.
able?

3 . Are all concepts necessarily empirically detinThis controversy is closely related to number two.

This que stion could be phrased, "Are operational definitions
possible tor all concepts in a theoretical structure, when

operational de finitions are restricted to relationships with
empirical re ality .

Grif�iths indicts the formulators ot the competency

pattern with misuse of the terms "operational" and "the ory.nlJ.4
As has already been discussed, whether or not " theory" is

misused depends on what theorists one has been reading .

There

are indications that Sullivan, Conant, Einstein, and . Northrop

would not consider it a misuse.

As for the term "operational,"

the reference ot misuse prob ably refers to Bridgman ' s round

ing of

the

school of thought known as · operationism .

After

reading Bridgman ' s more recent work, Reflection or � Physi

cist, 115 the ace�sation or misuse may more properly be made
or the positivists.

York :

114Grirtiths,

The question become s one or identifying

� · cit. , P •

53 .

Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist ( New
Philosophical Library, 1955) .

11

5p . w .

the reality for anchoring the operational relationship .
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It

the anchor is sought in empirical observations and physical
matter, then Griffiths • indictment is correct.

However, if

the operational relationship is anchored in human values,
then the indictment is most incorrect.

The formulators or

the competency pattern used the term tor identifying opera

tional belie:fs, one aspect or "know-how . "116

4.

Is the usefulness of theoretical structures re 

stricted to explanations ot what is?

'!'his is a challe nge of the traditional "is-ought"

dichotomy.

It is likewise a challenge or the premise that

the fundamental purpose or theory is to increase under
standing.

H.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The purpose ot this chap ter was to investigate the

nature of theory, to define some basic constructs or theory,

to determine the fundamental purposes or theory and to point

out major items or controversy among theorists.

The focus ot attention on theory in educational admin

istration became increasingly more intense as efforts were ac

celerated to make educational administration more professional

and to label the profession as a science .

Controversies

ll osouthern States Cooperative Program in Educational
Administration, Better Teaching in School Administration, ££ ·
cit. , pp. 124-177.
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about theoretical structures bees.me apparent as efforts were

made to divorce s cientific theory from philosophic theory .

The point was stressed in the chap ter that the phil

osopher, the scientist, the administrator, and the man in
the street all theorize as they perform daily acts or b e
It may b e poor theory, but is is nonetheless,

havior.
theory.

attitude.

Theorizing is contextually oriented to a scientiric

Expressions ab out theory by b ehavioral scientists,

philosophers or science, and authors in educational adminis
tration were reviewed and discussed.

From the premises of

postulations stated in this study, many points made by

authors were challenged, many were endorsed, and extrapola

tions were made from some .

The e lement or pur�ose in

theorizing was vigorously stressed .

Characteristics or the philosopher and the scientist

were discussed in some detail.

The b asic constructs or theory were identified as

assumptions, logical deductions and hypotheses .

Elementary

elements or these constructs were identified as proposi
tions and concepts.

The ultimate purpose attributed to theory was "pre

diction. "

Prediction was described as the relationship be

activity .

Other purposes of theory are either by-products

tween the present state or activity and a future state or

of, or preparation tor, this fundamental purpose .
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Equating educational admin istration with admin istra

tion of other organi zations can only be accomplished after

purposes have been clearly defined.

The ma jor controvers ial issues regarding theory are

philosophically grounded.

These maj or issues were identi

fied around the questions of (1 ) the place of human values
in a theoretical structure, (2 ) the free creative or the

restrictive aspects of assumptions, ( 3 ) the empirical defi 
nition o t all c oncepts, and (4) the validity of the "!s
ought" dichotomy.

CHAPTER III

THEORY FOUNDATIONS IN PHILOSOPHIC AND
SCIENTIFIC SYSTEMS OF INQUIRY
A.

INTRODUCTION

Theory has traditionally been associated with inquiry.

A thesis ot this study is that this association is correct,
and discussions of theory, to b e meaningful , must clarify

this association.

The prevalent lay notion that theorizing

is an activity in which impractical men engage themselves

stems from the association of theory with rationalistic

philosophy.

On the other hand, efforts to restrict theory

to a context of inductive science is another association

with a system of inquiry as well as an attempt to break the

prior association with rationalism .

Because of these associations, major differences

about the nature ot theory are fundamentally difference s

about the system of inquiry with which the theory is associ
ated.

There may be minor differences about mechanical or

technical aspects of theory, but f1:l,lldamental controversies,
such as those listed in Chapter II of this study, surpass

controversies about theory per se; they are more basic con
troversies about the nature of the system ot inquiry.

Perhaps some explanation is in order about what is

meant by "systems of inquiry. "

The systems have specific

reference to science and philosophy.

Any sear ch tor new
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knowledge or tor truth is necessarily an ex amination into

what is beyond that which is now known, thus inferring a
future state.

It may be contended, and indeed has been,

that philosophy is not oriented toward inquiry.

It is a c on 

tention here that from the most rationalistic form of ideal
ism t o the most inductive form of empiricism, these systems
are primarily ones ot tuturistic inquiry.

The level of in-

quiry, certainly, will always vary with the quality ot the

investigation and the loftiness ot the pui,,oses sought.

It

has alre ady been noted that many behavioral scientists with

positivistic orientation insist that the fundamental purpose
of s cience is explanation .

The same thing has been said

about rationalism, only the soundness ot the methodology has
been questioned--and very appropriately so.

A position al 

ready stated is emphasized here; i. e., explanation is mean

ingless unless the phenomena being explained have predictive

significance.

When man searches tor deeper understandings

and more comprehensive explanations he does so in order that
control may be exhibited on a future consequential act.

"Why" questions either encompass or point toward questions
-

-

" ot what significance. "

As Jacob Bronowski puts it:

living things act to anticipate the future .

"All

This is what

chiefly distinguishes them from lifeless things. " 1
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The p urpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the

historical evolvement ot modern science .

It will be shown

that ma jor controversies about theory are specific indica

tions ot differences among theorists about the nature of
scientific inquiry.

Major attention is paid to science as

it is perceived in a context of determinism and as it is
perceived in a context ot relativism .
B.

A DETERMINISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SC IENCE

A deterministic philosophy is one that presupposes a

fixity beyond the capacity of man to give it resilience.

�rard De Gre, in expressing his own assumptions of science
I

gave what appears to be the general tenets of determinism:

• • • ( 1 ) that a real world exists independently
ot our knowledge of it ; ( 2 ) that this real world
is to an extent knowable through a process of
approximation ; and ( 3 ) that knowledge is true to
the degree to which it approximates or is isomorphic to the structure of reality. 2

These tenets were held by the early realists, and

there is no evidence of their abdication by modern

1 Jaeob· Bronowski, "science as Foresight, " What is
Science, James R. Newman, editor ( New York: Simonaiid
Schuster, 1955 ) , P • 427 .
Ge rard De Gr;, Science as a Social Institution,
Short Studies in Soc i ology ( Garaen-City: Doubleday and
Company, Inc. , 195 5 ) , P • 37 .
2

empiricis ts , the logical positivists.

10 3

An attempt has been

made to create an anchor or absolute objectivity tor all
thought and activity.

The physical scientists ti�st adopted the idea of

absolute objectivity, perhap s as a revolt against dictates

by the church hierarchy and proponents of Aristotelian

dogma.

Frederic Lilge points out that this course or science

began in the Ge rman universities about 1820 as a revolt

against forms ot id�alistic philosophy:

Since idealism in its various forms was all the
philosophy German scientists had known, the rift
was indeed in•vitable. Yet it was unfortunate.
Scientists might honestly think that philosophy
was irrelevant to their work, an idea which con
tinued concentration on the foreground or tact and
experiment gradually turned into a fixed belief.
But actually science rested on certain assump tions
and employed conceptions which it never proved, and
these constituted nothing less than a metaphysic s •

• . •3

Regardles s

or the cause, the reliance on induction

ror the formulation of scientific theory is still widely

maintained.

" Gathering the tacts" i s a phrase used with

pride by many scientists , apparently without recognition

that the human being has been reduced to a technician who
collects and s orts tacts.

The vast majority of social and behavioral scientists

3 Frederiek Lilge, The Abuse of Learning ( New York:
The Macmillan Company, 19IilfT, PP • 62-63.
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have utilized deterministic concepts ot science tor their

own work.

Prescott Lecky tells us that

The fallacy of ob jective valuation in psychology
is an over-simplifying tendency similar in many
respects to statutory law . In both cases the at
tempt is made to eliminate the question or motive
by declaring it to be of no consequence . 4

Without further generalizations on the deterministic

philosophy of science, logical positivism, the modern-day

expres sion of determinism is examined.
Logical Positivism

Just as it would be impo s sible to define any particu

lar philosophic or theological point of view to the liking

of all who pay allegiance to it, so is it equally impos sible

to define a particular point of view about science . such as
logical positivism, to the liking of all its proponents .

It is, however, possib le to point to some generally he ld

tenets of this idea.

More important, it is po s sible to look

at some consequential products of the promotion of and ad

herence to this philosophy . 5

M odern p ositivism has developed

from a union of many spe cific ideas such as operationism,

4 Prescott Lecky, Self-Consistency, A Theory of Person
ality (New York: I s land-i5re°s a, 1945} , pp . -10-ll . -

5"Philosophy" is used throughout this study to refer
to broad points of view. It is not used as an antonym ot
" science. " When references are made to rationalistic brands
ot philo sophy, the se particular philosophic systems are re
ferred to by name or more generally as rationalism .
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phy•icali8Dl, scientific empiricism, psychological b ehaviorism.,

reductionism, and analytic philosophy.

Some of these have

been pursued more vigorously than others and have retained

their identity; however, positivism borrows from all and has
subsumed most of them.

Logical positivism as it is now known was formally

organize d in 1928 by an impressive group of scientists known
as the Vienna Circle.

The principle aims were to provide a secure founda

tion ror the sciences and to demonstrate the meaningless

ness

or all metaphysics. The method utilized to attain

these aims were the logical analyses of all concepts and
propositions . 6

The two most fund8lllental doctrine s of logical posi

tivism according to Weinberg are:

" ( l ) That propositions

of existential import have an exclusively empirical reference,
and (2 ) that this empirical reference can be conclusively
shown by logical analysis. " 7

The meaning of every proposi-

tion is reduced to atomic tacts.

It should be noted that

although the propositions are said to have empirical refer

ents, the methodology (logical analysis) does not have an

6 J. R. Weinbert, An Examination of Logical Positivism
(Paterson, New Jersey : tittlefield, Adams and Company, 1960 ) ,

P• 1.

empirical anchor.

106

This is explained away by the assertion

that the method is onl1 used to conne ct meanings, not infer

them.

Levi summarizes positivism into six doctrinal theses :

l. The fun ction of philosophy is logi cal analysis.

2. All co nitivel significant ( meaningful ) dis
course "Is9dlv fsible wtthout remainder -into analytI'c
or synthetic propositions.

1 1

3 . A y roposition that purports to be factual
or emlir ca has meaning only if it iapossible in
princ ple to describe � method tor its verification.

4. All me taphysical assertions, being neither
analyti c !!£!: syntheti c proposition, .!!:.! meaningless.

5. There is a single lan age for all science;
it is slmilar1n-torm to the8yangu.'"ige ot physics ,
andall synthetic!?roposit!ons are reducible to
elementary experiences expressible in this iaiigu
age.

6. All norma tive assertions, whether positin
moral, aesthetic or religious values, are sclentftic
llJ unverifiable, -and are therefore tobe
- classified
orms of �-cogii!tiiEtd!scour se. S--

An examination of the above theses makes possible some

very interesting generali zations.

First or all, philosophy

has been stripped of all functions save that of analysis •
• • • It should analyze all preten sions to
knowledge so as to clari�y the meaning of terms
and the logical relationships between ideas. In
the end this will mean that philosophy has become

8Albert William Levi, Philosophy and th& Modern World
( Bloomington : Indiana University Presa,�.59)"; pp. 343-345.

the logical analysis of science through the syntacti
cal analysis of scientific language. 9
phy.

ing.

10 7

This, of course, is a very narrow concept of philoso

It is used as a formal deduction for transposing me an

The value world of mankind for the application of

meaning has been omitted from positivism.

Me aning is not vested in the individual, but rather

it re sts in empirical referents and relationships .

All

"meaningful" discourse is either analytical or synthetic.

The formal sentences of logic and pure mathematics, with

out empirical re ferents, can be used to stipulate defini
tions, rules or syntax .

The synthetic discourse is terme d

the factual language ·of science where propositions can be
judged tor tl'Uth and falsity.

Since, it is held, meta

physical assertions do not fall in the two categories of
analysis and synthesis , then they are me aningless .

The con

tention is that metaphysical assertions have supposed

existential import, yet they are non-empirical .

They are

not re ducible to elementary propositions verified in experience.

With the emphases given to language, many inadequacies

were found in the multitude ot different ways of expressing
similar me anings.
. 9 Ibid. , P •

So, a single language was found to be
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necessary .

Levi define s this necessity as follow s:

1 08

Any empirical s cience should rest on a base of
sensory perception and should be intersub jectively
verifiab le. To meet these requirements and to
unity the various special sciences requires the
formation of a universal l anguage of science in
which proposition s from the most various sciences
might b e combined in a single body. Such a lan 
guage would be a thing-language consisting of defi
nite quantity-quality descriptions tor definite
space-time values. 10

A new language was the topic of investigation by

Rudolph Carnap; he was primarily responsible for refinement s

in positivism, known a s physicalism ( sometimes called radi

cal physicalism). 11

The last thesis mentioned by Le vi, that all normative

as sertions are forms of non -cognitive discourse, puts the

role of human purpose out side the realms of a p o sitivistic
science.

assertions

It is contended that an analysis of normative

• • • will always reveal them to be either socio
logical descriptions of moral phenomena, p sycho 
logical descriptions of moral beliefs , emotion
laden · expres sions of moral sentiment or impera
tive statements seeking to compel activity. 1 2

A point of view about meaning on which the positivists

have leaned heavily is operationi sm.

The tenets of

10Ibid. , p. ,+;,
�,. r1. •
llFor example, see : Rudolph Carnap, The Logical �
tax of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan'Paul ; New
York: Humanities . Press, 1937).

12tevi, �· cit. , P •

345.
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operationism are explored in the subsequent section.
Operationism

Operationism { sometimes called operationalism) is an

attempt to establish a criterion ror meaning.

porting has always been important in science.

Accurate re
The work

or

one scientist, to be meaningful to another for further ex

perimentation, must b e accurately reported .

In describing

one's experimentation , the choice ot terminology is impor

tant.

What does one mean when he uses a particular term?

Professor Percy W. Bridgman has been credited with origi
nating operationism. 1 3
11

He described his thesis as follows :

In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set

of operations; the conce pt is synonymous with the correspond-

ing set ot operations. " 14

To Bridgman, a physicist, concepts

were derined in the set of operations that necessitated their
use.

· �

,'

· · ·

Hempel outlines the basic tenets of operationism :

1. • �eanings are operational. • To unders tand
the meaning or a term, we must know the operational
criterions ot its application, and every meaningful
scientific term must therefore permit of an opera
tional definition. Such definition may refer to
certain symbolic operations and it must ultimately
make reference to some instrumental operation.
l3pe.rey W . Bridgman, The Lo gi e of Mode rn Phys i c s

(New . York :

The Macmillan Company,

14Ibid. , p.

5.

92Bj.

2. To avoid ambiguity every scientific term
should be defined by means of one unique operational criterion • • • •

11 0

3 . The insistence that scientific terms should
have unambiguous, specifiab le, operational. meanings
serves to insure the pos sibi lity of an ob jective
test for the hypotheses formulated by means ot
those terms. Hypotheses incapab le of operational
test or, rather, questions involving unte s �ab le
formulations are rejected as meaningles s. 1 /

The above explanation ot meaning is obviously an ef

fort toward the elimination of ambiguity through anchoring
the meaning of concepts to ob servab le operations; meaning
is anchored to physical empiricism.

To what extent Bridgman ,

intende d that this criterion be applicab le to sciences other
than physics is not clear.

Whether it was intende d or not,

psychologists adopted it !_!! mas se to give some stature to
their budding science.

tor their point of view.
..

The behaviorists found rich support

For the empiricists, here was an explanation of

meaning to rid themselves tor good of the perplexing prob lem
ot metaphysic s .

To s ay that Bridgman was displeased with the inter

pretations given to his book is quite an understatement.
1 9 53 ,

at the American As sociation for the Advancement of
15

In

c arl G. Hempel, "A Logical Appraisal of Ope ration
iam, " The Validation of Scientific Theories, Phillipp G .
Frank, 'editor (Boston: B eacon Press, 1956, copyrighted by
American As sociation for the Advancement of Science ) , pp.
53 - 54.
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Science symposium, while reviewing the current state ot opera
tionism he was prompte d to state :

• • • I fe el that I have create d a Franken
ste in which has certainly got away trom me . I
abhor the word operationalism or operationism ,
which seems to imply a dogma, or at le ast a thesis
ot some kind. The thing I have envisaged is too
simple to be dignitied by so pre tentious a name ;
rather, it is an attitude or point ot view gener
ated by continue d practice of operational analy
sis. So far as any dogma is involve d he re at all,
it is mere ly the conviction that it is better, be 
cause it take s us further, to analyze into doings
or happe1J.ings rather than into objects or e n
titie s . l b

To those who perceived here the ultimate in e mpiric

ism, Bridgman clarifie s his position very cle arly:

In general, I think, that there ne ed be no
qualms that the operational point of view will
ever place the slightest re striction on the fre e
dom of the the oretical physicist to explore the
conse quences ot any free me ntal construction that
he is ingenious enough to make. It must be re
membe re d that the operational point of view sug
gested itselt from observation of physicists in
action. 1 7

After Bridgman clari�ied his position in lectures and

publications subse quent to his original book on the sub je ct,

the more empirical-minded advocates of some of the othe r

sciences were content to judge him ( Bridgman ) as a physicist.
The psychologists were espe cially disturbed by his acknowl

e dgment ot the scie ntist as a personality who fre ely create s
York:

16 Perey W. Bridgman , Reflections of a Physicist ( New
Philosophical Library, 1955) , p. n>o7
1 7 rbid. ,

p. 166.
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and influence his research. 18

In positivism and its chief supporting ideo logy,

operati onism, it is apparent th.at the role or science is re

duced to explanation .

This stems from traditional realist

notions dating at least as tar back as Francis Bacon.

The

universe, it is assumed, has a fixity that lends itself t o

discovery .

When applied to human behavior, this same

rigidity of habit is assumed .

There is an alternative to positivism which is ex

plored in the fo llowing section.
C.

A RELATIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

It seemed important t o examine an alternative point

ot view about scientific investigati on.

The discussion here

was correlated with points di·s cussed regarding determinism
to show clearly b oth sides of the philosophical issues.

doubt, many scientists and philosophers with positivistie

No

orientati ons will resent the implication that positivism is

a deterministic philosophy of science .

The break from

rationalism was an effort to get from under the supernatural
universal laws .

The contention b y the positivists that

science is seeking not for truth or falsity, but usefulness
or lack of usefulness is commendab le .

But such strides

18 s. s. Stevens, " Psychology and the Science of
Science, " Psychological Theory, Melvin H. Marx, editor
( New York: The Macmillan Company , 1951 ) , p . 25.
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toward relativism are belied by the insistence upon empiri

cal referents for meaning .

So long a s this insistence is

maintained, words about relativism b y _ the positivists have a

hollow ring.

There are two general areas in which relativism has

had revolutionary effects .
and physical measurement .

These areas are physical matter

These, of course, originated in

the natural sciences ; however, like determinism there are

basic applications in the social sciences .
Quantum Theory

The advances in quantum mechanics during this century

are staggering to the imagination.

The early Greeks specu

lated that matter was composed of small particles which they

called atoms to suggest their basic, individual nature.

"Today, base d not on speculation but on ingenious, indirect

experiments we know that atoms exist; we even know their

sizes and shapes with accuracy, although they are invisibly
sma11. n l9 The only similarity between the atom speculated
by the Greeks and the atom as we now know it, is that the

name "atom" has been retained.

The atom itself is not a

mas s, but the nucleus of the atom is thought to contain mass.

19nonald s. Hughes, "The Elusive Neutron, " Adventures
of the Mind Series, The Saturday Evening -Post, CCXXXIV
(February 4, 19 61), �
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The minuteness of the dimensions of an atom amazes the non
scientist.

It would t ake at least one million atoms to

cross a very tine line, one-tenth or a millimetre wide.

In

side the atom, which may be considered as a zone, electrons
rotate.

In the center

or the atom is one nucleus which is so

small that there would be room tor a billion in one atom. 20

Wuesthotr illustrates the minuteness ot the mass as follows:
Just imagine an iron cube JO feet high by 30
feet wide by 3 0 feet deep. This would be a block
ot iron ab out the size of a small house. It it
were possible to squeeze together all the atomic
nuclei, that is to say all the points at which
the mass is concentrated, then all the atomic
nuclei from these 27 , 0 0 0 cubic feet ot solid iron
would only occupy the space of a pin head. 21

Scientists have made the nucleus a sub ject for in

vestigation , and of its two parts, the neutron which is not
electrically charged and the positively charged proton, the
neutron has been singled out for investigation.

Inside the

neutron, rapidly moving mesons have been found, and ·it is
conjectured that there may be other smalle r particles. 22
Hughes pose s the question tor us:

• • • Are there fundamental particles? Will
we ever find the ultimate particle? With the
20 Freda Wuesthott, " At omic Ene rgy and Peace, " Lecture
given at the First Meeting of the Stuttgart Peace Circle,
March 22, 1947. Printed by the Society for the Scientific
Study of Peace, Ge neva, 19 57 .
21Ibid. , pp.

1 2- 1 3.

22Hughes, .££ • cit. , p p. 22-2 3; 7 5-77.

enormous accelerators now building or in the
planning stage will we be able to split the meson
only to find new submesonic members of our family
of • elementary ' particles? At the pre sent time
no scientist or philosophe·r has a valid b asis for
answering this question. 2 3

11 5

This discussion of quantum mechanics was intended to

point out how unrealistic it may be to lean tor support on
physical reality.

In addition to the minuteness of the subatomic realm,

the shape of these particles and the rate of motion are also

factors which amaze even the physicists.

These subatomic par

ticles simultaneously behave as waves, such as ripples on a
pond, and as particles such as rolling marbles.

Also, at

variance with common sense is the speed of these particles,
which is not uncommon at about the speed of light, 18 6, 000

miles per second.

And, as the speed increases, so does the

weight or the particle, which accounts for the equivalence

of matter to energy. 24

Wuesthoft suggests that these new developments in

physics pose some real responsibilities :

Any physicist who looks out on the world today
and views with open eyes the present position of
the natural sciences cannot but feel an over
powering sense of responsibility. He knows that
the developments which have taken place very
recently in the field of physics have set in
23Ibid. , p. 77.
24Ibid. , p. 75.
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motion revolutionary changes of a most tar
reaching character, which will descend like
avalanches on all fields ot human activity. 2 5

Physicists found themselves in a quandry trying to

conduct experimentation when there were evidences that physi
cal systems behave like particles and like waves.

Northrop

des cribes the method of escaping this predicament as follows:
When exactly des cribed, it [E'he methog' may
be called the method or acting as if one does not
know what one does know. For the benefit of those
who insist upon an abstract and more dignified
title we shall call it the method ot simulated
ignoranoe . 26

This method, described by Northrop, appears to be an

appropriate one not only for physicists b ut for all who seek

intelligent behavior .

It is a way or subjecting our own

values and beliefs to s cientific scrutiny .

It seems that these new knowledges have implica-

tions for challenging traditional reliance on physical matter

in a theory or knowledge.

Levi suggests that, "A type of

physi cal theory which would be congruent with bo th cosmologi
cal and subatomic measurements seems, therefore, to require
a reinterpretation or the categories or time, space, sub
stance, and causality. " 2 7
2 ?Wuesthoft, �· cit . , p. 9.

s . c . Northrop, The Logic or the Sciences and
the Humanities ( New York: The Macmillan Company, 19471,p .
20 2 .
27 Levi, �· cit. , P • 247 •
26F.

Faurot:
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The situation has been summed up well by J. H.

• • • The axioms ot mathematics were at one
time thought to be self-evident; and until fairly
recently, the laws of Galilean physics, although
not considered self-evident, were believed to be
an exact transcription of the structure of nature.
Today among advanced scholars, the view is prac
tically universal that these truths are not abso
lute. We approach some sub jects in terms of
postulates, assuming what is never capable of being
proved. Other subjects, we approach in terms ot
hypotheses, sub ject to varying degrees of proba
bility . And most ot our knowledge is viewed in the
context o� function : a given proposition is true
for certain purposes, and no proposition is true
except these purposes be understood.
Our problem is to live with this new under
standing of knowledge • • • • 28

Experimentalism

John Dewey is largely responsible tor promoting the

philosophic system of experimentalism which is not in con 

flict, but rather complements these new knowledges .

As a

matter of tact this philosophy preceded many of these new
scientific developments.

Two fundamental elements of this

philosophy are intertwined.

These are :

( 1 ) the individual

is the focal point ot all activity and behavior, and (2 ) the
meaning of an idea is dependent on its consequential re
sults.

These tenets have a number of important implications.

2 8 J. H. Faurot, tt Truth and Responsibilit1, '' The
Journal of Higher Education, XXX (January, 1960 ), _ 3-;--
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In the first place, responsibility is removed from the laps

of the gods and .from the inherent nature of the "fact s. ''

Each individual has responsibilities .for his own behavior
and exercises control over his environment.

This makes it

mandatory that people, .from the international level to the
smallest group s , work together .for mutual benefit.

Every

individual must be as s ured ot freedom for his own selt de

velopment, but inherent in every guarantee of freedom is the
expectation that responsibility will be a ssumed neces sary to
guarantee the freedom of others.

The realization that man

is responsible tor his own behavior and tor his own develop

ment within a social frame of re.ference is comforting to some
b ut horrifying to others.

Our educational programs have a

ma jor role for as sisting each individual in his own develop
ment so that he will not be seeking ways of shifting re
s ponsibility.

The tenet that meaning rests with consequential re

sults is closely allied with the notion of individual rree
dom and responsibility.

This tenet is also basic to the

notion of theory that has been advanced in this study .

It

was maintained that the purpose of the ory is primarily that
of prediction--as sociating the present with the future with
past experience interpreting b oth .

When a problem is en

countered, an inte lligent person will analyze his assump

tions and pro ject pos sible problem solutions.

Whether or
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not a projecte d solution will work cannot be finally known

until it is te sted.

However, knowing that responsibility

tor the results ot this proposed solution re sts in the sound

ness of the assumptions, an individual is forced toward
intelligent behavior.

These re marks about in�ividual behavior throw open

the whole issue of morals and values for investigation.

The matters can be thrown out of science so long as reliance

tor confirmation of meaning is place d in physical reality.

But when the individual assumes responsib ility himself,
these things must be examined.

So long as it is contended

that there is a realm of science and there is a realm of
philosophy, and " ne ver the twain shall meet, " except

possibly on a very limited scale for analyses, then it is
comforting tor man to justify a dual lite.

perative need for unification:

Dewey saw an im

When · the consciousness of science is fully im
pregnate d with the consciousness ot human value,
the greatest dualism which now weighs humanity
down, the split between the material, the me chani 
cal, the scientific and the moral and ide al will
be destroyed� Human forces that now waver because
of this division will be unified and reinforced.
As long as ends are not thought of as individual
ized according to spe cific needs and opportunities,
the mind will be content with abstractions, and
the adequate stimulus to the moral or soc ial use of
natural science and historical data will be lacking.
But when attention is concentrated upon the diversi 
fied concretes, recourse to all intellectual ma
terials ne eded to clear up the special cases will
b e imperative. At the same time that morals are
made to to eus in intelligence, things intellectual

are morali zed. The vexatious and wasteful con
flict between naturalism and humanism is termi
nated. 29

1 20

Dewey suggests tour considerat ions neces sary to do

away with this dualism.

"First ; inquiry, dis covery take

the same place in morals that they have come to occupy in
scie nces of nature . " 3 0
This eliminates complete reliance

on past de cisions and old principles for justifying a cour se

ot action.

Also, a purpose in a definite case is not final,

but is he ld as a working hypothe sis until results confirm
its rightness.

Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable
accidents to be mourned or moral sins to be ex
piated and forgiven. They are les sons in wrong
methods of using intelligence and instructions as
to a b etter course in the future. They are indi
cations of the need of revision, development, re
adjustment. Ends grow, standards of judgment are
improved. Man is under just as much ob ligation to
develop his most advance d standards and ideals as
to use conscientious ly those which he already
posses ses. 31

The second consideration advanced is summarized by

Dewey as follows :

Anything that in a given situation is an end and
good at all is of e qual worth, rank and dignity with
2 9 John

Dewey , "Reconstruction in Moral Conceptions, "
The Structure of Scientific Thought� Edward H. Madden,
editor ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 3 53 -

354 .

30�. , P •
31Ibid.

354.

every other good of any other situation and deserves the same intelligent attention. 32
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The third consideration has to do with the removal or

fixed moral standards for everyone.

The good man is the man who no matter how
morally unworthy he has been is moving to become
better. Such a conception makes one severe in
judging himself and humane in judging others . 33

Finally, " · • • the process of growth of improvement

and progress, rather than the static outcome and result , be

comes the significant thing. »34

D.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THEORY
OF EDUCATIONAL ADM INISTRATION

It was suggested at t he beginning of this chapter that

fundamental points of view about t heory are imbeddad in
points of view about systems of inquiry.

The major contro

versial issues identified in Chapter II were centered around

the questions of (1.) the place of human values in a theoreti

cal structure, (2 ) the free creative or the restrictive

aspects of assumptions, (3 ) the empirical definition of all
concepts, and ( 4 ) the validity of the "is-ought" dichotomy.

-

-

It is quite apparent that these issues are fundamental ones
32Ibid.

33 Ibid. , PP • 354 -355.

34rb id . , P • 355 .
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in the larger philosophical considerations explored in this
chapter.

Those who adhere to a deterministic interpretation

ot the universe and human b ehavior obviously must look upon

theory from a significantly different vantage point than

those scientists who do not perceive their roles as map

makers 3 5 but as creators with human strengths and weaknesses.
Dwight Waldo, in his excellent discussion of pub lic

administration in The Study of Pub lic Administration, 36 sum

marizes the possib le _effects

logical positivism when

or

applied to pub lic administration.

His discussion, which is

pertinent to educational administration, is abridged in the

following paragraphs preceded by an abridgment of his analy
sis of the value problem in public administration.

Until the 19 30 1 s a separation between polities and

pub lic administration w as acknowledged, with politics identi

fied primarily with the legislative body and administration
with the departments and chief executive .

So long as the

separatism was accepted, the value problem did' not appear,

since value was assigne d to polities in deciding a course of
35Jame s B. Conant says that science is not an ex
ploration of the universe. "To my mind, the analogy between
the mapmaker and the scientist is false. A scientific theory
is not even the first approximation to a map; it is not a
creed; it is a policy • • • • "
James B. Conant, Modern Science
and Modern Man ( Garde n City: . Doubleday Anchor Books, Double
day and Company, Inc. , 19 5 2 ) , P • 97 .

3 6 Dwight Waldo, The

(New York :

��$fY

Random House;-1 ·

or Pub lic AdministratiOn

• -
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action directed toward a goal, and administration was only a

means for realizing the goal in the moat etticient and eco

nomical way .

In a broader perspective the value problem is a philo

sophic one.

Perhaps the most important philosophic movement

of the twentieth century in We stern countries has been toward

separating the categories of tact and value, ot the "is" and

the " ought."

This movement is associated with logical

positivism, however, some idealist philosophers in reaction
to the materialist ethos in modern science have promoted

this movement by contending that attention to the "is " of
facts cannot determine the good or right.

The positivists maintain that values are unveritiable

and do not belong in the realm of science.

against positivism are as follows:

Some arguments

1.

Logical positivism equates distinctions in logic

2.

What is presented as an instrument ot analysis

with distinctions in lite .

becomes a program ot action with Un.fortunate results.

( a ) The separation of fact and value, often identified

with logical distinctions between tact and preterence state
ments, encourages the divorce of me ans and ends.

Ends are

taken for granted; the organization is absorbed into a tech
nological context, and leadership is dispensable.

If leader

ship assumes no creative role in formulating ends when the
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situation requires it, then leadership will fail leaving be

hind a history of uncontrolled opportuni stic adaptation. 37

( b ) Logical positivists may be naive about their own

value premises.

Values have entered in the back door, since

what the �o�itivists are researching is valued or it would

not be res�arched.

(c) Research by the positivists lends itself to the

bias or uses of elitism s ince po sitivism i s value blind.

That is, the positivists have value systems but they are ac

cidental since they are unrecognized.

3.

The value neutrality of means as serted by the

4.

Even though positivism has a firm commitment

positivists is fals e.

to the ideal of science, the effect may b� to retard actual
scientific advance because or eliminating a wide realm or

experience .

5.

Positivism is a present-day extension of rational

ism which a�tords aid and comfort to the mystic.

The phil

osophy is usually associated with agnosticism but some

religious people £ind it congenial s in.ca their faith can be
£itted comfortably in the area
3 7Ibid. ,

or nonveri!'iable values. 38

pp. 63 -64, citing Philip Selznick , "Adminis 
tration arur!nstitutional Leadership. " ( Unpublished manu
script. )
38 rbid. ,

PP · 60-66.

In educational administration, theorists have en
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countered the same problems as Waldo defines above in his
discussion or public administration.

The question is largely

one or values which are ignored in a deterministic philosophy

or science.

Also, there is the question of means and ends,

the resolution of which depends again on the philosophic
point or view.

The determinist would virtually ignore ends

and purposes, while the relativist would gauge all behavior
by them.

An example or the tendency to ignore ends can be

seen in educational administration.

There are many who con

tend that administration i s the same wherever it is found

regardless or the organizational purposes.

It would appear that progress in the profession of

educational administration demands that every member or the
profession shoulder his share or responsibility.

This

challenge is appropriate especially to those who propose

theoretical structures, since their structures shape the
direction of research by others .

E.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter attempted to show that controversial

issues in theory are fundamentally issues in larger philo

sophic points of view .

A deterministic philosophy or science was reviewe d

with special investigations into modern expressions of

determinism--logical positivism and operationism.

The
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tenets of a relativistic philosophy of science were also

examined.

Special examples were cited and described in

quantum mechanics and experimentalism.

All of the controversial issues in theory were found

to be fundamental issues in the two alternative philosophies
of science.

Determinism seems to be of questionable validity in

the light of new scientific knowledges; a more tenable posi

tion seems to be one that insists on individual responsi
bility.

Progress in the profession of educational adminis

tration is dependent on the assumption of responsibility by
all members of the profession.

CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF THEORY
A.

INTRODUCTION

The discussions thus far have been largely from a

philosophic frame ot re�erence, noting scientific develop 

ments in support of the the sis advanced.

It is the purpose

of this chapter t o take a look at developments in psychology

that have special significance for intelligent theorizing.
Theorizing has been discussed as a human intellectual

process, which makes it especially pertinent to examine the
psychological bases ot theorizing--not in addition to, but

in conjunction with the philosophical and scientific context.
The specific investigations of psychology must be

interpreted within the context of a larger proble m wi th

which psychologists and philosophers have struggled since
the beginning or recorded history, the mind-body problem.

Early philosophers regarded the mind and body as two

different substances .

This is no longer assumed; however,

the perplexities have not subsided.

These perplexities of

differentiating the physical from the mental, such as private

public, quality-quantity, purposive-mechanical, have caused
many behavioral scientists to concentrate on the physical,

assuming the mental as non- or extra-scientific.

The argu

mentation of specific points about the mind-b ody can be
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detected in the several the ories of perception presented in

this chapter.

Psychology has undergone a metamorphosis within this

century.

The trend has gone from. a conce pt of the " empty"
organism to a " cognizing" organism. " 1
Cognition has ad-

vanced from the early Gestalt idea of c losure to the notion

of a very active organism which structures its stimuli and

environment.

Indeed, the time honored adage • to see is to
belie ve • seemed frequently better restated • to be
lieve is to see. ' Learning seemed to be not only
a c onne ctive and � co gnitive, but an effective - -an
emotional--process . The model of the 'empty
organism' that had been transforme d into a model of
the • cognizing organism' was transformed ye t again-
this r time into a 'dynami c ' or 'personalistic 1 organ
ism. 2

This newer concept of the organism is of concern to

perceptual psychologists.

Boring3 gives an historical

chrono logy of perception from ear ly sensationism to later

perceptual theories.
quent paragraphs .

His remarks are abridged in the subse 

lJacob w. Getzels , "Theory and Practice i n Educational
Administration: An Old Question Revisited, " Administrative
Theory as a Guide to Action, Roald F. Campbell and Jame s M.
Lipham, ed!tors (Ch!cago : Midwe st Administration Cente r,
1960) , PP • 3 7 - 58.
2Ibid. , P • 50.
3Edwin G. Boring, Sensation and Perception in the
His tory of Experimental P s chology (New York: Applet"on=
Century -Crofts , Inc. , 1942}, P P• 3-4 5.

B.
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THE HISTORICAL EVOLVEMENT OF PERCEPTUAL THEORY

He believes that the concept of sensation became im

portant in human thought by way of philo sophical empiric 
ism:

knowledge comes to the mind by way ot the sense s.

is an old doctrine that at least dates back to the fifth
century B. C.

This

Hera elitos s aid that knowledge c omes to man

through the door ot the senses , and Protogoras maintained
that the entire psychic lite c onsists only of sensations.
Other early Greeks also had a theory ot perception that

still haunt s the present.� It was supposed that objects give

oft from their surfaces or pores effluvia (an invisible eman 
ation) , which act upon the sen se s t o transmit knowledge of
the outer world.

Democritos (ca . 460-ca . 370 B. C. ) and

Epicuros (ea . 341 - 270 B. C. ) de scribed the se projections as
taint image s ot the object s which , through conduc tion give

the mind acquaintance with the object s which they represen t.
Empiricism came into prominence in the seventeen th

century with Thomas Hobbes who wrote that all c onceptions

in man ' s mind were at fir s t , totally or by parts, begotten
upon the organs of sen se.

After Hobbes came John Locke

who depicted the mind a
· s a piece of white paper upon which

experience writes.

The mental element wa s the idea, which

comes from experience by sensation or reflection.

It was

the aspect of retlecti�n , the belief that the mind knows

what it is doing, that tended to prevent empirici st s from
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becoming full-fledged sensationists, from assum.ing that all
knowledge come s from t he outside.

For Locke, ideas were such entities as white
ness, motion, elephant, army, sheep, murder, grati
tude; and of the se, whiteness is a simple idea,
whereas sheep and gratitude are compound, formed,
as Locke presently put it, by the association or
simple ideas. Such a psychology is an empiricism,
an associationism and also a partial sensationism .
Sensation is in it the primary source of knowl
edge . 4
Thomas Reid, who rounded the Scottish school ot

faculty psychology, helped to establish the primacy of sensa
tion in psychology, even though he was principally concerned

with preserving the . God-given perceptual faculties from re
duction to mere sensation.

Psychological sensationism tor

the next 150 years may well b e said to have b egun with Reid,

even though its materialist nature echoed the defeat of his

fundamental purpose.

Through the work of Charles Bell in 1811, Magendie

in 18 22, Miller in 18 2 6, and others, physiologists b ecame
actively engaged in sensationism because or the dichotomy

of nervous action into sensory and motor.

About the middle

ot the nineteenth century the sense-physiology of the

physiologists and the sensationistic p sychology ot the phil

osophers were ready tor synthesis .

Regarding the question ot what has become of sensa

tion in .modern psychology, Boring points out that tor some

psychologists it disintegrated into attributes (i. e. , an

associationistic sensationism).
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For Ge stalt psychologists

it was ab sorbed into perception. · But for othe rs it was

translated into discriminative behavior which became the

psychology or behaviorism invented by John Watson in 1913

through his experimentation with animals .

In his work with

animals, Wat son grew tired of asking a.rter e ach experiment
was finished:

"What sensations and other mental proces ses

must this animal have it he makes these discriminations, it

he behaves a s he does ? "
to him enough.

The tact s of discrimination seemed

It is important to this di s cus sion to pay special at

tention to what Boring has to say about what became of be
haviorism.

Behaviorism ultimately disappeared, in part be
cause in the 1930 1 s it got to be accepted as psy
chology, and in part because modern positivism be
came the sophisticated substitute tor it. The
older positivism ot Mack and Karl Pearson--the vie w
that the basic data of s cience are the immediate ob
servations and not the entitie s (light, electricity,
sensation, attention) inferentially derived from
them--was superseded_ in the 1930 1 s by the positivism
of the Vienna circle under Schlick--the view that an
entity derives its meaning from an understanding of
the operations b y which it is obse rved and any term
its meaning by analysis or the language which . gives
it significance . The doctrine was called logical
positivism 1n 1931 and is founded on the faith that
meaning is secure d for a concept by its reduction
to simpler, more fundamental, common terms. Before
1931, however, the physicist Bridgman had undertaken
(in 1928 ) to resolve the di lemmas of modern rela
tivity theory by insisting that physical entities,
like s pace, can be understood only in terms of the
operations for ob serving them.

All this was good gospel to the behaviorists,
once they learned about the movement. Tolmon,
the behaviorist, now became an operational be
haviorist. Others, not Bridgman, coined the term
operationism and used it in psychology • • • •
Sensation became nothing more than the operation
by which it is got, that is, to say, discrimina
Gestalt psychology, of course, wanted
tion. • • •
to keep immediate experience in psychology, where
as, the operationists wanted to reduce immediate ex
perience to behavior. The logical positivists rec
ognized this principle when they coined the word
behavioristics. S

13 2

Boring says that this controversy represents a funda

mental temperamental difference in scientific values and is

not yet cool enough to be handled in an historical text such
as his own .

It is interesting to note that the history ot

sensationism had fruition in the psychology ot behaviorism
and is ultimately embraced by logical positivism.

The posi

tivist, faced with explaining sensation, simp ly translates

it into discrimination.

This leads to a consideration of perception in a

larger, perhaps more meaningful context .

Thomas Reid first

insisted upon the distinction between sensation and percep 
tion.

Perception, he said , although it depends upon sensa 

tion, is nevertheless much more than sensation, for it in
cludes both a conception ot the object perceived and also
an immediate and irresistible conviction ot the ob ject ' s

present status.

Boring reports that this idea evolved into

Srbid. , pp. 12-13 .

John Stuart Mill's enlightened notions ot the s ub ject in

13 3

1856 .

Accepting the evanescent and changing sensa
tions as the immediate data ot mind, he was trying
to explain how our belier in an external world and
in permanent ob jects arises. An ob ject is, after
all, sub jective, a creation of the mind. John Mill
laid down as his premise the principle that the
mind is capab le ot expectation. Then he pointed out
that though sensations may disappe ar, their pos si
b ilities remain present to the mind. It one sees, he
said, a piece of white paper on the table and then
goes into another room, the sensations disappear, but
their pos sibility remains, a s is evidenced by their
recurrence it one returns to the room to look again
at the table. Sensations are figurative and transi
tory, but the 'permanent pos sib ilities of sensations'
are enduring. - That i s why the physical ob jects of
the external world are stable, even though generated
from changing sensations. They a�e s imp ly the Perma
nent Pos sibilities ot Sensations. b

The next event of importance was Titchener • s context

theory in 1909.

perception.

He

maintained that there were two stages to

A new perception must be supported b y appropri

ate imagery ( i. e. , a new face to be recognized must be s up

ported by a name or s ome other addition to the context ot
the visual core).

Such a thesis leads into field p sychology which sug

gests that perception has loosed the b onds or synonymity

with sensation.

With this historical background, some con

temporary ideas about perception are reviewed.
6rbid. , p. 1 5.

C.

PERCEPTUAL THEORIES

1.34

Allport7 reviewed thi�teen theorie s and proceeded to

formulate anothe r ot his own.

0 1 Neil8 categorizes the im

portant views into three groups, discrimination theories,
phenomenalist theories, and judgmental theorie s.

Discrimination will be re cogni ze� as the camp of the

behaviorists and positivists.

O'Neil does not limit this

category to these theorists, however.

Those placed here are

ordinarily realists (i. e . , the stimulus is real, not phenome

nal).

"There is a marked tendency to pack as mueh as

pos sible into the stimulus which i s scarcely di stinguished
conceptually from the cause of the response. " 9

The attractions ot this type of theory are many:

Foremost amongst these i s the scope provided by
rigorous theoriz ing and rigorous experimentation.
Anothe r, of les s certain value, is the avoidance
�t the bothe rsome problem ot introspection. As
the aim of perceptual experiment within this
theoretical cont�xt is the testing of limits ot
dis crimination and the seeking ot invariant rela
tions between stimuli and discriminative response s ,
it does not matter what th� responses b e • • • • 10

7Floyd Allport, Theories of Perception and the Con 
cept of Structure (New York : John Wiley and Sons, -r9'5517

M. O'Neil, '' Basic I s sues in Perceptual Theory, "
Psychological Review, LXV (November, 1958), 348-361.

8w.

9 Ib id. , p. 352.

18Ibid. , p. 353 .
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O ' Neil reports the drastic shift from dis crimination

to phenomenalist theories.

He tells us that a psychological

history of phenomenalism would begin with Muller' s doctrine

of the specific energies or the sensory nerves which stated

that we are aware not or the external objects, but of the
states they produce in our sensory nerves.

His explanation

of phenomenalism is important in that it provides a frame

of reference tor the evolvement

or

modern perceptual notions.

Within this doctrine a veridical ( real ) knowledge
of external objects would be attained to the extent
that there i s s ome parallelism or isomorphism between
the external objects and the states they produce.
When that parallelism breaks down we have error or
illusory perception. But how anything about parallel
ism or its absence can be dis covered is a puzzle. 11

Bor1ng1 2 attributed to the Gestaltists the es sence of

phenomenalism.

This, no doubt, is justified with respect to

the early Gestaltists, Koffka, Kohler, et al.

One is led to

bellion again st the sensationists of that era.

Hamlyn said

speculate, however, it this phenomenalist trend was not a re

that Gestalt theory itself was a reaction against the sensa

tionalist and as sociationist theories of the nineteenth cen

tury. 1 3

11Ibid. ,

1 2Boring,

York:

P • 354.

.2£• cit. , PP •

3-45 .

13n. w. Hamlyn, The Pa cholo o� Perce ti on (New
The Humanities Pres s , inc. , ff ffi, P • ;.

3

Regarding the judgmental theorie s, O ' Neil as serts
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that they have been propounded mos t o:rten by the philosophi
cally minded .

However, in his dis cussion ot the is sue s in

perceptual theory, he tells us :

• • • Some of the is sue s are epistemological but,
as the psychologists attempt .to shelve such is sues
as non-psychological have proved unavailing, it is
better to face them without too much apology . 14

Judgmental theorists seek to provide balance to the continuum

ot the realist ' s contention that the perceived ob ject has ab
solute reality within itself, and the phenomenalist's point

of view that neural proces ses produce a unit in the phenomenal
field .

Such a theory ( judgmental } can acconnnodate some
distinction ot the sort attempted in the contrast
between the real and the phenomenal, and at the
same time preserve some ot the advantages ot ob
jective reference attained by discrimination
theories; it may well be the type ot theory the
psychologist will find best adapted to his needs. 15

Functionalism

O • Neil's conclusion introduces a whole new era ot

perceptual psychology known as :functionalism which tocuses

attention on the perceiver in the perceptual process .

Hamlyn very appropriately points out that "the psychologi

cal theories of perception of today all have their roots, in
14o • Neil,

£1?.• cit. , p. 348 .

15rbid . , p .

355.

1
one way or another, in Ge stalt theory. " 6
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This fact will be 

come obvious as these theories are examine d.

The functional

ists find no contentment in the notion that perception is a

passive process whe rein something is done to the observer;
rathe r they maintain that the pe rce iver has a very active

role in his pe rceptions.

It is not intende d to imply that

all contemporary pe rce ptual rese arch is functionalist ; how

ever, this de finitely appears to be a positive trend.
and Postman1 7 made this observation in 1949 :

Bruner

The study of pe rception during the past decade
has . be en moving along two converging paths • • • •

One approach ( formalist ) to pe rce ption is pri
marily concerned with pe rce ption in and of ·itself,
without primary regard tor the manne r in which per
ce ption is imbe dde d in the other, ongoing activitie s
ot the perceive r. The re is re latively little con
cern with the role or pe rception in the ad justment
of the organism. The functional relations between
the dimensions of the stimulus and the attributes
or experience and the determination of the se rela
tions by sensory me chanisms concern some exponents
or this approach. Othe rs stress the intrinsic laws
of pe rcept !1 organization ( e. g. , the law of
Pragnanz ) . r

In rese arch involving the first approach the formal labora

tory techniques are utilize d , since it is crucial to control
and hold constant the learnings, maturations, and othe r

1 6Hamlyn, �· cit. , P • 3.
17
Jerome s . Bruner and Leo Postman , "Perception, Cog
nition, and Behavior, " JournaL of Peraonality, 18 ( Se ptem
ber, 1 949 ) , 14-31.
18 Ibid. , p. 14.
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personal attributes of the sub ject •

• • • He {Ehe sub jec!7 is as sumed to have a
basically neutral attitude toward the stimulus,
wishing neither to eat, destroy, cares s, nor in
any manner to use the stimulus p resented to him..
It is merely a something to be seen, heard, touched,
smelled, or s ensed . 1 9

On the other hand:

The second approach (functionalist ) attempt s to
treat perception in a broader behavioral context.
For its primary concern is with the manner in
which perceptual functioning is imbedded in and
interacts with other forms of p sychological func 
tioning . Perception is viewed as instrumental ac
tivity. Those who take this approach to perception
hope to add to and to go beyond the variables and
relationship s discovered in the formal study of
perception • • • • For a .t'ull understanding of the
perceptual proce s s it is neces sary to vary not only
the physical stimulus and the sensory state of the
organism b ut also tho se central conditions--motives,
predispositions, past learnings- -which have largely
remained out side the formal limit s or the perceptual
system . 20

Here are two patterns in perceptual research ; each

pattern, perhaps to the dismay ot the b ehaviorists and posi
tivists, is concerned with factors which are central to the

sub ject .

As an introduction to the examination 0£ the se

central factor s, another look should be taken at the stimu

lus, or the perceived ob ject .

"What is it that we see? " is

a very important question in perceptual psychology.

,_

Whitehead warns us that "we must not slip into the

fallacy ot as suming that we are comparing a given world with
l 9 Ibid.

2 0 Ibid. ,

pp. 14 -15.

given perceptions ot it.
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The physical world is in some
general sense of the term, a deduced concept. " 21
It is im-

portant to note that contemporary perceptual research has al

mo st completely advanced beyond the historical sensationism

of the behaviorists and positivists , and has adopted a more

sophisticated approach than the historical neural phenomenol

ogista.

This is to say that the importance of the intellec

tual capacity of the perceiver has come into prominence.

Earl C. Kelley22 commenting on the Hanover Institute

experiments in perception points out that the reality of an
object is what the perceiver attributes to it.

It [i. boo!r' only has reality and validity as you
and I as sign them, and its only importance lies in
what we make ot it • • • •

• • • I call it a book because I have book ex
perience. If I had no b ook experience, I would not
call it a book. So whatever we have that i s real
in the whole situation comes from e ach ot us ( our
past as experiencing organisms), and varies with
each of us . 23

Robert E. B illa, in the bulle tin, "About People and

Teaching, " 24 sets out his use ot the term - "reality":
York:

York:

21Alfred North Whithead, The Aims ot Education ( New
Mentor Books, 1949), p. 1'607 -- -22Earl C . Kelley , Education tor What is Real (New
Harper and Brothers, 1947) . -- --- -- -23Ibid. , pp. 36- 37 .

24Robert E. Bills, "About People and Teaching, "
Bulletin of Universit of Kentucky Bureau ot School Services,
XXVIII ( December, l95�);-2.

The term ' reality • will be used throughout the
bulletin to designate the perceptions most people
seem to hold in common. That there is such an
overlap ping of perceptual fields of different
people is seen in our ability to communicate with
them. Without overlapping, communication would be
impo s sible. But we should keep in mind that a
major portion of this overlapping exist s by agree
ment. For instance, we agree on certain names tor
objects and our numbering system which was not dis
covered, only agreed upon. The dittieulties in com
munication which come about when we use a different
system ot naming or language are apparent. 2 5
Ot course, Bills is commenting on perception in

social psychology, but it has s ignificance tor the individual

perceiver .

Kelley comment s on the overlap of perceptual

fields as follows :

Our perceptions do not come s imply from the ob
jects around us, but from our past experience as
functioning purposive organisms. We take a large
number of clues, none ot which is reliable, add
them together, and make what we can ot them. All
that this gives us is an estimate ot our surround
ings. It is never exactly right. It is never the
same tor different individuals. It . is like a
statistical average, a useful device tor making a
prognosi3, but always wrong in any particular in
stance. 20

This is not to say .that an ob ject of perception does

not exist .

"There would be no perception but tor the object.

What it is :functionally, however, comes rrom us , and
does not re side in the object it selr. 2 7
• • •

2 5Ibid. ,

p. 13.

2 6Kelley, � · cit. , P •
2 7Ibid. , p. 40 .

.34.

D.

PERCEPTUAL. DETERMINANTS
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Enough has been said regarding the physical ob ject ot

perception to point out that apart from meaning given by the
observer it has no functional significance, and even along

with the perceiver it has relative significance postulated
on the central factors within the organism .

What are some of these central factors that are con

tinuously at work in the continuous process ot perception?

beliefs ,
values, needs, attitudes, self-experience , and threat. 28

Bills names six important perceptual determinants:

Kelley, after reviewing perceptual experimentation of the

Hanover Institute gives evidence to support that we select

what we choose to see.

We do some interesting things with the percep
tio�s which come to us. To begin with, we do not
pay attention to all ot them, or even a good frac
tion ot them. We select the coincidences in nature
which we choose to register. Given the same scene
or nearly so, no two people pay attention to the
same fac tor s in it. 29

Bills calls attention to two very important factors

that cause us to be selective, past experience and purpose.
28Robert E. Bills , "Believing and B ehaving: Percep
tion and Learning, " Learning More about Learning, A lexander
.
Frazier, editor ( Washington: ASCD, National Education
Association, 1959 ), pp . �7 -62.
2 9Kelley, � · cit. , P •

45 .

Now you may want to raise the questi on as to why
a person sele cts what he does to pay attention to
out ot his surroundings, and why he classifies them
in his own way. It is easy to show that no two
persons do this alike. We have said that we bring
our past experience to bear upon it but this does
not seem to be adequate to account tor the whole
performance. In any ordinary scene, we have past
experience with practically everything in it, but
we do not pay attention to everything . Our selec
tion, therefore, must be based on something in addi
tion to experience.
It apparently is a combination of past experi
en ce and what we call purpose. The human being is
a purposive creature. The drives ne cessary . to sur
vival, food, sex, etc. , . are fairly simple. But
they seem to be only part of the purpose of the
total organism, which has value at the core ot it. 3 0
Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies 31 report that perceptual
sele ction is dependent not only upon primary determinants ot .
attention but it is also a servant ot one's interests, needs,
and

values.

Can one lean on the slender reed of 'limited
span of attention • and its primary determinants to
explain the selectivity ot perception? That there
is a limited span can hardly be denie d. But to in
voke it in an explanation of itself leaves unex
plained the differen ces in the pe rceptions of indi
viduals faced with the same stimuli and all hampered
by a 'limited span ot attention' and governed by
common primary dete rminants . 32
3 0Ibid. , pp. 46 -47•

31Le o Postman, Jerome S . Bruner and Elliott McGinnies,
"Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception,"
Journal of Abnormal and So cial . Psychology, XLIII (April,

1948 ) , 142-154.

32Ibid. , p. J.4,2 .

Ross Stagner also calls attention to some ways in

which the organism contributes to the nature ot the external
object as perceived:

sensory modalities, sensory de

ficiencies, past experience, expectancies, group influences,

and inner needs.

He concludes that all perception is ulti

mately purposive in character. 3 3

It is readily admitted tha t many of the central

determinants overlap and some may be synonymous.

Without

attempting to categorize or further differentiate among

these factors, to further support this discussion two fac
tors are selected tor further examination.

"values" and "purposes. "

These are

Values !.!. Perceptual Determinants

The positive role of values as perceptual determi-

nants was demonstrated in a study conducted by Postman,

Bruner, and MeGinnies in 19�8 which they report under the
title of "Values as Select ive Factors in Pereeption . "34

The hypo thesis of the study was that personal values are

demonstrable determinants of what the individual selects
perceptually from his environment.
3 3 Ross

(New York :

Stagner, Psychology ot Industrial Conflict
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1956) , pp . 20-29 •

.34Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies, loc . cit.

Twenty-five sub jects, students at Harvard and Rad
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cliffe, were shown thirty-six words, one at a time in a ta
chitoscope.

The words were unanimously chosen by judges to

represent the six values me asure d by the Allport-Vernon

Study ot Values--theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social,
political, and religious.

The final list, comprising six

words tor each value was balanced tor length ot words, and

insofar as possible, an attempt was made to select words ot
equal familiarity.

The thirty-six words were shown to the

subjects in random order with e ach word exposed three times
for . 01 second, . 0 2 second, . 0 3 second, etc. , until recog

· nition occurred.

A full record was kept of all the sub j ects'

recognition responses.

To obtain an independent measure of personal value

orientation, the Allport-Vernon Study ot Values was adminis-

tered individually to each sub ject either some weeks in ad
vance ot the perceptual experiment or a�ter the experiment.
The finding ot the study was that certainly vi aual

inspection indicates that, for the s ample as a whole, time
ot recognition v aries as a function of the value.

findings were statistically significant.

gists concluded their findings as follows:

The

These psycholo

The experimental evidence le ads us to the formu
lation of three mechanisms to account for the inter
relationship of these phenomena in perceptual be
havior. Value orientation makes tor perceptual
sensitization to valued stimuli, leads to perceptual

defense against inimical stimuli, and gives rise to
a proces s of value resonance which keeps the person
responding in terms of objects valuable to him even
when such objects are absent from his immediate en
vironment. These proces ses of selectivity must be
considered in any perc iptual theory which lays claim
to comprehensivene s s. 3 J
Related research has supported the above findings. 3 6, 37
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Purpo ses !.! Perceptual De terminants

Kelley reminds us that valueful purpose i s not easy to

demonstrate in the laboratory.

But it can be conclusively demonstrated • • •
that the selective nature ot perception cannot be
accounted for in any other way. This is common and
res pectable scientific proof. No one ha s ever seen
an electron, but the chara. cteristics of matter under
certain conditions cannot be a ccounted for in any
other way, so we accept their exis tence. In fact,
no one questions their existence any more than he
does those things which he can see. 3 8·

It seems logical to conclude that it reliance for per

ceptual selectivity rests solely on past experience, then we

would be in a static s tate dwelling in the pa st.
3 5Ibid. ,

With the

p. 154.

36J. Bruner and c . Goodman, "Value and Need a s Organ
izing Factors in Perce:e tion, " Journal of Abnormal and Social
P sychology, XLII ( 1947 ) , 33-44 .

3 7R. Levine, I. Chein, and G. Murphy, " The Relation
of the Intensity ot a Need to the Amount of Perceptual Distor
t ion: A Preliminary Report, " Journal of Psychology, XIII

( 1942 ) , 283 -293 .
3 8Kelley,

� · cit. , p. 47 .

factor of purpose interjected into the proces s, our past
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e xperiences tend to point the way toward reconstructing and
improving perceptual selectivity.

This, if acceptable, gives

perception the primary role in our growth and learning.

This is another way of s aying that the primary perceptual
determinant is purpose.

This point of view constitutes a

new aspect of perceptual psychology.

It i s an attemp t,

through recognition of the purposeful organism, to inte

grate fragments of psychology--i. e . , perceptual theory, per
sonality theory, le arning theory, motivation theory, etc . - 

into a general theory of behavior .
E.

EFFORTS TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY
OF PERCEPTION

Hochberg and Gleitman39 review the experimentation of

tho se engaged in pointing out the relationship between motivation and perception .

The experimental conditions of the

p sychological laboratory, they said, are seldom if ever

encountered in the ordinary life of an organism .

They sug

gested that the fundamental law of Pragnanz, the closure of

incomplete circles, continuation of figures, etc. , points
toward a much larger equilibration process.

Disequilibria

3 9 Julian E. Hochberg and Henry Gleitman, " Perception- 
Motivation Dichotomy, " Journal of Personality, XVIII ( December, 1949 ) , 180 -191 .
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occurring between isomorphic representations of objects or

stimulus con.figuration in the perceptual field is comparable

to the organism moving about in the environment until per
ceptual equilibration (i. e. , goal attainment ) is brought

about.

Within the Ge stalt theoretical framework here
adopted, this type of equilibration corresponds
to what is generally called goal-directe d be
havior. From such a point of view, the • motiva
tion ' is neither s uperimposed from above � nor in
jected in from below, p t is an attribute or the
total field situation. 4g

Bruner and Postman voice similar pleas for an inte

grated psychology .

They propose the following ob jectives as

tasks for the future:

. • • ( 1) To �ele ct central, nonperceptual vari
ables, changes in which can be shown to bring about
systematic changes in perceptual functioning; { 2 )
to select these variables from various theoretical
systems- -le arning theorie s, motivational theories,
theories of personality- - so that these the ories may
be made continuous within the body or perceptual
theory ; { 3) to postulate and then study those inter
vening mechanisms which account tor the changes in
perception which occur when we change the central
state of the organism; and ( 4) tinally, to emerge
with a unified theory of b ehavior which treats the
organism as an organized whole and which contains
laws stating the manner in which pe rceiving is an
instrument of adjustive activity. 41
40ibid. , pp. 18 6 -1 8 7 .

41Bruner and Po stman, � · cit. , p. 1 6.
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Other psychologists have been concerned with the de

velopment of an integrated psychology.

Lecky, 4 2 Bills, 43

and Combs, 44 all propose psychological theories of self

organization founded on the purposive nature of the indi

vidual perceiver.

The Perceptual Theory of Transactionalism

There is one theory of perception that deserves spe

cial attention:

(1) because of its comprehensiveness, and

(2) because of its significance to this study.

theory of transactionalism.

This is the

Many characteristics of trans

actionalism have been incorporated into prior di scussions,

however, full attention is directed to those characteristics

here.

Hamlyn said that the view which has been called

"transactionalism" is derived chiefly from the work of Adelbert Ames, Jr. (although its philosophy stems from Dewey)

and · work by Kilpatrick. 45

Le t us examine some characteristics

42prescott Lecky, Selr Conaistenc : A Theori or
l ).Personality (New York: Island Presa, l9�
5
43aills, "About People end Teaching, '' loc. eit.

44Donald Snygg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Be
havior (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949) .
45Hamlyn, �·· cit. , p. 1.02.

of this theory of perception discussed by Ittelson and Can

tri1. 4 6

There are three features ot perception which de
serve special attention with regard to human per
ception. First, the tacts of perception always pre 
sent themselves through concrete individuals dealing
with concrete situations. They can be studied only
in terms of the transactions in which they can be
observed. Se cond, within such transactions, per
ceiving is always done bJ a particular person from
his own unique position in sp ace and time and with
his own combination ot experiences and needs. Per
ception always enters into the transaction from the
unique personal behavioral center ot the perceiving
individual. And, third, within the particular
transaction and operating from his own personal be
havioral center, each of us, through perceiving,
creates tor himself his own p sychological environ
me nt by attributing certain aspects ot his experi 
ence to an e nvironment which he believes exists inde
pendent ot the experience. This characteristic ot
perception we can label externalization. 47
. The problem of perception is defined as follows:

·-

The major problem of perception has been formu
lated as the study of the process by which we achieve
correspondence, or lack of correspondence, between
the significances which we experience as existing
apart from us and the significances which we experi
ence as a consequence of action- -that is, p 1 tween
what we externalize and what we encounter. 4�
In the section of the booklet dealing with the de

velopment of perception, the important classes of significances
4 6william H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril, Perception,
A Transactional Approach (Garden City: Doubleday and Company,
Inc. , 1954).
q.7 �. , p. 2.
48Ibid. , p. 9.

are identified.

Following are the clas ses

with abridged explanations :
1.

"Thing" signi.fican ees.

1.50

or significances

This term re:fers to the

world of ob jects and people in so far a s we experience them

as entities apart from ourselves pos ses s ing their own charac

teris tics and spatial-temporal locationa.
2.

Sequential signi.ficances .

The world o.f objects

does not exist pas sively and statically .for our observation.

Very rarely, i:f ever, do we contemplate a completely un

changing world where all sights, all sounds, all touches,
tastes, and smells are s tatic, frozen, and .fixed.

Rather,

events ot one kind or another are constantly occurring

around us, new events following the previous in a never
ending series o.f sequences.

3.

Action significances.

Although we all do oc

ca sionally pas sively ob serve sequential events from the out
side, more frequently we enter into the sequence at some

point as active participants.

4.

Evaluative significances .

As a rule, in any con

crete situation into which we enter as active participants,

each of us is constantly faced with alternative course s of
action.

Evaluation among these alternatives is made on the

basis of the relative probability that each pos sible course

of action will lead to the desired sequence s, will produce
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the desired results. 49

Earlier, " values" and "purposes'' were isolated as

being central factors in the perceptual process that are

especially relevant to this study.
specifically note these factors .

uative significances they say :

Ittelson and Cantril

Under the category of e val

There are two main categories ot this kind of
evaluation which can be separated tor descriptive
purposes although in concrete experience they are
comp letely interwoven and almost never encountered
independently. ( 1) What-for evaluations involve
selection among alternati�goals on the basis of
which goal · offers the greater probability of pro
viding us with the v alue satis factions we seek out
ot life . This kind of value j udgment • • • enters
at least implicitly into every perception • • • •
( 2 ) How-to-do evaluations enter more explicitly
into theperceptual process. , They involve the
selection among alternative courses of action once
the immediate goal has been decided upon . 50

The final section of the booklet is devoted to a dis

cussion of p urposes .

We have discussed perception so far primarily as
a present experience with its roots in the past.
This time-orientation is in accord both with naive
observation and with the traditional approach of
psychology. Perception certainly seems to be of the
world as it is right now , or perhaps, as it was a few
minutes ago. Indeed the definition of perception
freque ntly appears in psychology texts as 'The aware 
ness of immediate ly present objects. ' But - again naive
observation and tradition are both inadequate • . • • •
If we were to close the study of perception where
we left it at the end of the last section, we would
49 r�id. , PP • 19-22.
50 i bid. , pp. 21-22.

then have misse d at least halr of the problem, or
more correctly, the problem would still b e dis
torted in such a way that it could not be solve d .
For ust � past pe rceptions !!!.!:! � present per
cept ons, so eve ry present perception is in a sense
the anticipated future of a past experience. The
roce s s � which the present becomes the pafj of the
uture is basic to perception . As Laoti sa , 'What
is is tne � of what s hall be . • '51 ( italics min;r-

1
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1

Ittelson and Cantril conclude :

The human being as all living organisms, ce ase
lessly attempts to cre ate an e nvironment within
which to carry out his purposes. And in every oc
casion of living , perception-in-operation is a
ne ver-ending process or pre diction in the tace of
uncertainty for action on the basis of faith. 52
F.

PERCEPTION AND AMINISTRATIVE THEORY

In Chapter III, controversial issues regarding theory

ot e ducational administration were received in the light ot
discussions about science and philosophy.

The e xamination of

perceptual theory seeme d to sub stantiate further the postu
lations ot this study.

The se new knowledges in psychology

she d additional light on the controve rsial is sue s .

The se

issues are re -examined with ·additional clarirication from
psychological and philosophical tram.es of reference.

Valuation in Theorizing

The first issue, que stioning the inclusion ot human

values in theoretical structures , is e specially clariried

51Ibid. ,

p. 27.

52 Ibid. , p. 3 1.

from the preceding discus sions.

1 53

Research in perceptual psy

chology has taught us that the perceiving organism inter

prets his perceptual tield in a context of all that he is at

the time--his values, his purposes, the sum total of his ex
periences.

Even the scientist cannot rid himself of this

fact in the rigors of his laboratory experimentation.

Theory

must be predicated on what the theorist perceives to be im
portant .

The significance of personal points of view in

theory construction has ironically troubled perceptual theor

ists who interestingly enough have sought objectivity in

the s tudy of sub jective perception.

Bakan tells us that

• • • clearly the beliefs entertained by the in
vestigator can determine the complexion of a theo
retical formulation. These beliefs determine what
the scientist regards as the events requiring ex
planation, what he regards as stimulus, and what
he regards as response . 53

In his discus sion ot the importance of beliefs ot the

s cientist in determining the stimulus, Bakan continues:
The s cientist s hould, therefore, recognize the
limitations inherent in a theoretical system in
which the stimulus is an important concept and in
which it must be defined, either implicitly or ex
plicitly. For the definition of the stimulus in
any theoretical context is influenced by certain
as sumptions made by the theorist concerning what
aspect of a total situation is · the stimulus. The
scientist constitutes a conceptual stimulus with
which he hopes to approximate a 'real stimulus. '

53Paul Bakan, "Current Theoretical Approaches to
Perception, tt Present-Day Psychology, A. A. Roback, editor
( New York: Philosophical Library, 1955 ) , P • 73 .

But his stimulus is a construct and not an en
tity . 54
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Northrop vividly points up the fallacy of depending

on the facts to speak for them selves •

• • • The only way to get pure facts, independent
of all concepts and theory, is merely to look at
them forthwith to remain perpetually dumb, never
uttering a word or des cribing what one sees, after
the manner of a calf looking at the moon. For the
moment one reports what one observes, at a meeting
of historians or in a book written for sociologists,
at that moment one has not pure facts but facts
brought under concepts, and hence theory. Thus,
the social s c ienti st ' s or the historian's aim at
pure fact is a snare - and a delusion . What one gets
are not facts, but facts b rought under some often
uncritically examined, unconscious, theoretical
as sum£ �ions of the s ociologist or historian in ques 
tion . 57

able.

The valuation exhibited by the scientist is unavoid

Man is a valuing creature .

matter very clearly:

Reichenbach states the

In some s ense, every human activity serves the
pursuit of a goal . . • •
In all such activities,
however, there are moments when a choice is to be
made; it is here that behavior exhibits valuation.
The valuation need not be explicitly stated, nor
achieved through reflection and comparison; it may
be performed in the spontaneous impulse • • • •
But in the decisions made we expres s our prefer
ences and thus indicate through our behavior the
valuational orde which contributed the background
of our actions . 5

i

54Ibid.

55F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and
The Humanities ( New York : �Macmillan Company, 1947 /,pp.

317 -318 .

5 6Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy

( Berkeley:

University of CaliforniaPres s ,

1951), pp. 313-14.

1 55

It appears that the efforts toward eliminating values

from administrative theory result only in substituting one
value for another .

Assumptions, Concepts, and Induction

The second issue, questioning the empirical b ases of

assumptions, is also further clarified.

An organism that

interprets and gives meaning to his environment i s not one

that anchors every act ot imagination on empirical reality.
Closely allied is the question

or

concept definition.

Operationism and functionalism are quite incompatib le.

Since these questions are elaborated in Chapter V, they are

not belabored here.

The "Is-Ought" Dichotomy

To get an understanding of this problem, it will be

helpful to refer to an elaboration of the issue b y the late,
great historian, Carl Becker. 57

In pointing up the fallacy

of assuming man knows only the present to the exclusion of
the past and future, he has the rollowing to say :

We are apt to think of the past as dead, the
futµre as nonexistent, the present alone as real;
and prematurely wise or disillusioned counselors
have urged us to b urn always with a 'hard, gem
like flame • in order to give ' the highest quality
to the moment's sake. ' This no doubt is what the
glowworm does ; b ut I think that man, who alone is

57carl Beeker, "Everyman His Own Historian, " in
Edward H. Madden, The Structure of Scientific Thought { Bos 
ton: Hougton MiffI!ii Company, 19b0 ), 176-187.
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properly aware that the present moment pas ses, can
tor that very reas on make no good use of the present
moment simply tor its own sake. Strictly speaking,
the present doesn ' t exist tor us, or ls at best no
more than an 1nt1nitesimalp0iiit intime;-gone bi"=
tore wi'riote it as present. Nevertheless, we must
have apresint; and s o we create one � robb!ngtlie
p
holding on to nie mos t recente vents ancfpre
.ez
t
in that thez a1rbilong to � immediate pe"rceE
t!ons. �8 ( italic s mine)

g,-

Using the philosophical terminology of "specious

present" to describe this past, present, future orientation,

Becker makes clear that the past i s not the only contrib utor
to interpreting the present.

The extent to which the specious present may thus
be enlarged and enriched will depend upon knowledge,
the artificial extension ot memory, the memory of
things said and done in the past and distant places.
But not upon knowled ge alone ; rather jEOD knowledge
directed £I purpose. 59 { italics mine

The individual who insists on sticking with the present

as the only meaningful experience i s the kind of unintellec 

tual individual that we hope to avoid through improving man ' s
capacity for theorizing.
perspective by Graft :

This whole problem is placed in

We probably cannot s ueces s:t'ully cope with the
• was -is-ought • trichotomy without a ssuming that
all behavior is moving through a t ime continuum.
This is precisely what the modern physicist doe s
ass ume with respect to the behavior ot matter;
and it is also an assumption of modern perceptual
theory re the b ehavior of human beings. In the

�a Ibid. ,

7

pp. 179 -1 aO.

59rbid. , p. 18 0.

case of people, however, there is the tremendously
complicating factor or purpose. If this factor or
purpose were the same tor all individuals, it would
constitute no problem. But it isn • t . For each
person it is a control on his interpretation or the
past ( the • was • ), a se lector of pres ent stimuli ( the
• is'), and � a proposed re-direction or be havior moving
through time ( the 'ought • ). Thus human values, in
the form of human purpose, are always present in the
• was, ' and 'is, ' and the • ought. •

1 57

It should be noted that the control of purpose
over human behavior se ems directly proportional to
the amount or intellectual effort involved. Since
the act or the ory building is a highly intellectual
affair, it seems obvious that purpose is a main con
sideration . The notion that theory has a quality of
• oughtness' about it seems unavoidable to me. 60

Rese arch in perceptual theory can leave little doub t

about the untenable position of those who would insist that

administrative the ory, or any theory, must conrine itself to
what is and avoid what ought to be.

Normative considerations

are what man sets for his own pursuits that determine whe ther
he behaves inte lligently or in the manner or Be cker's glow-

worm.

G.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter was an investigation into the psychologi

cal foundations ot theorizing.

Since theorizing has been

described as· a human process, psychological research has a

spe cial significance tor explaining this process.

60 o rin B. Graft, "Administrative Theory and Human
Values , " Address at the National Conference or Professors ot
1 9 60,
Educational Administration, Macomb, Illinois, August
pp. 21-22. ( Mime ographe d. )

24,

Efforts to solve the perplexing mind-b ody problem
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seem to encompass specific research efforts and to give some

meaning to controversial issues in theory .

The historical evolvement of modern theories of per

ceptual psychology was traced from early Greek sensationism

which gained signiticance through philo sophical empiricism .

Sensationism was embraced by behaviorism and reached fruition

in logical positivism.

Perceptual theories of today are �unded in Gestalt
psychology. The evolution from sensationism--which has be

come known as discrimination theory--has progressed through

recognizing the individual as a cognitive organism to recog-

-�izing the individual as an organism which structures the
stfmuli and environment.

Functionalist theories of perception are c oncerned

with the central factors of the organism--needs, purposes,
values, ete. --which act as perceptual de terminants.

Values

and purposes of the individual have been demonstrated

through research to be active determinants of what the in
dividual wishes to perceive and how he interprets what he
sees .

Much progress may be possible toward formulating an

integrated theory ot personality by perceptual research .

The perceptual theory of transactionalism seems to

be of special importance tor theorists to examine.

The role

of the individual as a creator o.f his environment in
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carrying out his purposes are portrayed in this theory .

The controve rsial issues re garding theory in educa

tional administration were re-examined in the light of per
ceptual research .findings with .furthe r discussion of the

philosophic issues .

Rese arch in perception seems to discount such notions

as " theory is value-.free, " and " theory is con.tined to the is

at the exclusion of the ought. "

CHAPTER V
THE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF

THEORY CONSTRUCTS
A.

INTRODUCTION

The cons tructs of theory identified in Chapter II of

this study were as sumptions , logical deductions and hypothe
ses.

Although different terms have been used to describe

these elements ot a theoretical structure, there is general

agreement among writers who have dealt with the subject that

these three constructs do constitute the vital elements

or

ion, however , on the nature or the se three constructs.

Be

theoretical structure.

There are wide differences of opin

a

cause of these differences , an analytical examination of the
constructs is highly significant.

Not only are there wide differences of opinion about

the nature of theory constructs , but there is lack or agree

ment on the meaning of analysis and synthe sis.

In the dis

cus sion of logical positivism in Chapter III, analysis was

described as the method of showing relationships , and syn

thesis was the method or inferring meaning through reduction
to atomistic elements of experience.

Obviously , the posi

tivist's use ot these terms is different from uses of the
terms in this study .

Analysis , as it is used in this study,

is the scientific proces s ot breaking down a complex

structure into simpler units.
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The purpose of this method as

describe d by Bronowski is H to shift our gaze .from the thing

or event to its structure. " 1

Bronowski goes on to say that ,

"We understand a process, we explain it, when we lay bare in

it a structure which is like one which we have me t else
where . " 2

The analytic section of this chapter treats e ach of

the thr�e constructs individually.

Since theorizing has

bee n described as a human process, the individual constructs

are therefore parts of this process • . It is helpful to think

of the three constructs, not as assumptions, logical deduc

tions, and hypotheses, but rather as assuming, logically de
ducing, and hypothe sizing.

Such a consideration makes them

more vividly a part of the process of theorizing.

The synthetic section of the chapter relates the three

constructs to each other.

The total structure is then shown

to be meaningful, not through re duction to atomistic ele

ments of experience, but through its capacity for insuring

intelligent behavior, including scientific experimentation.
1 Jacob Bronowski, " Science as Foresight, " What Is
Science, James R. Newman, editor (New York : Simoii"andSchuster, 1 955 ), P • 4 29 .
2Ibid.

B.
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THE ANALYSIS

The breaking down ot complex stru ctures into simpler

units can be very dangerous.

The danger lies in the distor

tions which may arise when viewing any unit out ot its usual
context.

Even though the theoretical constru cts are examined

individually in this study, their function in the total

structure should be kept in mind.

Contrary to a determinis-

. ti c philosophy ot s cience, knowledge is not gained by pro
gression from atomistic elements to more universal relation
ships.

Rather, progression is trom universal assumptions to

atomisti c elements tor testing, and, thus, to more refined

universal assumptions.

The question then arises about the

method of formulating universal assumptions.

This problem

is dealt with in the examination or the first theory con

struct, a set of assumptions.
The Nature or Assumptions

The elements ot theory generally termed the assump

tions are frequently known by other names.

Northrop pre

ferred to call them postulat1ons 3; Campbell called them
hypotheses. 4 No doubt, Sullivan was referring to these

3F. s . C. Northrop, Logie ot the Sciences and the
Humanities ( New York: The Ma cm11Iin--C0mpany, 194'7)'; �140.
4Norman R. Campbell, "The Stru cture of Theories, "
Readings in the Philosophy ot Science, Herbert Feigl and May
Brodbeck, ed!lors (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. ,
1953 ) , P • 290.
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elements when he said that science has a certain amount or

userul myth on which mathematical formulations can be hung. 5

Assumptions are synonymous with Conant ' s working hypotheses
on a grand scale. 6

Many writers, including Graft and Street7

refer to this co llective construct as the the�ry.

Most theoretical structures have many assumptions.

Since they must be internally consistent and logically re-.
lated they are generally referred to colle ctively as a set

of assumptions and as a si�gle theory construct.

The number

of assumptions would decrease as the theory became more ab

stract and general.

Conversely, the number of assumptions

would increase as the theory became more specific and con
crete.

This examination of assumptions is concerned with

(1) determining the function of assumptions in a theoreti cal

structure, and (2 ) to investigate methods tor formulating
assump tions.

5J. w. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (New
York: Mentor Books, The New American Library ot World Liter
ature, Inc. , 1952), p. 157.

6 James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New
Haven: Yale University Press, l9;IT, P • 47 .

7 Qrin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, Improving Co •
�a
tence in Educational Ad.ministration (New York: Harper an
Brothers, . 19 56.
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Ennis describes tour different uses ot assumptions:

(1 ) deprecatory use, (2 ) concluding use, ( 3 ) premise use,

and ( 4 ) presupposition use. 8

The deprecatory use e ncompasses

the charge that very little or no e vidence is available .

example of such usage is, "Oh, you are only assuming ; you
don ' t really know. "

An

The concluding use also suggests some

we akness in the e vidence.

An example would be, "I assume

that you are going out, since you have on your dark blue

cap. ,, 9

In the pre mise use, a conclusion or point of view

is justified in terms of the assumption which stands as a
premise.

The presupposition use me ans that the assumption

must be true before an utterance can be considered to be
correct.

An example would be, " The present Oakwood Latin
teacher is a graduate ot Illinoi�. 11 10
The stateme nt pre

supposes that there is a Latin teacher at Oakwood.

Assumptions in -a theoretical structure most ne arly

approximate premise-type · assumptions.

In a theoretical

structure there is a set of assumptions and there is a set

ot hypotheses which is logically deduced from the assumptions.

8 Robert H. Ennis, "Assumption-Finding, " Languafe and
Concepts in Education, B. Othane l Smith and Robe rt H . nn!i;
e ditors (Chicago: Rand. McNally and Company, 1961 ) , pp. 161-

178.

9 Ibid. , p. 163 .

lOibid. , p. 164 .

The reasonablenes s of the hypotheses i s premised on the
reasonablenes s of the as sumptions.
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Of course, the hypo the

ses are s ub ject to rigorous tes ting; however, no amount of

tes ting can verity an hypothesis independent of the as sump
tions from which it was deduced.

It is diffic ult to choose which theory cons truct is

mos t important, since all are vital.

However, a s sump tions

are preliminary to any inves tigation or act ot behavior.

To this extent, they are ot most importance.

Also, as sump

tions give more trouble to the theorist--and everyone is

to s ome extent a theorist--than any of the other cons truct s .
Northrop maintains that as sump tions are the under
lying source of all problems s ubjected to examination. 11

Campbell des cribes this element of theory as being a set of

propositions setting forth a collection of ideas character
istic of the theory. 12

Sullivan would use this element as

pegs on which he would hang mathematical formulations. 13
For Conant, this element would be t he basis tor deducing
consequences for expe rimentation. 14
llNorthrop, � · cit. , pp. 19 -34.

12campbell, �· eit. , p. 290.
13sullivan, loc. cit.
l�conant, loc. cit.

It has been maintained throughout this s tudy that
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every act of intelligent behavior and s cientific experimenta
tion presupposes a theory.

It is further maintained tha t

the fundamental presupposition is a set ot assumptions which
gives rise to hypotheses.

ones .

There are implicit assumptions as well as explicit

The explicit assump tions offer little difficulty

since they can be readily investigated for logical internal

relatedness and consistency.

Also 1 the tac t th.at �hey are

explicit makes it likely that they have been carefully
s crutinized .

The implicit assumptions 1 however, are un

usually problematic since they frequently have not been

inte llectualized.

The rise of a deterministic philos ophy

or science has contributed to the failure of many people to
examine implicit assump tions or even to admit that they
exis t .

The advocacy o f a kind o f s cience intended only to

explain what is and of a kind of theory purported to be

free from human values perpetuates encouragement for ignoring

implicit assl.'Ullptions.

Many people become furious and highly

defensive when implicit as sumptions are suggested in explana

tion of some statement they have made or some act of behavior
they have exhibited • . Such a reaction is typ i cal of those

who prefer to compartmentalize their lives into the s cien
tific realm and the metaphysical realm..

These individuals

would likely insist that it is nobody's busine ss what they
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believe.

Wrapped up in the notion of implicit assumptions are

individual beliefs, values and purposes.

For example, an

as sumption about administrative behavior in education pre

supposes assumptions about education, assumptions about a

society which would promote particular kinds of educational

opportunities, and assumptions about man, the individual

unit of society--his nature, his purposes.

implicit cosmological assumptions.

Also, there are

It is not advocated here that implicit assumptions

always be stated in a scientific theory , but that they be
understood.

It is advocated, however, that every individual

be constantly engaged at defining his own implicit assumptions.
A well-orde�ed lire demands that a person know what he be
lieves.

The alternative would result in an inconsistent,

frequently manipulative and opportunistic individual.

This

argument does not imply that a person's be liefs never change.

It is possible constantly to evaluate beliefs and revise
them only when they are identifiable.

A scientific venture

limited to an examination or what is can result only in a

massive accumulation of me aningless data.

said :

Whitehead once

• • • No science can be more secure than the un
conscious metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes.
The individual thing is necessarily a modification

of its environment, and cannot be understood in
disjunction. All reasoning, apa�t from meta
physica l reference, is viscous. 1 /
How, then, are assumptions formulated?
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Ideas about

the nature of assump tions would infl uence points of view

about their formul ation .

Griffiths, in taking issue with

the normative nature ot assump tions, describes his own ideas
about how assumptions are formul ated.

We can say • • • that a theory is essential ly
a set or assumption s from whi ch a set ot empirical
princip l es may be derived. Since the princip l es
are empirical they must be statements or veri
fiab le fact. Since it is logicall y impossib le to
derive empirical statements from value assumptions,
the assumptions of a theory must be restricted to
factual or empirica l l y verifiabl e statements. The
assumption of a theory ot administration cannot
be val ue statements . l o

Griffiths insists that assumptions must be restricted

to factual or empiricall y verifiab le statements.

This

method of formulating as sumptions wou l d depend on induction-
gathering the facts.

An alternative me thod for formulating

assumptions in the science of physics was expressed by Albert

Einstein :

1 5A l fred

North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas ( New
York: M entor Books, The New Amer!ean Libraryof Worl d Literature, Inc. , 19 58 ) , p . 1 58 .
i6nanie l E. Griffiths , " The Nature and M e aning of
Theory" ( Paper read at the National Conference or Professors
ot Educational Administration, Macomb, I l linois, August 24,
1 9 60 ).

There is no inductive method which could lead to the
fundamental concepts ot physics . Failure to under
stand this tact constituted the basi c philosophical
error ot so many investigators ot the nineteenth
century.

. .

..

. .

.

. .

........

. . . .

.
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Physics constitutes a logical system 0£ thought
which is in a state ot evolution, and whose b asi s
cannot be obtained through distillation by any in
ductive method from the experiences lived through
but which can only be attained by tree invention. ! 7

Perhaps this fundamental question ot whethe r assump

tions are generali zations ot accumulated tacts or whether

they are tree creations ot the mind constitutes a basic

focal point of fundamental controversies regarding theory.

Around this question hinges the "is-ought" dichotomy,

the philosophy-science conflict, and the question ot human

values in theoretical stru ctures .

The position advanced here is that there are assump

tions which can never be empirically tested.

An assumption

which is made a subject of investigation may be tested; how
ever, the validity of the test rests on other assumptions
which are not empirically verifiable .

In other words, the

foundations ot science rest on tree creations ot the human

intellect .

Popper points up the logical fallacy ot relying on

induction :

17Albert Einstein, Out of � Later Years ( New York:
Philosophi cal Library, 1950},pi):" 78, 96 .

Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point
_of view, that we are justified in inferring uni
versal statement s from singular one s, no matter how
numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may
always turn out to be false: no matter how many
instances of white swans we may have observed, this
does not justify the conclusion that all swans are
white. 18

17 0

Continuing his argument, Popper uses the principle of

induction to disprove itself :

For the principle of induction must be a uni
versal s tatement in its turn. Thus ir we try to
regard it s truth as known from experience, then
the very s ame problems which occas ione d it s intro
duction will arise all over again. To justify it,
we should have to employ inductive inferences; and
to justify the se we should have to as sume an in
ductive principle of a higher order; and so on.
Thus the attempt to base the principle of induc
tion on experience breaks down, since it must lead
to an infinite regre s s. 19

Efforts to tie all a s sumptions to the "facts" not only

are illogical, but re search in perceptual psychology dis 

proves the validity of such contentions .
interpret s his environment.

matter:

The individual

As Northrop so ably put the

• • • The s ocial s cientis t ' s or the historian ' s
aim at pure fact is a snare and a delusion. What
one ge ts are not facts, but facts brought under some
often uncritically examined, unconscious, theoreti
cal as sum�tions of the sociologist or historian in
ques tion. 20
1 8Karl

( London:

R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Hutchinson and Company, Lta. , l959 ) , p • . 27 .

19Ibid. ,

p. 29 .

20Northrop, �· cit. , pp. 3 17 - 3 18.
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Northrop defines the prob lem regarding formulation ot

assumptions, in promoting his thesis that once facts are com

municated, they are interpreted facts , not pure facts •
• • • In fact, metaphysics, when unambiguously
defined, is the thesis that there are concepts by
pos tulation 3nterpretatio!!7 as well as concepts
by intuition L'fmmediately apprehendable factif;
positivism, conversely, is the thesis !hat there
are only concepts by intuition • • • • 2

No matter how vigorously man tries to define his re

s ponsibilities out of existence b y reliance on the "facts, "
in the final analysis , the facts are of his own . making, and
the responsib ility is his �

As Profes sor Bridgman described

it, more revolutionary than the discoveries of Galileo, New

ton, or Darwin is the realization by scientists that it is

impossible to transcend the human reference point. 22
Logical Deductions

The second construct of theory has been identified as

the process of logical deduction.

Logical deduction is the

process of inferring relationships, primarily between- the

set of assumptions and the set of hypotheses, but also

internal relationships among the assumptions and among the

hypotheses.

That is, the ass umptions and the hypotheses

21Ibid. ,

p. 8 7 .

2 2 James B . Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man
( Garden City: DoubledaI and . Company, Inc:-;-1952 ), pP:-86- 8 7,
citing P. W. Bridgman, Philosophical Implications of PhysicsJ'
American Academr or Arts and Sciences Bulletin, III, No. 5
( February, 1950 .

must be logically re lated and internally consistent.
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As a

theory construct, howe ver, the chief concern in this investi

gation was to tre at the process of logical deduction as the
connecting link between the set of assumptions and the set

of hypotheses.

Even though the proce ss is isolated for ex

amination, its re lationship to the · other constructs mus t be
ke pt in mind.

Hull refers to this theory construct as a set of

definitions of critical terms employed. 23 Marx would prob

ably e quate logical deduction with his theoretical proposi�
tions--generalized statements concerning functional rela

tions among variables. 24

Hall and Lindzey 1 s empirically de

fined conce pts, which they maintain bring the theory into

contact with reality, are s imilar to this construct. 25

Northrop ' s third stage in initiating inquiry was to logi
cally deduce hypothese s. 26

His terminology is the s ame as

that used in the study and the process is identical.

Camp

bell refers to this cons truct as the dictionary of the
2 3 c1ark

L. Hull, "The Hypothetico-Deductive Method, "
Psychological Theory, Me lvin H. Marx, editor (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1951 ) , p. 219.
24Melvin H. Marx, " The General Nature of Theory Con
struction, tt PaychologicaL Theor , Melvin H. Marx, editor (New
York: The . Macmillan Company, I�51 ) , p. 7 .
2 5calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories ot Per
sonality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ine. , 1957 ),p.--r-2.
2 6xorthrop,

�· cit. , pp. 60 -61.
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theo ry. 2 7

Griffiths would accomp lish the logical deduction
task through operational concepts. 28

It is frequently said that, " This is logical, or that

is illogical. "

What is meant by such assertions?

What the

theorist is trying to do is to attain correspondence between

the assumptions and the hypotheses .

What every individual

in every act of b ehavior is trying to do is t o attain corre
spondence between his value framework and the ob jective

world which he believes exists independent o.f' himself.

Lecky exp lains this predicament o.f' the individual as follows :
Immersed in an environment which he does not
and cannot understand, the individual is forced
to cre ate a substitute world which he can under
stand and in which he puts his faith. He acts in
consistency with that conception, derives his
standards o r values from it, and undertakes to al
ter it only when convinced by further experience
that it !'ails to serve the goal of unity. Since
this self-made scheme of life is his only guarantee
of security, its preservation so·on becomes a goal
in itself . He seeks the type of experience which
confirms and supports the unified attitude, and re
jects experiences which seem to promise a disturb
ance of this attitude. 2 9

The above exp lanation is not unlike Dewey ' s conception

· of logic as being the transformation of an indeterminate
27campbell, �· cit. , p. 29 0.

28Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory ( New York:
App leton-Century-Cro.f'ts, Inc. , ,. 19 59 ), pp • .38-42 .
29 Pres eott Le cky, Self-Consistency A Theory of Personality { New York: Island Press, 1945) , p . ;o .
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situation into a determinate situation, 30 or Ittelson and

Cantril ' s theory ot transactionalism whereby

• • • each of us, through perceiving, creates for
himself his own psychological environment by attribu
ting certain aspects ot his experience to an en
viroilillent which he believes exists independent or
the experience • • • • 31

Logic, then, for the individual is the attainment of

correspondence between his own interpretations ot his en

vironment (from his value frame of reference) and the en

vironment as he experiences it.

Proponents of this point ot

view have been criticized for denying the existence of an

external world; this criticism is unwarranted.

It is readily

admitted that there does exist something, but the it ot ex

ternal reality has no functional significance except as

significance is given to it by the interpreting individual.

As Whitehe ad so vividly put it:

• • • Philosophers have known for centuries
that our senses are no reliable testimony to the
existence of the outside world. • • •
There
was absolutely no reason to infer the existence
or external reality from any evidence brought in
to us by our senses. I t is all subjective. The
outer world may not be . there at all. And yet, as
a matter of t act, the only human beings who do
not assume the existence of that outer world as a
reality are in the lunatic asylums • • • • 32

30 John Dewey, Logic, The Theor of Inguirz ( New York :
Henry Holt and Company, 1938],pp. lO!-Io'5.
31William H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril, Perception,
A Transactional Approach (Garden City : Doubleday and Company,
Inc . , 1954) , p . 2.
32 tucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead
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The individual who behaves inte lligently is one

whose correspondence between his interpretations and the
world which he supposes is external or him are closely
correlated .

The external world does not provide meaning ;

the individual infers meaning.

The only public meaning is

through common agreement on private me anings .

The variance of the point ot view herein expres sed

from the point ot view or deterministic philosophers or
s cience is quite apparent.

Reliance ot the positivists

on operational definitions and corrnnon concepts is an effort

to confine meaning to operations and empirical matter out
side the individual' s own capacity to be stow meaning.

ambitious efforts are noteworthy, but unfruitful.

Such

Northrop

exposes the impossibility of attempting to operationally de
fine all concepts in theory:

There is no justification, from an analysis or
s cientific method itself, nor is there any other
reason , for supposing that it is neces sary to re
duce every concept in one's deductively formulated
s cientific theory to the type of meaning which
only those who think merely with their hands can
understand. In the case or most s cientific
theories only some ot the theoretical concepts by
postulation have operational meanings and denota
tively given epi stemic eorrelates . 33

( New York: Mentor Books, The New American Library of World
Literature, Inc. , 1954), P • 297.
33Northrop, �· cit. , p . 124.
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There must, however, be some way of insuring a degree

of common understanding among scientists who are pursuing
similar experimentation .

One convenient way tor doing this

is operationally defining some of the concepts.

We shou ld

not be deluded into thinking, however, that meaning in such

operations is anything more than personal meaning attributed

by each scientist; the meaning becomes public only through
common agreement of the . scientists.
It is at the stage of logical deduction that mathe

matics has been relied on heavily and the use of machines
for this operation has been invaluab le to the researcher.

However, neither mathematics nor machines can ever replace
the ingenuity of the scientist .

So long as science can be

confined to induction (gathering the facts) and to manipu

lating the facts, then machines are far superior tor these

operations than is man.

These devices are only tools for

the scientist to make his busy-work lighter.

The prime func

tion ot science , that of predietion--anticipating and con

trolling the future--rests with the scientist who must assume

full responsibility for his explorations.

The caution of the

great mathematician, Norbert Wiener, is especially appropri

ate for those who would reduce all science to machine-like
manipulations:

If we use, to achieve our purposes, a mechanical
agency with who se operations we cannot efficiently
interfere once we have started it, because the

action is so fast and irrevocable that we have not
the data to intervene before the action is complete, then we had better be quite sure that the
purpose put into the machine is the purpose which
we really de�ire and not merely a color.tul imitation of it. 3�

17 7

The factor of human purpose is ever-present, and the

scientist can no more absolve himse lf of re sponsibility than
can the consumer of scientific technology.

There is one furthe r aspect of logical deduction that

requires examination.

It has b een asserted that logical de

duction as a theory construct is the corre sponding link be

tween the set of assumptions and the set of hypotheses.

Im

plicit assumptions have been equate d wi th normative consider

ations--that is human purposes and values.

On the other hand,

hypotheses are deduced for empirical testing.

( The nature

of hypothe ses is discussed more fully in the next section of

this chapter. )

The que stion arise s about the method of

log ically relating normative considerations with e mpirical

considerations.

That is, how are metaphysical propositions

connected with empirical propositions, or the ought with
the is?

Northrop defined the proce ss of j oining an un

observed component ( anything designated by a concept by

postulation ) to its directly inspe cted component ( anything

34Norbert Wiener, "Some Moral and Technical Conse
quences of Automation, '' Science, CXXXI ( May 6 , 1960), 1358 .
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designated by a concept by intuition ) as epistemic correla-

.

tions.

. .

An epistemic correlation joins a thing known

in the one way to what is in some sense that s ame thing
known in a different way. " 3 5

An example in physics is cloud

chamber expe rimentation whereby the principle of ionization

is epistemically correlated with ·the inspected paths of the
ele ctrons as they collide with gas molecules.

The task or the deductive scientist • • • is to
begin with the postulated entities and relations
of his deductively formulated theory and to find
directly inspected data with which certain of his
postulated entities can be epistemieally corre
lated, so that the existence of the latter en
tities can be put to an experimental test. 3 6

The joining of untestable propositions with testable

propositions does not prove the truth or falsity of the un
testable propositions.
shown.

Only the relationship or the two is

For example, if A and B represent the assumptions and

hypotheses respe ctively, then the argument would be:

if A,

is quite obvious that the argumentation is illogical.

The

then B.

B is the ca se.

Therefore, A' is the case. 37

It

existence of B does not logically prove the existence of A .

The propositions by postulation ( assumptions ) are still un

verified.

Through the proce ss or inferring relationships,

35Northrop,

£E·

3 6 Ibid. , p . 121 .
3 7 Ibid. ,

p . 108 .

cit. , p . 119 .
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however, the reasonableness of the assumptions becomes more
firmly fix.ad.

For example, a democratic way of life has not

proven to be superior to other ideologies.

We firmly be

lieve it is superior, but its superiority is still an assump 
tion.

A classroom atmosphere where the individual students

are given some freedom to plan certain phase s of their edu
cational program and are expected to assume responsibility

for the results of such planning is logically related to the
democratic ideology .

Such clas sroom practices tend to make

our allegiance to the democratic ideal more firmly fixed ;

however , it still is not proven to be superior.

Even if

it is conclusively proven that student s learn better in such
an atmosphere, while our ideal becomes more firmly fixed,

it is still an assumption.

Its propagation and advancement

rests with the value frame or reference of all.

Parenthetic

ally, to degrade implicit assumptions by asserting that they

are only assumptions, is to degrade the fundamental directive

of all intelligent human behavior.
Hypotheses

Some examination of the nature or hypotheses was

necessary in the prior discussions of assumptions and logical
deductions.
se ction.

However, they are more .fully examined in this

A set of hypotheses is that construct of theory

which is deduced from a set of assumptions.

Hypotheses differ

from assumptions in that they have the additional

18 0

characteristic of being testable in terms of the assumptions.
They also tend to be much more speciric and concrete than

are assumptions.

Hypotheses have not been given a place in

the theoretical structure by some theorists.

In such cases,

it is maintained that a good theory must be productive of

testable hypotheses.

It is true that the number of hypothe

ses possible from a highly general set of assumptions is un
limited.

The testing of one hypothesis may give rise to

many others.

However, a theoretical structure is incomplete

without the inclusion or some hypotheses .

Such will b ecome

apparent as the nature of hypotheses is investigated.

Hull's hierarchy or interlocking theorems ultimately

derived from the postulates i s simi lar to the construct which

has been delineated as a set of hypotheses. 3 8

wise used theorems synonymously with hypotheses.

referred to them as consequences. 3 9

Northrop like
He also

Marx calls them em-

pirical propositions--statements of fact of what has been

observed. 4°

This construct or theory for Campbell would be

concepts or laws, the truth or falsity of which would always
be known. 41 Conant, like Northrop, equated this construct
3 8Hull,

loc. cit.

3 9 Northrop,

££·

cit. , p. 140.

4-0Marx, loe. cit.

4lcampbell, � · cit. , p. 291.
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with consequences which are sub ject to tes ting. 42

Perhap s the nature of hypotheses can be under stood

better by examining the simulated problem situation posed

earlier in the study.

A problematic situation for the in

dividual is an obstruction blocking his way as he progres ses
through time and spa ce toward the attainment of a speci£ic

goal .

The method ot attaining the goal had been pre-planned

from the same value frame of reference that had formulated

the goal .

The problem which has disrupted the plan for

attaining the goal mus t be dealt with .

Here is an indetermi

n ate situation which the individual endeavors to make determi

nate.

The first s tep in the solution is to analyze the

as sumptions which engendered the goa1 and made it see m worth
pursuing.

Let us suppose tha t an examination of the as sump

tions reinforced the worthwhilenes s or the goal.

Pro jections

are then made for solutions to the prob lem--pos sibilitie s for
attaining the goal.

These pro jections are hypotheses.

Any

one of several hypothese s may accomplish the purpose ; on the

other hand, any one of them may fail as did the original one .
In deducing the hypotheses , they must be logical

derivatives from the assumptions.

This is especially impor

tant, else the b attle may be won at the expense of all we

hold dear l

Whether or not an hypothesis will work must b e

42conant, Science and Common Sense, loc. cit.
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determined by testing it--that is , anticipating the conseguent.

The acid test for the hypothesis which was chosen

is whether or not the goal was attained.

In a sense, an

hypothesis undergoes a double cheek, first its consistency

with the set of assumptions and then, its fruitfulness in
attaining the goal.

It can easily be seen, by examining the above situa

tion, how hypotheses are used synonymously with theorems and
consequences .

In a theoretical structure . whether for a

scientific experiment or an intelligent act of behavior , the
three constructs--a set of assumptions , logical deductions

and a set of hypotheses--are mandatory.

either renders the theory invalid .

The absence of

In the absence of a set

of assumptions, there is no recognizable problem; in the ab
sence of logical deduction , there is no direction for prob
lem solutions ; in the absence or hypotheses, there can be

no active involvement in problem solving .

It is maintained

far too frequently that the method of science is the testing

of hypotheses.

Actually this process t akes place · in the

last stages of scientific method .

The explanation of hypotheses as being an anticipa

tion of the consequent is not unlike the tenet of experi

mental ism that the meaning of an idea rests with its conse
quential results.

Charles S . Peirce put it thus:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
practical bearings , we conceive the object of our

•

conception to have. Then, our conception of these
effec� § is the whole of our conception of the ob 
ject."i-::S
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It is imperative that we never lose sight of the

fundamental anchorage of hypotheses in the assumptions.

They are testable only in terms of the assumptions.

The

central focal point remains the value frame ot reference of

the individual who must assume full responsibility tor his

theory or theories.

C.

THE SYNTHESIS

An effort was made throughout the analytic examina

tion of the theory constructs to maintain the relationship
of each of the three constructs to the other two.

This main

tenance of relationships seemed to b e the only way of com

muni cating their significance.

The task of synthesizing is

simplified by the nature of the prior discussions.

The syn

thesis of the three theory constructs may. be effected best
by examining an old problem in terms of a unified the ory.

This prob lem is the traditional means-ends controversy.

It has been charged that relativistic philosophy is

oriented toward ends at the expense ot the me ans .

The prag

matic justification , it has b een sai d , is "Was the mission
4 3Philip P. Wiener (ed . ) , Values in a Universe of
Chance, Selected Writings 0£ Charles S. JliiFce �1839-11P:)
Garden City: Doub leday anaCompany , Tnc. , 1958 , p. l •

accomplished? "
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On the other hand, it has been charged that

the positivists concentrate on the means at the exclusion of
ends.
edge.

This is a charge which the positivists freely acknowl

The experimentalists vigorously deny--which they have

every justification for doing--that they neglect means .

As

a matter of fact, the means are wrapped up in the ends, a

necessity when the individual is the focal point ot all be

havior and activity.

This entire question is part of a basic question

raised in the analytic section ot this chapter .

It is:

"Are

all acts of behavior, including scientific experimentation,

founded on and directed by normative considerations, or must

all normative considerations be eliminated from science? "

Professor Raup, while emphasizing his own position

in the matter, states the case for both sides admirably:
• • • When a denoted goal is shown in its
connection with the conditions which lead to it,
this relationship is one that must be normatively
established . The goal is a construction in human
choice and preference. The conditions which lead
toward the realization of this goal are also
formulations of choice and preference • • • •

For many minds, the principal obstacle to this
normative approach to nature is imbedded in a pre
vailing and erroneous assumption regarding em
pirical science that its t facts • identify natural
objects as they exist inde pendently or our think
ing; that since the method tt establishing facts
achieves this independence, this is the only
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dependable method o.f achieving knowledge o.f
nature . 44

Those who prefer the latter view expresse d by Raup

whereby the ".facts spe ak for themse lve s" would insist that

assumptions are generalizations o.f singular facts.

Hypothe

ses would also have empirical re.ferents indepe ndent o.f the
assumptions.

The chie.f tools for the scie ntist with this

orie ntation would be machines �or manipulating the data,

te sting variable s, e tc.

There se e ms to be some illogic in

a the oretical structure where both the assumptions and the

hypothe ses have empirical referents.

It is di.f.fie ult to en

vision a nee d for de ducing hypothe se s if the assumptions

stand alone grounded in ex ternal reality.

Induction is a

very important part of scie nce as is the correlation o.f

variable s, but such hardly se ems to accomplish the aims of

science, that o.f pre diction and cre ation o.f ne w knowledges.

There is no apparent direction to such a science.

It can

only be conclude d that the scientist ' s unexpresse d value s

direct the science, a practice that has very serious impli

cations.

The re lativistic premise s advance d throughout this

study as the y are refle cte d in the ory construction are:

( 1 ) assumptions are .fre e cre atir n• of the human inte llect

44R. B. Raup, " The Community Criterion in Judgmental
Practice, " Studie s in Philosophf and Education, I ( Se ptembe r,

1960 ) , 31 .
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molde d by his value frame of reference, and (2) hypotheses
are testable only in re lation to the assumptions.

Since individuals ' percepts and values are influenced

by past experiences it could be, and indeed has been, main

taine d that free creative assumptions are s till generaliza

tions from past atomistic experiences.

There is, however,

the additional element of purpose that removes implicit

assumptions from the confines of a cause and effect science .
It does not remove their formulation from the confines ot

science !

Rather, assumptions are never sub jected to scien

tific scrutiny until they a�e honestly admitte d as a part

of scientific investigation.

The dogma of the deterministic

philosophers of scie nce that there is a realm of fact (scie n

tific) and a re alm of human values (me taphysics ) condones
opportunistic manipulations and irresponsibility.

Bronowski defines our current situation a� a dangerous

one brought about by irresponsibility:

The civilized world is indee d, threatene d with
destruction by the physical impact of science on
our lives, and it is characteristic that we are
thre atened as much, for example, by overpopulation
as by radioactive death. For what threatens us in
both cases is not the seientificdiscovery, but our
o'wnfailuretoliii'gllall the consequences honestry
and without compromise's:- We are threatened by over
population because we refuse to face hone stly- -that
is, to face actively- -the nee d to control human
re production. And we are threatene d by atomic bombs
because we refuse to face the' necessity for a new age
of trust among nations. Somehow we think it remote

from morality to face the facts ; somehow we
think it possible to be good without being
wise . 45 (italics mine)
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Bronowski sums up his expose of our false sense of
f

morals :

We live in a technical age of plenty and are
frightened because we try to control this abund
ance by a morality which �huts its eyes to the
consequences of our acts. 46

When ends , or normative purposes, are eliminated from

scientific scrutiny, then me ans are without direction .

A

haven is provided for the mystic and an excuse for the
iia
scientist who has not the inc11 tion nor courage to state

his views.

Rampshe rger definea l the fir st role of the phil

osopher of science as an exposer of hidden assumptions .

The first task for the philosopher of science is
to examine the actual historical development of
science to discover what philosophical assumptions
have been taken tor granted. · What vie ws as to the
nature of reality and our means of knowjng it has
been tacitly or explicitly presupposed?�7

A synthesized theory is one whereby implicit assump

tions are made explicit.

The a s sumptions must be logically

interrelated and mutually supporting.

Hypotheses must also

45 Jacob Bronowski, "A Moral for An Age of Plenty, "
Adventure s of the Mind Series, Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIII
(November 12 , 1960 ) , 72.
York:

46 Ibid .

47Albert G . · Rampsberger, Philosophy of Science ( New
F . S . Crofts and Company � 1942 ) , p . 3'7
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be logically interrelated and mutually supporting as well as

have a logical and con sistent relation ship to the as sump
tions.

The testing of hypotheses is impos sible except in

relationship to the assumptions; the relationship of hypothe
ses to empirical reality does not stand alone.

In every act

of intelligent behavior, we are literally testing hypotheses

which were formulated as an anticipation ot the con sequent.
The consequences of purauing the act ot b ehavior must be

borne by the individual himself who projected the hypothesis
from his own s et of implicit normative as sumptions.

Such is

equally true of the scientist; he cannot avoid his private

respon sibilities by declaring sc�ence a public respon sibility.

As Bridgman put it, " Science does not begin until my activi
tie� begin. n48

The process that I want to call scie ntific is
a proces s that involves the continual apprehension
ot meaning, the con stant appraisal ot signiticance,
accompanied by a running act ot checking to be sure
that I am doing what I want to do, and ot judging
correctnes s or incorrectnes s . This checking and
judging and accepting, that together con stitute
understanding, are done by me and can be done tor
me by no one else. They are a s private as my
toothache , and without them science is dead.

. .

................

. .

.

. .

..

. . • Always beyond the public level , waiting
tor a deeper analysis, is the private level. lt
is on the private level that I realize my

48 p. w. Bridgman , Retleciions ot A Physicist { New York:
Philosophical Library , 1955) , P • 50 .

essential isolation; here is my awful free dom
that I can hardly tace. 49
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Obviously this awful freedom which Bridgman found

difficult to face has proven impossible for many scientists
and lay citizens to face.

A synthesized theory, whether it

be a theory of physics, chemistry, medicine, educational ad
ministration or the daily problems of mankind in mutual

coexistence, has at the core ot it private normative values.
The burden, and it is a burden, is for e ach of us to assume

responsibility for exposing our values so that we may col
lectively examine them intelligently ( scientifically ) .

We

can no longer afford to hide behind the cloak ot scientific
immunity.

Reiser sums up the problem as follows:

• • • There is much said about science being
more suited to the determination of. me ans rather
than e nds, to the study of facts rathe r than
value s, to the description of wha t is rather than
what ought to be. It is surprising to find
religionists and Logical Positivists agreeing
with this conclusion, even though the motivations
in e ach case are very different.

Contrary to this view that 'facts' and ' value s'
are mutually exclusive, I hold that the realm of facts and the kingdom of value s are ruled by a
common sovereignty: we must le arn to think
compassionately and fee l inte lligently. That is
49 Ibid. , pp. 50,

75 .

to say, science is committed to a value- system . 5°
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A society, such as ours, that stakes it s existence on

an educated, intelligent citizenry has cause for being ill

at-ea se when theories of educational leadership purport to

be divorced from the society ' s value-sys tem .

D.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter the three constructs or theory, a

set of a s sumptions, logical deductions, and a set of hypothe

se s , were analysed individually to determine their nature and

their role in the proces s of theorizing.

The three constructs

were then synthesi zed to show their composite function in

intelligent behavior and responsible scientific inves tiga

tion .

Theoretical as sumptions are free creations of the

human intellect.

They are implicit premises for every act of

behavior and for every experiment of science .

All as sump 

tions are rounded on metaphysical, normative considerations .
At the core of them is the value frame of reference of each

individual.

The se normative a s sumptions can become public

only when individuals honestly make explicit that which is

implicit, and sub ject them to intelligent ( scientific)
scrutiny.

As sumptions do not n ces sarily have empirical
i

50o1iver L. Reiser, The
fnte ration of Human Knowl
edge (Boston: Porter Sargent,. 958 , , PP • 6I'=62 .

referents; the facts do not speak tor themselves.
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Communi

cated facts are not pure facts but they are interpreted

tacts.

The individual cannot absolve himself ot responsi

bility for his own assumptions.

Logical deduction is the process ot interring relation

ships primarily between the set ot assumptions and the set

of hypotheses, but also interrelationships among assumptions
and among hypotheses.

Relationships between normative

assumptions and testable hypothe ses are e ffected by epistemic

correlation; that is, the hypotheses are testable in terms
ot the assumptions.

Operational definitions ot a ll terms in

a theoretical structure is impossible.
cepts by postulation.

There must be con

Logical deductions are a part of each

individual ' s intelligent behavior when he seeks to attain

correspondence between his conception of the environment and

the environment as he experiences it.

Intelligent behavior

re quires rising above being a naive realist, a condition

which Wolfgang Kohler said comes from childhood and persists
with us most ot· the time. 51 Rather, we are interpreters

from our value frame ot reference .
always anchored in human purpose.

Logical deductions are

Hypotheses are logical deductions from the set ot

51wolfgang Kohler, " The Mind-Body Problem, " Dimensions
of Mind, Sidney Hook, editor ( New York: New York University
l're�1960 l-, P • 9 .

assumptions .

They have the additional characteristic of

being testable in terms of the assumptions.

Hypotheses are

con jectured solutions to problems which obstruct goal

attainment.
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They are anticipations of th� consequent.

Since

hypotheses are deduced from normative assumptions , whether
explicit or implicit, they must be tested in terms 0£ the

assumptions.

Hypotheses are pro jections from the indi

vidual's value frame 0£ re£erence; their consequential re
sults are his responsibility.

A synthesized theory would not be concerned with

either means or ends at the exclusion of the other .
means would be part and parcel of the ends .

The

A goal worth

pursuing would be pursued with the same integrity as was

used in selecting the goal for pursuit .

The survival 0£ man

kind is dependent on moral standards critically examined and
utilized for insuring mutual coexistence.

to be good without being wi se .

It is impossib le

CHAPTER VI
AXIOMATIC BASES FOR ·THEORIZING IN
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
A.
was :

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study, as designated in Chapter I ,

to offer a logical explanation of the process of theory

construction in educational admin istrat ion so that wide

differences of opinion regarding administrat ive theory may be

reduced .

The existence of controversial issues among members

of the profess ion concerned w ith the development

or a theory

or theories ot educational admin istration constituted the

problem of the study.

In the study, efforts were made to determine the nature

ot and the purposes for theory.

The .fundamental controver 

sial issues among those who have investigated the structure
of theor ies were identified.

Philosophic and psychological

bases of theory were examined, and the basic constructs of
the ory were identified, analyzed and synthesized.

It is the purpose of this f inal chapter to ( 1 ) pull

together the points of view advanced in the study as they

tend to offer resolutions to the controversial issues, and
(2 ) to advance some axiomatic bases tor theor izing, espe

cially in educati onal administrat ion.
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The major controversial issues were identified around

the questions of (1) the place of human values in a theo

retical structure, ( 2) the free creative or the restrictive

aspects of assumptions, ( 3 ) the definition of concepts, and
(�) the validity of the "is-ought" dichotomy .

Each of these

questions is reviewed below in the light of argume ntation ad

vanced throughout the study.
philosophical differences.

All of the issues basically are

Those who are oriented to a

deterministic philosophy would b e sharply divided from those

with relativistic orientations.

These points of view were

examined in the study noting the supporting research and

logic of each.

These points or view are reviewed prior to

consideration of the individual issues .

It is maintained by deterministic philosophers of

science that there exists an external world independent of
man's knowledge or it.

Man's knowledge or this external

world is true only as it approximates the external structure
of reality.

Logical positivism, a current instrument of

determinism, advocates a separation of the world of value

from the world of fact, the ought from the is, the ends from
the means.

Values, ends, purposes and all normative con

siderations are said to b e in the realm or metaphysics, and

are, thus, unscientific .

Such a philosophy makes it possib le

tor man to compartmentalize his life, and, also, an escape

from shouldering personal responsib ility is furnished.

It

is convenient to take the position, "Don't ask me, I just
work here.

Check the tacts. "
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Proponents of this point of

view (determinism ) insist that man ' s values are to b e divorced from all s cientific investigation .

to eliminate all metaphysics from s cience.

Efforts are made

On the other hand, relativistic philosophers ot s cience

maintain that the external world is me�ingful only through

hum.an interpretation.

Modern research in quantum mechanic s

would seem to otter a deterrent to those who still think of
matter as the solid stutf ot r�ality .

Research i� perceptual

psychology seems to be conclusive that the individual chooses

from his perceptual field those things to which he ascrib es
value.

M eaning attributed to perceptual ob jects varies with

the perceiver ' s past experiences, values and purposes.

Man, then, as a purposeful creature selects his goals

and �dapts his methods tor goal attainment to the goals them
selves.

Both the goals and the methods are anchored in

man ' s individual value frame of reference.

Ac cording to the

relativi s t, the above des cribed procedure is equally appli

cable to the scientist in the laboratory as to the lay person

in any act of intelligent behavior.

In determinism, meaning is vested in external reality.

The individual becomes an ob server and a reporter.

Whereas ,

in relativism, meaning is vested in the values of the indi
vidual.

He is the formulator ot goals and he mus t as sume
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full responsibility for their attainment .

The position stated at the beginning ot this study

and advanced throughout was one of relativism.

Research and

logic seem to support overwhelmingly the relativistic posi

tion.

Resolution or the controversial issues in the ory

necessitate an understanding of their philosophical genesis .

B.
1.

EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF
.
'
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES

Are theoretical structures free or human values?

In the light of the above discussions, it is obvious

that those people with deterministic orientations would in

sist that theoretical structures, to be valid, must be free
of human values.

A theory or administration, they would say,

must be usable equally by any administrator, in any organiza
tion, at any time, and in any social setting or political
ideology.

Some would concede that values may be used as

variables, but they are not a part of the theoretical struc

ture.

To the relativist, the validity of the theoretical

structure would depend on the validity or the normative sys
tem which supports the theory.

Since theorie s are man-made they inevitably encompass

human values, either explicitly or implicitly.

Such, at

least, was the thesis advanced in this study and which an
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' examination of the process of theorizing seemed to support .
facts?

2.

Are assumptions generalizations of inductive

This issue could be phrased, "Are all assumptions

empirically testable? "

The determinist would answer the

question in the affirmative, while the relativist would ve

hemently decry such an assertion .

The position of the deter

minist on this issue would be obvious .

With his faith in

external reality and his aversion of metaphysics, he would

have no recourse but to insist that assumptions are proposi
tions built up from singular propositions with empirical
referents.

The relativist , on the other hand, would maintain

that assumptions are free creations of the human intellect

anchored in normative considerations.

Assumptions , it appears, may be tested if subje cted

to examination, but the test is based on more general assump

tions which are not testable .

In the final analysis , assump

tions rest with the individual ' s set of values , and he is

responsible for them .

It is urged that implicit assump

tions be made explicit and subjected to rigorous examination.

3.

Are all concepts empirically definable?

If it is conceded that there are implicit assumptions

by postulation, then the propositions of these assumptions

must be made up of concepts by postulation.

Operational
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conce pts would be impossible tor an unobserved entity ; and

e fforts to use only operational conce pts in a theory would

result in (1 ) an infinite regress, (2 ) a theory which would

omit implicit assumptions (and their relevance would be

denie d ) , or ( 3) an unintelligent set of propositions based

on the immediately appre hendable , with the theorist naively

assuming he has made no interpretations.

4.

How valid is the "is-ought " dichotomy?

Man, progressing through space and time, interprets

the present from the past and he pro jects into the future
from both.

Actually, the pre sent is only the link between

the past and the future.

Man ' s specious present consists of

the �' the is, and the ought.

Perceptual re search seems to shatter the validity of

any is-ought dichotomy.

Man interprets his environment (the

"is " ) in te rms of his purposes (the "ought" ).

· It appears that man would be a victim of his environ-

ment if he were restricted to what is .

-- -

For the scie ntist

in the laboratory, the purpose tor his experimental work
gives me aning to that which he is investigating.

A the ory of

social behavior including educational administration must

factor in the oughts of the subjects as well as those ot the
investigator.

In summary, the tenets ot a dete rministic philosophy

of science would be:

(1 ) theories are value-free;

( 2 } assumptions are composite singular empirical tacts ;
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( 3 } all concepts must be operationally , or empirically , de

finable; and ( 4 ) what is must be separated from what ought
to be.

Whereas, the tenets of a relativistic philosophy of

science would be quite opposite.

It does no good to say that one camp would have one

view, and the other camp another view.
difference what you believe1

It does make a

To assume otherwise, would be

to suppose that a man's beliefs make no difference in his
social behavior.

What difference does it make to the profession or

educational administration whether its members are adher

ents of determinism or relativism?

Strict adherence to determinism would result in ig

noring the purposes of educational administration, the pur
poses of education, and the purposes of man as a social
being.

Research in educational administration would con

sist of the researcher making observations within a school

or school system and recording what he finds.

He would

never know or care what constituted an educational program

adequate for attaining purposes of education ( whatever they

may be ) ; nor would he know or care if the administrator was
doing an effective or ineffective job .

Research would be

come a job for technicians and their data frequently would
be trivia .
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Progre ss in the profession of educational administra -

'

tion, it seems, i s dependent on the extent to which educa-

tional administrator s contribute to the attainment of educa

tional purposes.

Educational purposes are, in the final anal 

ysis, individual purpose s of the members of society.

Each

member ot the profe s sion- -so cial s cienti st, practitioner, pro

fe ssor, student- -can afford to do no les s than display maxi 
mum integrity in stating hi s a ssumptions and shouldering re
sponsibility for improving the profession.

Such effor ts

require tran s cending the threshold of empiricism in research,

preparation programs, and in administrative function s.

C.

AXIOMATIC BASES

It has been contended throughout this s tudy that the

solid ba se of reality is man' s value frame of reference.

Axioms have traditionally been equated with that which is
self-evident, such as the axioms or Euclidean geometry.

It

may appear that the use ot ax.ioms in a relativistic context
i s in con sistent.

Such would, indeed, be the ca se if the

traditional definition of axioms were held.

Research and

thoughtful inve stigations by s cientist s and philosopher s

alike, which were cited in thi s study, invalidate any claims

for self-evident truths.

Axiomati c bases are no more than

axiological bases--that i s, bases with value referents.
However, there are no bases more solid than well -formulated

values.

2 01
In conjunction with the reasoning advanced throughout

this study, the statements below are advanced with equal

fervor.

The statements are intended to provide, to some ex

te nt, direction ror those (1) concerned with the structure

of theory; (2) those concerned with constructing and/or

using theories for research purposes, especially in educa

tional administration ; and ( 3) those concerne d with im
proving the profession of educational administration.

There

are implications also for those concerned with intelligent
daily living.

Had different assumptions been held, these

statements would have been different.

That is, the validity

of the statements rests on the validity of the assumptions

(postulations ) of the study and the logic or the argumenta-

tion.

It will be noted that some of the s tatements are re-

statements of . the postulations of the study.

The postula

tions were not proven to be true or false, however their

soundness was reinforced substantially by the research.
1.

Theory cannot be disassociated from the human

process or theorizing.

Any theory , whether for scientific

investigation or for intelligent daily behavior, is the
product or a human intellectual process .
2.

Everyone who behaves intelligently theorizes.

The normal drives, such as . hunger, · sex, self-preservation,
etc. , are inadequate to insure intelligent behavior .

It is
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erroneous to as sume that only scientists theorize.

izing is required of all who anticipate the future.

3.

Theor

Theoriz ing begins from the individual's private

frame of reterence--his values and his purposes.

The per

s onal reference point 0£ the theorist cannot be transcended.

Theory becomes a public matter through mutual agreement on
private values.

No science can be stronger than the integ

rity of the scientists who are willing to expose for exami
nation their private values.

4.

Theorizing involves utilizing what !!.!! (the past )

for a s sociating what is (the present) with what ought to be
(the future).

Stated another way, the purpose of theory

is prediction- -projection into the future.

The accumulation

of new knowledges can come about in no other manner.

5.

All theorizing is premised on normative a s sump 

tions, either explicitly or implicitly.

The more general

assumptions cannot be empirically tested; rather, they are

reinforced through the t esting of logically derived hy
potheses, if the testing has positive results.
6.

The testing of hypotheses i s always premised on

the s oundnes s of the untested as sumptions from which the

hypotheses were deduced.

7 . All of the concepts of a theoretical structure can

not be operationally defined.

A s sumptions by pos tulation ne

cessitate concept s by postulation .

Concept s by postulation

(unobserve d entities ) and conce pts by intuition ( the im
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me diately apprehendable ) must be e piste mically corre lated.

The validity or the o perational conce pts re sts on the valid
ity of the conce pts by postulation .
8.

The research theorist in educational administra

tion is called upon to make explicit those implicit assump
tions which undergird his theory.

The re should be no doubt ,

in the minds of those who would use a particular the ory,

about its consistency with sound social norms.
9.

Profe ssors in preparation programs for educational

administrators will do we ll to gear their programs toward im
proving the theorizing competencies of practicing and/or

potential educational administrators.

Such a program will de

mand of e very participant an examination and re finement of
his value frame of reference .

The perpe tuation of our

socie ty demands e ducational programs with le adership who se

integrity is above reproach.
10.

Everyone who theorizes must assume full re sponsi

bility for the consequences of his theory or theorie s.

The

facts do not speak for themse lves; communicate d facts are al

ways facts which have be en interpre te d and conce ptualize d by
the communicator .
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